Event Notification Report for March 21, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/20/2013 - 03/21/2013
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48840
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: AARON TUBB
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: AARON TUBB
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/21/2013
Notification Time: 10:09 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2013
Event Time: 05:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2013
Notification Time: 10:09 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2013
Event Time: 05:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
RADIATION MONITORS INOPERABLE FOR PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 0507 EDT on March 18, 2013, radiation monitor RM-01TV-3536-1, Turbine Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) was declared inoperable for pre-planned corrective maintenance. Compensatory actions were put in place to sample per the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) and the duration of the maintenance was originally not expected to take longer than 72 hours. This event is now reportable because the planned equipment outage exceeded 72 hours.
"This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety of the public or the operation of the facility. Compensatory actions remain in place to sample per requirements of ODCM.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
"This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 0507 EDT on March 18, 2013, radiation monitor RM-01TV-3536-1, Turbine Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) was declared inoperable for pre-planned corrective maintenance. Compensatory actions were put in place to sample per the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) and the duration of the maintenance was originally not expected to take longer than 72 hours. This event is now reportable because the planned equipment outage exceeded 72 hours.
"This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety of the public or the operation of the facility. Compensatory actions remain in place to sample per requirements of ODCM.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 48841
Rep Org: EI DUPONT DE NEMOURS, PENCADER SITE
Licensee:
Region: 1
City: NEWARK State: DE
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHIRLEY STEWART
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee:
Region: 1
City: NEWARK State: DE
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHIRLEY STEWART
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 03/21/2013
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2013
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
EI DuPont de Nemours and Company Inc.(DuPont) during a routine periodic audit identified that one tritium exit sign was missing from a doorway at their Pencader Site. It is believed that the sign was misplaced during recent remodeling/construction in the area.
A thorough search has been conducted by both the demolition vendor and DuPont and the sign is presumed lost. The missing sign was a Betalux E-Series, Model 171, Serial Number C090859 with a manufacture date of 7/2012. There was 21.6 curies of tritium gas in the sign at the date of manufacture.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
EI DuPont de Nemours and Company Inc.(DuPont) during a routine periodic audit identified that one tritium exit sign was missing from a doorway at their Pencader Site. It is believed that the sign was misplaced during recent remodeling/construction in the area.
A thorough search has been conducted by both the demolition vendor and DuPont and the sign is presumed lost. The missing sign was a Betalux E-Series, Model 171, Serial Number C090859 with a manufacture date of 7/2012. There was 21.6 curies of tritium gas in the sign at the date of manufacture.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48842
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CHRIS LAWS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CHRIS LAWS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/22/2013
Notification Time: 06:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2013
Event Time: 22:40 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2013
Notification Time: 06:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2013
Event Time: 22:40 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MOMENTARY INNER AND OUTER REACTOR BUILDING ACCESS DOORS OPEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
"During performance of surveillance OSP-CONT-M102, secondary containment had been declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.A had been entered.
"Operations personnel performing the surveillance were holding the inner door open and testing the outer door interlock. When the individual presented his badge to the badge reader and attempted to open the outer door, the door opened. Per the surveillance contingency actions, the individual immediately shut the door. Momentarily, both the inner and outer reactor building access doors were open.
"The surveillance was completed with no further issues. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.A was exited and secondary containment was declared operable.
"There were no radiological releases associated with this event.
"No safety system actuations or isolations occurred."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DIEGO SUAREZ TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 17:55 EDT ON 3/25/2013 * * *
"The licensee is retracting this event based on the following: During subsequent evaluation for reportability, guidance in NUREG-1022 was reviewed. NUREG-1022 provides that removal of a system or part of a system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function) is generally not reportable.
"In the case of this event, the secondary containment system was removed from service as part of a planned surveillance test. TS Action 3.6.4.1.A was entered as directed by the governing surveillance procedure in anticipation of the airlock interlock testing which, by the very nature of the test, could result in both doors in a given airlock being open simultaneously.
"The event described above should not have been reported in consideration of the guidance provided in NUREG-1022 and did not constitute a reportable event as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Pick).
"During performance of surveillance OSP-CONT-M102, secondary containment had been declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.A had been entered.
"Operations personnel performing the surveillance were holding the inner door open and testing the outer door interlock. When the individual presented his badge to the badge reader and attempted to open the outer door, the door opened. Per the surveillance contingency actions, the individual immediately shut the door. Momentarily, both the inner and outer reactor building access doors were open.
"The surveillance was completed with no further issues. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.A was exited and secondary containment was declared operable.
"There were no radiological releases associated with this event.
"No safety system actuations or isolations occurred."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DIEGO SUAREZ TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 17:55 EDT ON 3/25/2013 * * *
"The licensee is retracting this event based on the following: During subsequent evaluation for reportability, guidance in NUREG-1022 was reviewed. NUREG-1022 provides that removal of a system or part of a system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function) is generally not reportable.
"In the case of this event, the secondary containment system was removed from service as part of a planned surveillance test. TS Action 3.6.4.1.A was entered as directed by the governing surveillance procedure in anticipation of the airlock interlock testing which, by the very nature of the test, could result in both doors in a given airlock being open simultaneously.
"The event described above should not have been reported in consideration of the guidance provided in NUREG-1022 and did not constitute a reportable event as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Pick).