| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/01/2013 - 03/04/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 48762 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: WELDSONIX INC.
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 05718
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/17/2013
Notification Time: 00:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2013
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCONNECT FROM RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The State of Texas submitted the following via email:
"On February 16, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was contacted by the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for QSA Global requesting reciprocity to work in the State of Texas. The RSO stated they had been contacted by a Texas licensee who requested the recovery of an iridium - 192 source at a work site near the city of Jacksonville, Texas. The source was out of a Sentinel model 880 exposure device. The RSO stated that the disconnect occurred at about 0900 hours [CST] during the first exposure of the day on February 16, 2013. The RSO stated that the dose rate at the exposure device was 5 millirem per hour leading them to believe the source was still in the collimator. At 2134 hours the RSO for QSA Global contacted the Agency and reported that the source had been recovered. The individual recovering the source received 10 millirem during the recovery. No overexposures occur due to this event. The source and exposure device will be returned to the manufacturer for inspection. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
TX Incident # I - 9060
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO CHARLES TEAL AT 0753 EST ON 02/19/13 * * *
"The Texas incident number for this event has been changed to I-9042. The spelling of the company's name has been corrected."
Notified R4DO (Hagar) and FSME Event Resource. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48776 | Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: PRINCE WILLIAM HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: MANASSAS State: VA
County:
License #: 683-166-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 02/22/2013
Notification Time: 09:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/13/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSE DURING MEDICAL PROCEDURE
"On December 13, 2012, a patient received a permanent implant of I-125 seeds to the prostate as part of a combined external beam treatment and brachytherapy. It was determined during a post-surgical CT that the tumor may have been underdosed and a follow-up MRI was performed. As a result of the MRI, it was discovered, on February 21, 2013, that the dose received for the brachytherapy was 70 percent of the written directive. The licensee will submit a written report to the Virginia Radiation Materials Program."
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48796 | Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY CHITWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/01/2013
Notification Time: 04:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2013
Event Time: 21:54 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | Event Text EMERGENCY BUS INADVERTENTLY DE-ENERGIZED WITH UNIT DEFUELED
"On February 28, 2013, at 2154 PST, Unit 2 4kV ESF Bus G deenergized while attempting a repair to the bus automatic transfer circuitry. The deenergization of 4kV ESF Bus G initiated a start signal to Diesel Generator 2-1, which supplies emergency power to 4kV ESF Bus G. Diesel Generator 2-1 did not start due to being placed in manual control to prevent starting automatically during the repair. However, a valid actuation signal was generated to start Diesel Generator 2-1. As the Diesel Generator was shut down and in manual control, no actuation occurred.
"This is reportable as a valid system actuation that was not part of a pre-planned sequence during testing.
"Unit 2 is currently defueled, with the core offloaded into the spent fuel pool. No loss of cooling occurred as spent fuel pool cooling equipment had been selected to unaffected buses.
"The NRC resident has been notified." |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48797 | Rep Org: FLOWSERVE
Licensee: ANCHOR DARLING
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/01/2013
Notification Time: 11:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/29/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
NRC HQ PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - WEDGE PIN FAILURE IN ANCHOR DARLING MOTOR OPERATED DOUBLE DISC GATE VALVES WITH THREADED STEM TO UPPER WEDGE CONNECTIONS
The following is a summary of information received from Flowserve via facsimile:
"This is to notify the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission that, in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR Part 21, we have identified a potential issue and are submitting our evaluation of the event.
"Flowserve has been working with the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant to investigate the failure of a Size 10, Class 900 Anchor/Darling motor-operated double-disc gate valve. The failure was due to the shearing of the wedge pin which serves a joint locking function at the threaded interface between the valve stem and upper wedge. The pin is designed to ensure that the joint does not loosen due to vibration and other secondary loads. On some valve designs, the pin also is used to attach the disc retainers to the upper wedge. The pin shearing allowed rotation of the stem during the closing stroke when the valve was seating and ultimately resulted in loss of the stem to upper wedge joint integrity.
"Flowserve has completed an evaluation of the failure and concluded the root cause of the wedge pin failure was excessive load on the pin. The stem operating torque exceeded the torque to tighten the stem into the upper wedge before installation of the wedge pin. The additional stem torque produced a load on the wedge pin creating a stress which exceeded the pin shear strength causing the failure. The recommended assembly stem torque did not envelope the operating torque for the TVA application providing the potential for an over load situation and ultimate failure. The operating torque for the TVA valve was unusually high due to the fast closing time of the actuator and very conservative closing thrust margin.
"This situation can potentially occur on any Anchor/Darling type double-disc gate valve with a threaded stem to upper wedge connection, typically size 2.5" and larger, operated by an actuator that applies torque on the stem to produce the required valve operating thrust. An operating stem torque greater than the assembly stem torque can provide the opportunity for excessive pin load and potentially failure.
"We have reviewed our records, and the only similar wedge pin failure that we can identify, in addition to the Browns Ferry problems, is a sheared wedge pin at LaSalle Nuclear Station in 1993. Our investigation of the LaSalle failure concluded that the wedge pin failed due to excessive torque in the opening direction due to bonnet over pressurization.
"Flowserve recommends that all critical Anchor/Darling Double-Disc Gate valves with threaded stem to upper wedge connections and actuators that produce a torque on the stem be evaluated for potential wedge pin failure. Valves with electric motor actuators which produce high output torques are the most susceptible to failure. Valves which were assembled with stem torques that exceed the operating torque are not candidates for failure.
"Below is a list, based on our records, of customers, utilities and nuclear plants which were supplied with Anchor/Darling Double-Disc Gate valves with motor actuators on contracts with ASME Section III and/or 10 CFR 21 imposed.
"Flowserve plans to provide each of the customers identified [below] with a copy of this notification letter."
The following facilities in the United States may be affected:
ANO 1, Browns Ferry, Brunswick, Callaway, Catawba, Clinton, Columbia, Cook, Cooper, Crystal River, Dresden, Diablo Canyon, Duane Arnold, Fitzpatrick, Fort Calhoun, Grand Gulf, Hatch, Indian Point, Kewaunee, LaSalle, Limerick, Maine Yankee, Millstone, Monticello, Nine Mile, North Anna, Oconee, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom, Perry, Pilgrim, Prairie Island, Quad Cities, River Bend, Robinson, San Onofre, St. Lucie, Surry, Three Mile Island 2, Waterford, VC Summer, Vermont Yankee, Wolf Creek.
See Related Part 21 EN #48650. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48798 | Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CRYDOM, INC
Region: 1
City: DANBURY State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WEINSTEIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 03/01/2013
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - DUAL ALARM MODULES THAT MAY CONTAIN FAULTY DIODES IN SINGLE STATE RELAYS
The following is excerpted from a facsimile received from Curtis Wright:
"Crydom Inc., the sole supplier to Scientech of D4D07 Solid State Relays (SSRs) since before
2009, has informed Scientech that SSRs provided with date codes between 0908 (August 2009) and 1004 (April 2010) may have included faulty diodes which resulted in reduced reliability (early failure) of their SSRs.
"The mode of failure is that the module output may not be able to maintain voltage sufficient to activate its external load. It appears that this failure occurs randomly after some duration of operation, typically weeks or months. No common cause has been found.
"Scientech screens components for infantile failure by burning-in modules for a minimum of 48 hours prior to final test. There were no SSR failures during burn-in of potentially affected modules; therefore burn-in was not an effective screen for this issue.
"Prior to January 2013, Scientech did not track SSRs by date code. In establishing conservative boundaries for product shipped with suspect SSRs, Scientech can be certain that no suspect SSRs were shipped in Scientech products prior to August 2009 (the earliest suspect date code). It was determined in September 2012 that Scientech did not have any SSRs with a date code of 2010 or earlier in inventory or work-in-progress. Scientech can therefore determine that products shipped after September 2012 do not contain suspect SSRs."
Affected components:
DAM801, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM801 (/1 optional),
Part number EIP-E287PA-1
SAM801, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM801 (11 optional),
Part number EIP-E289PA-1
DAM502, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM502, Part number
EIP-E297DD-1, -2, -3
SAM502, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM502, Part number
EIP-E297DD-4
DAM503, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM503, Part number
EIP-E304DD-1, -2, -3
SAM503, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM503, Part number
EIP-E304DD-4, -20
DAM504, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM504, Part number
NUS-A131PA
Affected Facilities:
Beaver Valley
Farley
Ginna
Indian Point 2/3
Kewaunee
North Anna
Prairie Island
Surry
Turkey Point |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48801 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KENNETH GRACIA
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 03/01/2013
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: 10:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | Event Text 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION OF INOPERABLE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VALVE BASED ON NRC BULLETIN 80-14
"Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Valve Declared Inoperable.
"On March 1, 2013 at 1045 hours, with the reactor at 94% core thermal power (CTP), a scram discharge volume valve, CV-302-22B was declared inoperable as required by station procedural direction due to an observed degradation in opening stroke timing during performance of a compensatory surveillance test of the Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Vent and Drain Valve. This report is provided consistent with NRC IE Bulletin 80-14.
"Currently, station engineering is evaluating the valve stroke time trend data of CV-302-22B and plans to address this issue will be developed as part of the Corrective Action Program (CAP). Pilgrim Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.G applies due to the inoperability of CV-302-22B.
"This notification is being made in accordance with the NRC IE Bulletin 80-14, 'Degradation of BWR Scram Discharge Volume Capability,' Part A.3., which states, 'By procedures, require that the SDV vent and drain valve be normally operable, open and periodically tested. If these valves are not operable or are closed for more than 1 hour in any 24 hour period during operation, the reason shall be logged and the NRC notified within 24 hours (Prompt Notification).'
"A similar event report was generated for the same valve on February 18, 2013. Compensatory measures applicable to the original event report included a revised lubrication application and additional surveillance testing. Although surveillance tests subsequent to the original February 18, 2013 tested demonstrated valve operability, the initial March 1, 2013 test did not meet opening stroke time operability requirements for the valve. Subsequent stroke time testing has met the opening stroke time operability requirements for the valve.
"This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public.
"The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
See similar event EN #48766. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48802 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC MARTINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 03/02/2013
Notification Time: 00:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: 22:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2013 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
ELMO COLLINS (R4RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
JASON KOZAL (IRD)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS
On 3/1/2013 at 2242 CST, Wolf Creek Unit 1 declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) due to both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) being unavailable: With the 'A' EDG out of service for planned maintenance, the 'B' EDG was discovered to have high governor oil level and was declared inoperable at 2235 CST.
The governor oil level was adjusted and the 'B' EDG was declared operable at 2307 CST. The NOUE was terminated on 3/21/2013 at 2321 CST. Normal offsite power was maintained to the plant and no offsite assistance was requested.
The licensee notified state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email). | |