| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/14/2012 - 12/17/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 48567 | Rep Org: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: AGRI INDUSTRIAL PLASTICS CO.
Region: 3
City: FAIRFIELD State: IA
County:
License #: GL 3111-1-51-
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDY DAHLING
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 12/07/2012
Notification Time: 09:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2012
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
FSME RESOURCES (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STATIC ELIMINATOR MISSING
The licensee reported to the State of Iowa that they could not account for one static eliminator, NRD model P-2021, which contains a nominal 10 mCi Po-210 source. The State is investigating and will update this report when more information is obtained.
* * * UPDATE FROM RANDAL DAHLIN TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/10/12 AT 1527 EST * * *
The following information was received by facsimile:
"AGRI Industrial Plastics reported the loss of an NRD static eliminator model P-2021, serial number A2HW186 that contained a nominal activity of 0.37 GBq (10 mCi) Po-210 sealed source. The general license registrant had received seven static eliminators from NRD on October 12, 2011. The RSO for the facility discovered the device in question to be lost on December 6, 2012. The apparent cause for the lost device is human error and inattention to detail. The remaining six devices were shipped back to NRD on December 7, 2012. The corrective action for this event is that AGRI Industrial Plastics will no longer use static eliminators that contain radioactive material."
Notified the R3DO (Cameron) and the FSME Resources via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48571 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: GEOLOGIC ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: SAN BERNARDINO State: CA
County: SAN BERNARDINO
License #: 6147-36
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 12/07/2012
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2012
Event Time: 08:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-ma)
ILTAB (E-ma)
MEXICO (Fax)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text TRUCK STOLEN WITH LOCKED HYDROPROBE GAUGE IN BED OF TRUCK
The following information was received via E-mail:
"The RSO for GeoLogic Associates notified the RHB [Radiologic Health Branch] that a CPN DR-503 hydroprobe #H330306914 (containing 1.85 GBq (50 mCi) of Am-241:Be) was found to be stolen on 12/7/2012. The hydroprobe's Type A transportation case was locked with two padlocks, out of sight in the rear bed of the employee's personal vehicle; a Honda Ridgeline. The vehicle was reported as stolen to the Riverside City Police Department, report #P12177015, on 12/7/2012.
"A notice for return of the stolen hydroprobe will be placed in the local newspaper if the stolen vehicle containing the hydroprobe is not recovered within 24 hours."
California Report #120712.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48590 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW BUSCH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/13/2012
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 12/13/2012
Event Time: 16:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
LOUISE LUND (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"An increased usage of Nitrogen to maintain Primary Containment pressure within specification was noticed during steady state operation. Investigation into the extra Nitrogen usage revealed that Primary Containment Leakage was in excess of that allowed per Technical Specification 3.3.3.a. No action statement is provided for leakage in excess of Technical Specification 3.3.3.a; therefore in accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.1, the reactor shall be placed in an operational condition in which the specification is not applicable. This requires the plant to be shutdown and cooled down to less than 216 degrees F.
"Additionally, this is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The primary containment was declared inoperable at 1630 EST and a normal orderly plant shutdown was commenced at 1645 EST and will be less than 215 degrees F within 10 hours.
"Investigation of containment leakage is in progress.
"An update will be provided when the plant is in an operational condition in which Technical Specification 3.3.3.a is not applicable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee has notified the State of New York.
* * * UPDATE AT 0011 EST ON 12/14/12 FROM CHRISTOPHER GRAPES TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *
"As of 2333 EST on 12/13/2012, the reactor is below 215 degrees F, and containment is no longer required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.3.3. As part of the shutdown, a manual reactor scram was initiated as part of the pre-planned shutdown sequence and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink.
"HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 1913 EST, RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point and the HPCI system initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the turbine bypass valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to the scram.
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Cold Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via shutdown cooling (SDC). The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State authorities. Notified R1DO (Holody) and NRR EO (Lund). |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48591 | Rep Org: SHAW/AREVA MOX SERVICES, LLC
Licensee: FLANDERS CSC
Region: 1
City: AIKEN State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOUG YATES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 12/14/2012
Notification Time: 09:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
PART 21 MATERIALS (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING NONCONFORMING WELDS ON A PELLET HANDLING TRANSFER GLOVE BOX
The following information was provided by Shaw/AREVA via fax:
(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
"Kelly D. Trice
President and Chief Operating Officer
Shaw AREVA MOX Services
Savannah River Site
P.O. Box 7097
Aiken, SC 29804-7097
(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility is addressing nonconforming welds and a weld process associated with the procurement of a pellet handling transfer glove box PML*GB100C.
(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"The pellet handling glove box is being supplied to MOX Services as a basic component by Flanders CSC.
(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"PML*GB100C has a total of 32 welds that will need repair which will require adding additional fillet welds on top of the current weld such that the weld is large enough to satisfy structural requirements. Each weld will have to have at least a 3mm fillet weld added. Adding these additional welds will most likely have to be applied in two or three weld passes per location to create the needed weld dimension.
"The boss was attached to the glove box using a fillet weld on top (Outer) and a single bevel weld on the inside. This does not allow for complete joint penetration between the fillet and bevel welds resulting in a weld with incomplete fusion. weakening the joint significantly and creating the possibility for high stress concentration areas in the weld joint.
"Furthermore, using the GMAW (Gas Metal Arc Welding) short circuit arc process in this joint design produces a joint that cannot be counted on to carry load. When the GMAW short circuit arc weld process is used on material of ?" or less in thickness, it allows for adequate heat to be transferred into the material to provide proper fusion of the filler material into the base material. When using the GMAW short circuit arc weld process on material over ?", the mass of the base material results in a heat sink that is too large for the process to adequately fuse the filler material with the base material creating a weld that looks acceptable but could fail under small loads. In the PML boxes, these bosses support internal equipment and also support the glove box itself. Under this condition during a seismic event, the bosses could break away from the glove box shell breaking the confinement boundary as well as the flanges on each end, possibly causing the box to fall which could affect its static confinement barrier safety function. An additional seventeen glove boxes previously received are being reviewed for similar issues.
(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
"The deviation was identified in a non-conformance report on October 18, 2012.
(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply. the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
"MOX Services does not possess information as to whether other facilities have been supplied a similar basic component by Flanders CSC.
(vii) The corrective action. which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
"Non-Conformance Report NCR 12-4583 will disposition the repairs associated with Flanders glove box PML* GB100C. MOX Services will ensure repairs are performed by either the vendor, MOX Services or a third party. These repairs will be performed in support of the construction schedule.
(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"None.
(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
"This is not an early site permit concern." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48595 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/14/2012
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2012
Event Time: 13:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN - CONTROL STRUCTURE CHILLERS INOPERABLE
"At 1350 on 12/14/2012, both Control Structure Chillers at Susquehanna were rendered inoperable. This event required entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3 for both Units. Per Susquehanna procedures, after 1 hour, a power reduction must be commenced. Tech Spec 3.0.3 requires that action be taken within one hour to place the Unit in Mode 3 within 13 hours and Mode 4 within 37 hours.
"Physical power reduction commenced at 1453 for Unit 1 and 1459 for Unit 2.
"The 'A' Control Structure Chiller was previously inoperable for routine maintenance. The system was in service for post maintenance testing and activities were underway to swap to the opposite train to allow removal of test instrumentation and fan belt tensioning for equipment associated with the 'A' Control Structure HVAC system. At 1350, the 'B' Control Structure loop circulating pump tripped, rendering the 'B' Control Structure Chiller inoperable.
"This condition requires immediate entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3. Both Control Structure Chillers are inoperable and this report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as a shutdown required by Tech Specs, and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of a Safety Function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Efforts are underway to restore at least one system to operable status in parallel with Unit shutdown activities."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying the State of Pennsylvania.
* * * UPDATE FROM ALEX MCLELLAN TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2228 EST ON 12/14/12 * * *
"On 12/14/12 at 1500 EST Susquehanna Steam Electric Station reported a shutdown had been commenced at 1453 EST for Unit 1 and 1459 EST for Unit 2 due to inoperability of both Control Structure Chillers. At 1750 EST the 'A' Control Structure Chiller was declared operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. Power reduction for both Units was halted at 1750 and preparations for power restoration initiated. On 12/14/12 Unit 1 power was restored to 98% at 1819 EST and Unit 2 power was restored to 98% at 1943 EST, the maximum power output possible based on grid conditions for Unit 1 and thermal limits for Unit 2."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Holody) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48596 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/14/2012
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2012
Event Time: 13:06 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTROL BUILDING EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR TWO MINUTES
"At approximately 1306 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST), Brunswick Nuclear Plant lost the operability of both trains of Control Building Emergency Ventilation (CREV) for approximately two minutes. This is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"At the time of the event, Brunswick was implementing a modification to upgrade its control building fire detection. In support of short duration circuitry work on the detectors, CREV train A was placed in service manually in compliance with the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). This action prevents an auto-start of the opposite CREV train B, and thus Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3 Condition A was entered to restore CREV train B to service within 7 days.
"During work to electrically isolate ('jumper') one of the fire detectors associated with CREV train A fire protection, electrical continuity was lost. This caused the detector to fail safe, sending an internal charcoal fire signal to the CREV train A circuitry and shutting it down. With CREV train A shut down due to the signal, TS 3.7.3 Required Action C.1 applied for both CREV trains inoperable, requiring both Units to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours. Actions were taken to immediately re-establish the circuitry, which re-started CREV train A, and TS 3.7.3 Required Action C.1 was exited.
"This condition did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
"The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The CREV function was only inoperable for approximately two minutes. Though considered inoperable, CREV train B remained available and could have been placed in service at any time by alternating the train A and train B control switches."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48597 | Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM HELSEL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 12/15/2012
Notification Time: 10:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/15/2012
Event Time: 07:34 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/15/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER COOLING FAN INOPERABLE
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 based on 'Loss of Response' capability.
"This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 0734 EST on 12/15/2012 AH-17, the Technical Support Center (TSC) Cooling Fan was found exhibiting no flow. The cause of the no flow condition was a broken fan belt. Repairs are being planned and will be worked immediately.
"TSC functionality requires all areas of the TSC be maintained between 50 degrees F and 86 degrees F. The actual TSC area temperatures range from 59 degrees F to 67 degrees F.
"Should the TSC need to be activated for an event, . . . compensatory measures are in place to consider relocating the TSC to the Alternate Emergency Facility per PEP-240. This decision would he based on the existing event conditions and coordinated with the Emergency Response Manager, SEC-MCR, and Radiological Control Manager."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48598 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ALEX McLLELLAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 12/16/2012
Notification Time: 04:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/16/2012
Event Time: 01:56 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/16/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR SCRAM FROM 98% POWER DURING TURBINE CONTROL VALVE TESTING
"At approximately 01:56 hours on December 16, 2012, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor automatically scrammed while performing testing of the number 2 control valve per the station surveillance testing program. The number 2 control valve closure initiated a 1/2 scram in the reactor protection system as designed; specifically the 'B1' channel. Evaluation of plant data indicates that an 'A' scram channel signal was activated during the time period the number 2 control valve scram signal was active, thereby causing a full reactor scram. The cause of the 'A' scram channel signal is not understood at this time and is under investigation.
"A second reactor scram signal was received at approximately 02:10 hours due to reactor water level lowering to 13 inches. Reactor water level was restored above the trip setpoint. All control rods inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped at -38 inches. Reactor water level lowered to -48.5 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) and level 2 (-38 inches) isolations.
"HPCI and RCIC both automatically initiated and were overridden by control room operators after water level was restored. All isolations and initiations at this level occurred as expected. No steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected.
"This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4 hour reports, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an 8 hour report.
"The unit 2 reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the reactor scram is underway.
"Unit 1 continued power operation.
"The NRC resident inspectors were notified. A press release will occur." The licensee will be notifying the State authorities. | |