| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/07/2012 - 12/10/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 48546 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: HOUSTON REFINING LP
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 00187
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 11/29/2012
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2012
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
MEXICO (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST X-RAY FLUORESCENCE ANALYZER
The following was submitted by the State of Texas via email:
"On November 19, 2012, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that they could not locate a Thermo Niton model number XL-II x-ray fluorescence analyzer. The device contains a 10 millicurie cadmium - 109 source and a 20 millicurie iron - 59 source. The radiation safety officer thought the device had been shipped to the manufacturer, but after he was unable to find any shipping papers for the device, he determined the device was missing. The licensee does not believe the lost device poses an exposure hazard to members of the general public. The investigation into this event is on going. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I - 9019
* * * UPDATE AT 1513 EST ON 12/4/12 FROM ART TUCKER TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following update was received from the State of Texas via email:
"The Agency [State of Texas] contacted the device manufacturer and was informed that the device requires a password to operate. The Agency [State of Texas] contacted the licensee who stated the password feature was active and that the password would not have been included in the container with the device.
"The device contains a 20 millicurie iron - 55 source and not a iron - 59 source as previously reported. The date of the event was November 29, 2012, not November 19, 2012 as stated in the Event Narrative."
Notified R4DO (Deese) and FSME Events Resource, ILTAB and MEXICO via email/fax.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48566 | Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MARTY ARNOLD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 12/07/2012
Notification Time: 09:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2012
Event Time: 09:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PLANNED EMERGENCY OFFSITE FACILITY/TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION MAINTENANCE
"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability.
"On December 7, 2012, the EOF/TSC air handler chiller unit was removed from service to perform planned maintenance. This maintenance activity will not affect the air filtration portion of the system and these facilities remain available for use during an emergency. This maintenance activity will be performed in a manner to minimize the time that the air handler chiller is out of service. This maintenance activity impacts the ability to maintain ambient air temperature in the facilities. The estimated duration of this activity is planned to be 12 hours.
"If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the emergency response facilities, the EOF and TSC will be utilized. The Emergency Response Organization team members have the ability to relocate to alternate locations in accordance with emergency implementing procedures based on conditions. Alternate emergency response facilities will remain available in the event that relocation is necessary. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An update message will be provided when the emergency response facilities are restored."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local authorities.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE HEBLER TO PETE SNYDER AT 1948 EST ON 12/7/12 * * *
The licensee completed maintenance and returned the EOF/TSC air handler chiller unit to service as of 1920 EST on 12/7/12.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48568 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIM TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 12/07/2012
Notification Time: 10:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2012
Event Time: 10:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 60-DAY TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On October 9, 2012, at 1050 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), the 2A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) Set Voltage Regulator failed causing the 2A1 Circuit Protector to trip on undervoltage, resulting in a half scram. In addition, the loss of 2A RPS caused the isolation of Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8, which resulted in the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) Trains 'A' and 'C' and the isolation of the 2-RM-90-256 Continuous Air Monitor (CAM), inboard valves, Drywell floor drain inboard isolation valve, and the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU).
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level, High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Vessel High Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level, High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist, therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"The affected equipment responded as designed.
"This condition was the result of the failure of the 2A RPS MG Set voltage regulator. To address this condition, the failed voltage regulator was replaced.
"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report 621027.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48569 | Rep Org: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT
Licensee: FISHER DIVISION
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRISH CROSSER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 12/07/2012
Notification Time: 09:53 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2012
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (E-MA)
| Event Text PART 21 - BRACKETS USED PROXIMITY SWITCHES INSTALLED UPSIDE DOWN
"Equipment Affected By This Fisher Information Notice:
"This Fisher Information Notice (FIN) applies to equipment provided to Arizona Public Service Company-Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station per Fisher Order Number 019-F10051845, Items 0001, 0002, 0004, and 0005 (Arizona Public Service PO# 500559374).
"The affected equipment Is:
"4 [inch] CL900 Fisher HPD valve assemblies with TopWorx C8-24521-E3 proximity switches.
"The equipment is identified by Fisher serial numbers 20417605, 20428975, 20428977, and 20428978 respectively and Arizona Public Service Company tag numbers 1JSGEUV0169, 2JSGEUV0169, 1JSGEUV0183, and 2JSGEUV0183.
"Purpose:
"The purpose of this FIN is to alert Arizona Public Service Company that as of 9 November, 2012, Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) became aware of a situation which may potentially affect the safety-related performance of the aforementioned equipment.
"Fisher is informing you of this circumstance in accordance with Section 21.21 (b) of 10 CFR 21.
"Applicability:
"This FIN applies only to the aforementioned equipment supplied by Fisher to Arizona Public Service Company- Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
"Discussion:
"Arizona Public Service Company has determined that the brackets used to install the TopWorx switches were installed improperly by Fisher.
"Specifically, the mounting brackets for the switches were installed upside down. This orientation makes it impossible for the switches to operate properly and to perform their safety-related function.
"While the design used for these brackets was unique and constituted a first-time installation by Fisher, Fisher is in the process of performing a root cause analysis as well as investigating why the error was not detected prior to shipment. Fisher will implement a corrective action to prevent problems like this from reoccurring in the future.
"Additionally specific arrangements are being made with Arizona Public Service Company to correct the problem on the subject serial numbers, at Fisher's cost.
"Action Required:
"Fisher is currently working with Arizona Public Service Company to resolve the situation, including, the implementation of a bracket redesign and testing program to demonstrate the problem has been satisfactorily corrected.
"10 CFR 21 Implications:
"Fisher requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 21.
"If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact:
"George Baitinger;
Manager, Quality;
Fisher Controls International LLC;
205 South Center Street Marshalltown, IA 50158;
Fax: (641) 754-2854, Phone: (641) 745-2026." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48570 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 12/07/2012
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2012
Event Time: 10:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TEMPERATURE SWITCH FAILURE CAUSES DIVISION I ISOLATION SIGNAL
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On October 12, 2012, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) received a Division I primary containment isolation signal which resulted in the closure of Group 5, 6, and 10 primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in the following systems:
"Group 5 PCIVs: Residual Heat Removal System (RHS); Shutdown Cooling (SDC);
"Group 6 PCIVs: Reactor Water Cleanup System (WCS) supply outside isolation valve; and
"Group 10 PCIVs: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System.
"All affected PCIVs responded as designed. The Division I isolation signal was generated due to the failure of a temperature switch unit. The Division I and II temperature switch units were both reading within limits when the Division I unit failed. Since the isolation signal was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation, the isolation signal was determined to be invalid.
"The event was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2012-009380. There were no safety consequences and no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."
The licensee notified the New York State Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48572 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRYAN CURRIER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 12/07/2012
Notification Time: 18:27 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2012
Event Time: 14:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY - EMPLOYEE HAD A CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
A non-licensed, non-supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |