Event Notification Report for August 29, 2012

PARTIAL LOSS OF PLANT RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM REMOTE READOUT

"On August 29, 2012, power was removed from SCADA B of the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) to perform a planned system modification. During this period, data for most Unit 2 radiation monitors will not be electronically available in the emergency response facilities and will not be supplied to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), if activated. System alarms and data displays will still be available to the plant operators in the Control Room. The expected duration of RMS remote data partial inoperability is approximately 72 hours. The loss of Unit 2 remote readout capability requires compensatory measures to be used for the acquisition of radiological data in the emergency response facilities. These compensatory measures have been communicated to the emergency response organization. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the portions of the RMS are inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An update message will be provided when the RMS is restored.

"The NRC Resident and Region IV EP Inspectors have been notified."


* * * UPDATE FROM ALAN MARZLOFF TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1921 EDT ON 8/31/2012 * * *

"This is a follow-up to ENS report number 48247. The Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) alarms and data displays have been restored to the Comanche Peak emergency response facilities (ERFs) following completion of planned system modifications. The emergency assessment capability of the Comanche Peak emergency response facilities have been re-established [as of 1821 CDT]. The NRC Resident has been notified."

Notified R4DO (Azua).

ARIZONA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ARIZONA WORKER CONTAMINATED WHILE WORKING AT LOS ALAMOS IN NEW MEXICO
The following information was obtained from the state of Arizona via email:

"On Saturday, August 25, 2012, the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency was informed by Tempe Fire Department that they responded to a 911 call for assistance from a private citizen who indicated that he may have received a possible radiation exposure/contamination while working at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. The Tempe Fire Department conducted a radiation survey and found that the shoes were the source of the radioactive contamination.

"At 2315 hours MDT, on August 25, 2012, DOE Region 4 sent a radiological response team to Tempe, AZ to investigate and perform a radiological survey of the item/s reported with the radiation contamination. A radiation survey, using a Ludlum survey meter with a beta detector, provided a positive result for contamination on a few articles, bottom of both shoes (350 cpm above background) and a pair of underwear (measured 850 cpm above background).

"On Tuesday August 28, 2012, the following occurred:

-The source of the contamination as reported by DOE RAP Teams Region 4 is Technetium-99. (Half-Life is 211,000 years and is a Beta emitter)
-It is reported that 13 to 16 individuals may be contaminated with the Tc99.
-It is reported that several automobiles and other personal articles have been located in New Mexico and were moved to an isolated area.
-ARRA laboratory is now in possession/control of the clothing and will conduct a laboratory analysis to determine and confirm the source of the radioactive material.
-ARRA reported levels of Beta Radiation several times above background on both the shoes and underwear.
-DOE Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Management team has recovered the contaminated items from ARRA with a chain of custody for the record.

"The Los Alamos National Laboratory has released the following information regarding this event:

" 'Los Alamos National Laboratory is investigating the inadvertent spread of some Technetium-99 by employees and contractors at the Lujan Neutron Scattering Center at LANSCE [Los Alamos Neutron Science Center]. It's been determined that about a dozen people were exposed, and some tracked small amounts of Technetium 99 off-site. The contamination poses no danger to the public.

" 'The Laboratory and Department of Energy RAP teams (Radiological Assistance Program) have been working to survey, assess, and where needed, decontaminate all affected people and property. The teams will continue to address all possible escape paths to be certain that all off-site contamination has been appropriately characterized and remediated. So far, based on multiple direct measurements, no exposures to Lab workers or the public pose a health risk.'"

"The Agency [ Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency] continues to investigate.

"The Governor's Office, state of New Mexico and the U.S. NRC are being notified of this event."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST THEN RECOVERED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Virginia via facsimile:

"On August 29, 2012 at 10:30 a.m., the licensee reported that a Troxler Model 3440 portable density gauge was missing. The gauge, in its transport case, apparently fell from the licensee's truck during transport. The licensee notified the local law enforcement and initiated a search for the gauge. At 11:45 a.m., the licensee reported that the gauge had been found by a local resident who called the licensee. The RSO verified that neither the gauge nor the transport case was damaged. The Virginia Radioactive Material Program is investigating the cause of the incident."

Virginia Event Number: VA-12-05

LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY DUE TO LIMITED RANGE ON INDICATOR

"This is a non-emergency report regarding a condition that does not apply in our current operating mode. No actual event has occurred.

"At 0827 hours EDT, on August 29, 2012, Harris Operations discovered that the instrumentation used for determination of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) during Modes 5 and 6 for loss of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory would not provide the required information. Specifically, the criterion states that an Alert should be declared if standpipe level is less than -96.5 inches (72% on the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System [RVLIS]). During a loss of inventory from the reactor vessel below the RCS loop nozzles, the standpipe indication would not reflect a level below -95.5 inches. This condition was discovered during an assessment of EAL implementing procedures in response to industry operating experience.

"There is no adverse impact on nuclear safety. All Site Emergency Coordinators and Emergency Response Managers will be directed to use the alternate RVLIS indication to ensure emergency classifications continue to be accurately assessed, which will also be communicated in a shift order. The EAL guidance will be revised to fully resolve the issue in an expeditious manner.

"This report is submitted based upon a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with º50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

EVACUATION ROUTE UNAVAILABLE DUE TO FLOODING FROM HURRICANE ISAAC

"This is a non-emergency notification being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of emergency preparedness capabilities. At approximately 1530 CDT, Entergy Operations, Inc. was informed of a road closure which could impact the ability to perform a potential evacuation required by the Waterford 3 Emergency Plan.

"Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) reported that US Highway 51 to Interstate 10 was closed due to flooding from elevated water levels in Lake Pontchartrain resulting from Hurricane Isaac.

"Alternate evacuation routes remain available."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

PRIMARY PLANT COMPUTER OUT OF SERVICE

"Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Primary Plant Computer (PPC) is out of service. The PPC provides monitoring capability for the Emergency Response Data System and Safety Parameter Display System. The loss of the PPC requires alternate monitoring methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used. Therefore, appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications and communications can still be made, if required, during the time that the PPC is unavailable.

"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which is any event that results in major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. As previously stated, alternate means remain available to assess plant conditions, make notifications and accomplish required communications, as necessary."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

LOCAL CONTROL CAPABILITY OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR #2 NOT AVAILABLE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS

"On August 28, 2012, during planned maintenance on Emergency Diesel Generator No.2, a post-maintenance continuity testing associated with the Alternate Safety Shutdown (ASSD) switch on Emergency Diesel Generator No.2 (EDG 2) revealed unexpected results when the switch was taken to the LOCAL position. Troubleshooting activities determined the switch to be operating properly, meaning the contacts are actually open. However, a current path preventing isolation of the control room circuit remained. It was determined that a wire, not identified in EDG wiring diagrams, created a short between two ASSD switch contacts.

"At 2134 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on August 29, 2012, it was concluded that the condition may impact the ability of EDG 2 to perform its intended ASSD function. In the event of a fire, an induced fault could potentially affect the ability to locally control EDG 2. Local control of EDG 2 is credited in the safe shutdown analysis. Therefore, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition.

"This condition did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. This condition has no affect on the Technical Specification operability of EDG 2 and it was fully capable of performing its intended design basis accident response functions given the as-found condition of the circuitry.

"The initial safety significance of this condition is minimal. This condition has no affect on the Technical Specification operability of EDG 2 and it was fully capable of performing its intended design basis accident response functions given the as-found condition of the circuitry.

"Repairs to the ASSD switch wiring have been completed. Post maintenance testing is occurring at this time. Planning is in progress to inspect the remaining Emergency Diesel Generators for similar conditions."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.