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Event Notification Report for December 23, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/22/2011 - 12/23/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47509 47535 47536 47546 47547

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 47509
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ALAN MCLAUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/07/2011
Notification Time: 20:40 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2011
Event Time: 14:58 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ABOVE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Following initial troubleshooting of the reactor building ventilation (VR) differential pressure (DP) control loop, the Unit 1 VR DP controller was left in manual per the troubleshooting steps. It was noted at 1458 CST, on 12/7/11, that building DP was above the TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 required value of -0.25" H20. This rendered the secondary containment inoperable. Reactor building DP was returned to within the TS requirements within 14 minutes, and following system walkdowns, secondary containment was declared operable at 1615 [CST, on] 12/7/11. Troubleshooting will continue with other excursions above -0.25" H2O possible until repairs are complete (anticipated being complete week of 12/12/11)."

This condition requires the licensee to comply with technical specifications values within 4 hours or be in Mode 3 within 12 hours.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM R. DRAPER TO P. SNYDER ON 12/22/11 AT 1440 EST * * *

"On December 7, 2011, following initial troubleshooting of the reactor building ventilation (VR) differential pressure (DP) control loop, the building DP was above the TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 value of -0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. The secondary containment was declared inoperable and determined to be a loss of safety function. During the investigation it was determined that the event occurred due to a failure in the non-safety reactor building ventilation differential pressure control loop. The safety related function of the secondary containment and the non-safely reactor building ventilation differential pressure control loop are completely independent from one another. It is recognized that reactor building DP may exceed the TS SR [Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement] 3.6.4.1.1 value due to non-safety related component failures such as system fan trips, pressure controller malfunctions, rapid air temperature changes due to blast heater trips, or station heat recovery coil issues. A failure of a non-safety component does not result in a loss of safety function. The safely function of the secondary containment is maintained by adequate leak tightness and the operable ventilation equipment required to maintain the negative pressure requirements of TS SR 3.6.4.1.1. The safety related Stand-By Gas Treatment (SGT) ventilation system performs the negative pressure safety function. The secondary containment isolation safety function, isolation dampers and SGT systems remained operable throughout the event. Therefore this event did not constitute a loss of safety function of secondary containment and this event is not reportable."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Pelke).

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Agreement State Event Number: 47535
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: KRATON POLYMERS
Region: 3
City: BELPRE State: OH
County:
License #: 31201850010
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KARL VON AHN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 12/20/2011
Notification Time: 08:14 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2011
Event Time: 11:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER FAILURE ON OHMART SH-100 PROCESS GAUGE

"At 11:30 AM December 19, 2011, the licensee's radiation safety officer provided a 24-hour telephone report notification of a shutter failure on a gauge. The gauge involved was an Ohmart SH-100, serial number 70230, containing 10 mCi of CS-137, with an assay date of Aug 1981. The shutter mechanism is a lead block screwed to a sliding aluminum plate. The licensee was removing the gauge from its mounting to replace it with a different new gauge as permitted by their license. When the licensee removed the gauge from its mounting, the lead block separated from the aluminum plate. The licensee replaced the lead shielding and secured it in place. The licensee secured the gauge from unauthorized access and will return it to the manufacturer for disposal with other gauges they are replacing. The licensee states that no personnel received radiation doses during this event."

Ohio Report #OH110005

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Agreement State Event Number: 47536
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: NUCOR-YAMATO STEEL
Region: 4
City: BLYTHEVILLE State: AR
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TAMMY KRIESEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/20/2011
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SCRAP METAL FACILITY REJECTED LOAD

The following information was provided by the state via email:

"Nucor-Yamato Steel in Blytheville, Arkansas reported to the Arkansas Radiation Control Program on December 19, 2011, that a sealed source containing radioactive material had been found in a load of scrap metal received at their facility. The broker for this load of scrap metal was The David J. Joseph Company. The load of scrap originated in Louisiana.

"Survey readings on contact with the source using a sodium iodide detector were 1.0 mR/hr. Smears taken and counted using a thin window GM detector in the field indicates that the source does not appear to be leaking.

"The source has a glass covered flange end approximately 1.125" diameter, with a fitting on the back side of approximately 0.5" diameter. Overall length is approximately 1.0". No identifying marks have been found at this time.

"The source was contained within a small can, secured within a locked storage room. The steel mill is awaiting a consultant to pick-up, identify and dispose of the source."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47546
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: LOURDES PORRO
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/22/2011
Notification Time: 09:56 [ET]
Event Date: 12/22/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PREPLANNED MAINTENANCE

"On December 22, 2011, at 1000 EST, due to pre-planned refueling outage maintenance, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system on St. Lucie Unit 1 is inoperable. The Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation system provides filtered air to the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system, therefore, the TSC ventilation system has been rendered unavailable during the course of the work activities. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation system is expected to be returned to service in 38 hours, and TSC filtered ventilation restored.

"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Should the TSC become uninhabitable, the TSC staff will relocate to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Unit 1 is currently de-fueled.

* * * UPDATE FROM CHUCK MONTANA TO VINCE KLCO AT 0459 EST ON 12/23/2011* * *

"Update 12/23/2011, 0418 EST: The U1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation has been restored to operable [status] and the TSC filtered ventilation has been restored [to operable status]."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47547
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: PATRICK WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/23/2011
Notification Time: 03:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2011
Event Time: 22:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO A POSSIBLE FAULTY TEMPERATURE SWITCH

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.

"On November 7, 2011, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) received a Division 2 reactor building pipe chase high ambient temperature isolation signal, which resulted in closure of isolation valves in the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, and the residual heat removal (RHR) system (isolation valve groups 5, 6, 7, and 10). All affected isolation valves responded as designed.

"The Division reactor building pipe chase high ambient temperature isolation signal was generated by a new NUS/Scientech ambient temperature indicating switch that had recently been installed as a replacement for the original Riley temperature switch, which is no longer being manufactured. Two temperature switches (one for Division 1 and one for Division 2) monitor the reactor building pipe chase area to detect a rise in area temperature, which is indicative of a leak in the RWCU, RCIC, or RHR system piping that exists in the area. At the time of the event, operations personnel confirmed that conditions requiring isolation of the RWCU, RCIC, and RHR systems did not exist, based on a check of the Division 1 reactor building pipe chase high ambient temperature channel and area radiation monitors. Therefore, the isolation signal was determined to be invalid. The NUS/Scientech temperature switch was subsequently removed and the original Riley temperature switch was re-installed. The apparent cause for generation of the trip signal from the new temperature indicating switch was determined to be the presence of signal noise that was not adequately filtered.

"This event was entered into the [Nine Mile Point] corrective action system as Condition Report (CR) 2011-010062. There were no safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012