Event Notification Report for October 25, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/24/2011 - 10/25/2011
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47374
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK MOEBES
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK MOEBES
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/25/2011
Notification Time: 23:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2011
Event Time: 15:34 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2011
Notification Time: 23:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2011
Event Time: 15:34 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DEFICIENCY IDENTIFIED IN TRANSITION TO PERFORMANCE BASED STANDARD FOR FIRE PROTECTION
"At 1534 on 10/25/11 Site Engineering and Licensing reported the following to the Operations Department:
"The following deficiency was identified during reviews for NFPA 805 Transition: Cable 1B11 (#12 awg - Fire Area Route 16, 17) from the shunt in the 250 VDC Battery Board 1 (0-BDDD-280-0001) compartment #1, to the control room ammeter 1-EI-57-38 mounted on Control Room Panel 1-9-8, is not fused or otherwise protected against an electrical fault. The 250 VDC Battery 1 is an un-grounded DC system. However, in a scenario where the 250 VDC Battery Board system negative becomes grounded at the same time the ammeter cable 1B11 has a fault to ground, the cable may not be protected and the cable could auto-ignite anywhere along the cables length from the ground fault location back to the battery source. For example, in a Fire Area 16 (Control Bay) scenario, these ground faults could result in a fire being spread from Fire Area 16 to Fire Area 17 (Battery Board 1). Fuses should be added to protect these cable conductors.
"A similar condition exists for the remote ammeters on Unit Battery Board 2 (Cable 2B11 - Fire Area Route 16, 18), Unit Battery Board 3 (Cable 3B11 - Fire Area Route 16, 19), Unit Battery Board 4 (Cable 2B4018 - Fire Area Route 16, 26), Unit Battery Board 5 (Cable 1B383 - Fire Area Route 16, 26), and Unit Battery Board 6 (Cable 3B336 - Fire Area Route 16, 26).
"This condition is reportable as an 8 hour notification to the NRC IAW 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'
"This is also reportable as 60 day written report IAW 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).
"Fire watch compensatory measures are in place for the Fire Areas of concern. Ref. FPIP#09-1920
"The NRC resident has been notified of this event.
"This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as PER# 452185."
"At 1534 on 10/25/11 Site Engineering and Licensing reported the following to the Operations Department:
"The following deficiency was identified during reviews for NFPA 805 Transition: Cable 1B11 (#12 awg - Fire Area Route 16, 17) from the shunt in the 250 VDC Battery Board 1 (0-BDDD-280-0001) compartment #1, to the control room ammeter 1-EI-57-38 mounted on Control Room Panel 1-9-8, is not fused or otherwise protected against an electrical fault. The 250 VDC Battery 1 is an un-grounded DC system. However, in a scenario where the 250 VDC Battery Board system negative becomes grounded at the same time the ammeter cable 1B11 has a fault to ground, the cable may not be protected and the cable could auto-ignite anywhere along the cables length from the ground fault location back to the battery source. For example, in a Fire Area 16 (Control Bay) scenario, these ground faults could result in a fire being spread from Fire Area 16 to Fire Area 17 (Battery Board 1). Fuses should be added to protect these cable conductors.
"A similar condition exists for the remote ammeters on Unit Battery Board 2 (Cable 2B11 - Fire Area Route 16, 18), Unit Battery Board 3 (Cable 3B11 - Fire Area Route 16, 19), Unit Battery Board 4 (Cable 2B4018 - Fire Area Route 16, 26), Unit Battery Board 5 (Cable 1B383 - Fire Area Route 16, 26), and Unit Battery Board 6 (Cable 3B336 - Fire Area Route 16, 26).
"This condition is reportable as an 8 hour notification to the NRC IAW 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'
"This is also reportable as 60 day written report IAW 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).
"Fire watch compensatory measures are in place for the Fire Areas of concern. Ref. FPIP#09-1920
"The NRC resident has been notified of this event.
"This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as PER# 452185."
Research Reactor
Event Number: 47375
Rep Org: RHODE ISLAND ATOMIC ENERGY COMM
Licensee: STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Region: 1
City: NARRANGANSETT State: RI
County: WASHINGTON
License #: R-95
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000193
NRC Notified By: HANK BICEHOUSE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Region: 1
City: NARRANGANSETT State: RI
County: WASHINGTON
License #: R-95
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000193
NRC Notified By: HANK BICEHOUSE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/25/2011
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2011
Event Time: 11:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2011
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/25/2011
Event Time: 11:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DUANE HARDESTY (NRR)
BETH REED (NRR)
QUICHOCHO (NRR)
SLOAN (NRR)
DUANE HARDESTY (NRR)
BETH REED (NRR)
QUICHOCHO (NRR)
SLOAN (NRR)
24 HOUR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED REPORT BASED ON A POTENTIAL OVER-EXPOSURE EVENT
At approximately 1115 EDT on 10/25/11 an intern entered the dry gamma room at the Rhode Island Nuclear Science Center Facility during an ion probe calibration procedure. The intern received an estimated unplanned dose of between 2-3 rem based on a stay time of 5 minutes in a 500 mr/min field. His dosimetry, an OSL (Optically Stimulated Luminescence) badge, has been sent to Landauer for expedited processing. The dry gamma room is properly posted as a high radiation area with administrative controls in effect to limit access. The assistant Director of the facility is performing an investigation including event reconstruction to determine the cause.
* * * UPDATE FROM JEFF DAVIS (LICENSEE) TO HUFFMAN ON 10/26/11 AT 10:03 EDT * * *
The licensee clarified that the call to the Operations Center made on 10/25/11 was a 24 hour notification required by the facility's Technical Specification 1.25.8 based on the potential for over-exposure.
NRR Backup Project Manager (Hardesty) notified.
At approximately 1115 EDT on 10/25/11 an intern entered the dry gamma room at the Rhode Island Nuclear Science Center Facility during an ion probe calibration procedure. The intern received an estimated unplanned dose of between 2-3 rem based on a stay time of 5 minutes in a 500 mr/min field. His dosimetry, an OSL (Optically Stimulated Luminescence) badge, has been sent to Landauer for expedited processing. The dry gamma room is properly posted as a high radiation area with administrative controls in effect to limit access. The assistant Director of the facility is performing an investigation including event reconstruction to determine the cause.
* * * UPDATE FROM JEFF DAVIS (LICENSEE) TO HUFFMAN ON 10/26/11 AT 10:03 EDT * * *
The licensee clarified that the call to the Operations Center made on 10/25/11 was a 24 hour notification required by the facility's Technical Specification 1.25.8 based on the potential for over-exposure.
NRR Backup Project Manager (Hardesty) notified.