| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/24/2011 - 10/25/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 47358 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: MARION L SHEPARD CANCER CENTER
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: NC
County:
License #: 0311-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHEILA NELSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 10/20/2011
Notification Time: 09:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOSS OF CONTROL OF AN I-125 BRACHYTHERAPY SEED
On October 10, 2011, North Carolina Radiation Protection (NCRP) received a call from the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at Marion L. Shepard Cancer Center in Washington, NC, informing them that on September 26, 2011, while working with I-125 brachytherapy seeds for calibration, they had discovered the loss of one of the seeds. The lost seed was a 0.346 mCi brachytherapy seed that had been received on September 23, 2011. According to the RSO, they had made every effort to locate the seed but could not find it. At that time, it was believed that the seed must have gone behind an un-movable counter in the hot lab at the hospital nuclear medicine department. The well counter they use is kept at the cancer center and taken to the hospital's nuclear medicine department when needed to assay the seeds.
According to North Carolina section .1645 of the rules, this amount did not require immediate phone notification but does require notification within 30 days by phone and a written report within 30 days of the phone notification.
On October 19, 2011, NCRP received a call from the State of Wisconsin to notify them that a licensee at the University of Wisconsin had received a well counter from NC that contained a brachytherapy seed.
It has not been the policy of the Cancer Center licensee to survey a well counter prior to shipment, since it should not contain any radioactive material, but in the future, well counters will be surveyed. The well counter belonging to the licensee was sent to Wisconsin for calibration and will be shipped back to the Marion L Shepard Cancer Center.
No personnel exposures occurred during this event.
North Carolina Incident: 11-56
Wisconsin Item Number: WI 110066 (This item received via North Carolina)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47368 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: PAT FOTI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 09:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 01:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH DIVISIONS OF THE RWCU HIGH DIFFERENTIAL FLOW ISOLATION FUNCTION REMOVED FROM SERVICE
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). On October 23, 2011 at 0915 EDT, the Division 1 Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system differential flow - high channel was declared inoperable due to failing its channel check. A troubleshooting plan was developed to determine the cause for the failed channel check. In accordance with this troubleshooting plan, at three separate times (October 24, 2011 at 0152, 0258, and 0519), both the Division 1 and Division 2 RWCU differential flow timers were placed in bypass, and Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.6.1, Condition B was entered for one or more automatic functions with isolation capability not maintained. In each of the three instances, one channel of the RWCU differential flow - high function was restored to Operable status within 1 hour as required by TS 3.3.6.1 Required Action B.1. It was believed at the time of the troubleshooting evolutions that this condition was not reportable because it was a planned maintenance evolution performed in accordance with approved procedures and the plant TS; however, further review has concluded that disabling both divisions of the RWCU differential flow - high function constitutes a reportable condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47369 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL A. KOMM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 16:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 1 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO ERRATIC IRM INDICATIONS DURING STARTUP
"While performing a startup of HNP-2, after reaching criticality, the crew observed erratic indications on two Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs), 2C51K601A and 2C51K601C. IRM 2C51K601A had been spiking and was subsequently bypassed. The 2C51K601C was spiking downscale and could not be bypassed due to the 2C51K601A being bypassed already. Both IRMs are in the 'A' RPS trip system. At the time when the second IRM was acting erratic, the crew identified the condition as both IRMs in the same quadrant and did not continue withdrawal of control rods. As a result of not withdrawing control rods, reactor power began to decrease and the crew conservatively inserted a manual reactor scram to shutdown the reactor. All rods did fully insert into the core. No PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation System] actuations occurred and none were expected to occur based on plant conditions following the scram.
"At this time, investigation is in progress, but the investigation and corrective actions have not yet been completed.
"The crew is maintaining HNP-2 in Hot Standby [Mode 3] at this time."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47370 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: AMY MCMARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 10:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEMS OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO MAINTENANCE ERROR
"On 10/24/11 at 1035 CDT, a maintenance technician performing a field walk-down of a clearance order inadvertently opened the bus potential fuse drawer for Unit 2 Safety Related Bus 23. This caused all loads of Bus 23 to receive an undervoltage (UV) load shed signal. Division I Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) pumps are powered from Bus 23 and are currently aligned to the Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) Air Conditioning system. On a loss of CCSW, the CREV Air Conditioning system is inoperable due to a loss of its emergency cooling water supply. This condition affects both Dresden Units 2 and 3. This condition lasted for approximately 7 seconds before the bus potential fuse drawer was reinserted and the Bus 23 UV condition cleared.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47372 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY OPERATION FACILITY OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY
" At 1715 hours on 10/24/2011, replacement of a router and circuit at the Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) commenced. This action will cause a temporary outage of network devices such as personal computers, telephones, printers, routers, switches, alarm panels, and wireless communications. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 8 hours. If use of the EOF is subsequently required, this condition may delay activation of the EOF until equipment is restored. Restoration of the equipment will take less than one hour.
"This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the State of Pennsylvania, Luzerne and Columbia Counties and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBINSON TO KLCO ON 10/24/2011 AT 2252 * * *
Systems have been restored and the EOF is operable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco). | |