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Event Notification Report for October 21, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/20/2011 - 10/21/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47359 47360 47361 47362

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47359
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/20/2011
Notification Time: 13:46 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2011
Event Time: 10:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

FLOOD BARRIER PENETRATIONS NOT WATER TIGHT

"During follow-up inspections of flood barrier penetrations into two rooms in the plant it was determined that some of the water tight conduit fittings were not filled with the material required to make them water tight. Inspection caps were removed from the fittings to perform the inspections. Three fittings into room 19 (auxiliary feedwater and plant air compressors) and fittings into room 56E (electrical switchgear) were found to contain no filling material. One additional fitting into room 56E that was thought to be capped was found to be open with a sheet metal box covering the inside access thereby obscuring inspections.

"All of the affected penetrations have modifications in progress to assure that they are modified and qualified for design basis flood levels.

"Of the 16 penetrations 6 have been verified to be made water tight by other means, specifically fire foam barrier installed in the conduit from the room 56E side.

"The remaining 10 penetrations will leak with a 1014 flood, although the plate will restrict flow to some degree. The stations auxiliary feedwater and safety related electrical switch gear could be affected.

"This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 47360
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
                   FABRICATION & SCRAP
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County: PENTON
License #: SNM-1227
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001257
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/20/2011
Notification Time: 13:03 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2011
Event Time: 09:10 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(5) - ONLY ONE SAFETY ITEM AVAILABLE
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
DOUG WEAVER (NMSS)

Event Text

ONE HOUR REPORT DUE TO A FAILED ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY

"At approximately 0910 [PST] on 10/20/2011 during discussions with an NRC inspector, the AREAVA Richland NCS Manager concluded that a previous determination made on Friday, 7/22/2011 that an IROFS (a criticality drain on a HEPA filter housing) declared to be in a degraded state was, in fact, failed in that a pre-filter in the HEPA housing was sitting on the drain and could have prevented it from performing the required safety function. This original discovery was made during a routine PM of the system (a management measure prescribed to this IROFS). On 7/22/2011 (the initial day of discovery) the criticality drain was modified so that it would remain unobstructed and free flowing.

"At 1303 EDT, AREVA's EHS&L Manager notified the NRC Operations Center of this condition per the requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A criterion (a)(5) (1 hour report) which requires reporting if '... only one IROFS remains available and reliable to prevent a nuclear criticality and has been in that state for greater than 8 hours,' and indicated that potentially criterion (b)(1) (24 hour report) was also met. This 24 hour criterion requires
reporting '... the facility being improperly analyzed, or different than analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR 70.61.' Subsequent to the initial report, AREVA has concluded that the performance requirements of 10CFR 70.61 were met and the 24 hour reporting criteria (b)(1) do not apply.

"Safety Significance of Event: The safety significance of this event is low. This process is used to recover incinerator ash and the ISA team was unable to identify any mechanism whereby a critical concentration of approximately 285 g U/liter of solution could be created in the process connected to the duct work.

"Potential Nuclear Criticality Pathways Involved: The only potential pathway is for uranium bearing liquids that exceed 285 g U/liter to gradual build up in the HEPA filter housing.

"Controlled Parameters (Mass, Moderation, Geometry, Concentration, Etc.): Uranium mass/concentration is controlled.

"Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or Control System(s) and description of the failures or deficiencies: No control system failures occurred.

"Corrective Actions to Restore Safety Systems and When Each Was Implemented: A grate was installed over the criticality drain inlet on July 22, 2011 and has been present since that time."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47361
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: BRIAN GORDON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/20/2011
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INOPERABLE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP POTENTIALLY IMPACTS RHR SAFETY FUNCTION

"At 08:00 CDT on 10/20/2011 Essential Chilled Water Loop B was declared inoperable while turbine driven Emergency Feedwater Pump AB was out of service for planned maintenance. Operability of Essential Chilled Water Loop B was restored at 08:50. During this time period, the application of cascading technical specifications rendered motor driven Emergency Feedwater Pump B inoperable. The remaining operable Emergency Feedwater Pump A is a design rated 50 percent pump; therefore, this event could have prevented fulfillment of the Residual Heat Removal safety function. Offsite power and Train A safety related equipment and systems were verified operable.

"Essential Chilled Water Loop B was declared inoperable because Essential Chiller B failed to automatically restart from a load recycle. The shift crew took action to align Essential Chiller AB to restore operability to Essential Chilled Water Loop B. The cause for the failure of Essential Chiller B is not yet known. Restoration of operability to Essential Chilled Water Loop B concurrently restored operability to Emergency Feedwater Pump B.

"No plant transient or safety system actuations occurred. Plant operation continues stable at 100 percent power."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47362
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM MORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/20/2011
Notification Time: 20:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2011
Event Time: 16:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO THE OFFSITE FATALITY OF AN EMPLOYEE

"On October 20, 2011 at approximately 1335 hours, a South Texas Project employee suffered an apparent heart attack offsite while attending a fire brigade training exercise. The person was transported to Matagorda County Regional hospital. The individual was evaluated by emergency room personnel and later pronounced deceased.

"OSHA is being notified pursuant to the requirements of 29CFR1904.39. This ENS report is being made in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"There was no radioactive contamination involved in this event. The licensee does not plan any media or press release.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012