| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/13/2011 - 10/14/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47210 | Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LANE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 08/28/2011
Notification Time: 03:38 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/2011
Event Time: 20:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"At 2130 [EDT] on August 27, 2011, an automatic actuation of the Unit 1 Train A emergency diesel generator occurred due to an actuation signal from the load sequencer. The Train A 4160 kV emergency bus transferred to the emergency diesel generator and all Train A emergency loads required for Mode 2 started and sequenced onto the Train A 4160 KV emergency bus except the 480 volt center breaker to the bus E1A2 that did not close. The load sequencer is designed upon the receipt of a safety injection actuation and/or loss of offsite power to provide a signal to strip loads from the 4160 kV emergency bus and then, in sequence, to re-energize the associated 480 volt buses and to load engineering safety feature components onto the 4160 kV and associated 480 volt emergency buses in a predetermined sequence. Per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B), additional emergency safety features loads that actuated were the Train A reactor containment fan coolers and auxiliary feedwater system.
"Unit 1 remains critical at 100 percent power. No emergency core cooling system injection occurred into the reactor coolant system.
"The event occurred during surveillance testing when the Train A sequencer was taken from the AUTO Test position to the local position. It is not understood why the actuation occurred. In addition, it is not understood why the 480 volt load center breaker to the bus E1A2 did not close.
"The 480 volt bus E1A2 was re-energized at 2308 [EDT] on August 27, 2011. The Train A 4160 kV bus was restored to the offsite power source at 0150 [EDT] on August 28, 2011 and the Train A emergency diesel generator and engineering safety features loads were restored to their normal condition at 0201 [EDT] on August 28, 2011.
"With the Train A sequencer non-functional, the following Train A components are inoperable: 1) High Head Safety Injection Pump 1A; 2) Low Head Safety Injection Pump 1A; 3) Containment Spray Pump 1A; 4) RCFC [Reactor Containment Fan Cooler] Fan 11A; 5) RCFC Fan 12A; 6) Component Cooling Water Pump 1A; 7) Essential Cooling Water Pump 1A; 8) Aux Feedwater Pump 11; 9) Control Room/Elect. Aux Bldg HVAC; 10) Ess [Essential] Chiller 12A; and 11) ESF Diesel Generator 11.
"Although these components will not automatically start on a safety injection signal or loss of offsite power, these loads can be manually actuated. Engineered Safety Features Trains B and C remain operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/13/11 AT 1221 EDT FROM MORRIS TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee is updating this event report to retract the originally reported valid specified system actuation and report it instead as a 60-day invalid specified system actuation report made by telephone:
"This update is a 60-day telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1).
"This event was originally reported per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of the Unit 1 Train A emergency diesel generator and sequencing of Mode II (Loss of Offsite Power) emergency loads. The actuation occurred during surveillance testing when the Train A load sequencer was taken from the AUTO test position to the local position. Subsequent investigation has determined that the actuation occurred due to a faulty integrated chip within the sequencer's load sequence auto test module, and was not due to sensed or simulated plant conditions that would require a Mode II actuation. Unit 1 was at 100% power and no loss of offsite power occurred.
"The Train A equipment response to this invalid actuation is described in the original notification information provided on 08/28/2011.
"Additionally, the 10CFR50.72 Notification originally reported under Event Number 47210 is being retracted, since the actuation has been determined to be not valid."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Whitten) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47341 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: LEE GOLDSTEIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/13/2011
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FIRE RELATED UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT COULD IMPACT EQUIPMENT CREDITED IN SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS
"In preparation for converting from 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, to NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 805, a review of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) Safe Shutdown Analysis identified conditions that may not ensure a protected train of equipment remains available under certain postulated fire scenarios. The analysis determined that a postulated fire in specific fire areas could cause spurious actuation of critical components, potentially resulting in loss of equipment required for Safe Shutdown. A fire in one of the specified fire areas could potentially adversely affect the following; Suppression Pool level instrument 2-CAC-LT-2602, Residual Heat Removal net positive suction head (i.e., Drywell Containment Overpressure), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), Emergency bus E-1, and Emergency bus E-3.
"The initial safety significance of this event is minimal. Fire watches have been established for the affected portions of fire areas RB2-01, RB1-01, TB1, CB-02, and CB-23E. Additionally, fire detection and suppression equipment in the affected areas is fully functional.
"Fire watches have been established for the affected portions of fire areas RB2-01, RB1-01, TB1, CB-02, and CB-23E. This condition has been entered Into the Corrective Action Program (i.e., CR 493784).
"This is reportable as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures have been established to provide an hourly fire watch for the affected fire areas."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47342 | Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ED TREMBLAY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/13/2011
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2011
Event Time: 11:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"The Unit 3 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) communications link failed its engineering performance test. Troubleshooting [of the problem] is to commence on 10/14/11 during normal business hours."
The license has compensatory measures in place should ERDS be needed by Unit 3 prior to completion of repairs.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47343 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RICHARD GARCIA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/13/2011
Notification Time: 20:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2011
Event Time: 09:50 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 0915 on 10-11-2011, Columbia Generating Station's (CGS) Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) system was taken out of service for planned maintenance activities. Assessment of the ERDS outage considered the anticipated duration of the outage along with the knowledge that the system would not be recoverable within an hour of a declared event (Alert or higher) during this maintenance period. Station personnel concluded the planned maintenance to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' To that end, a call was made to the NRC's Headquarters Operational Office (HOO) at 09:22 PDT on 10-11-2011. Feedback received during that call was that the event was a loggable entry but not recordable and no EN number was assigned.
"Efforts to fully restore ERDS following the maintenance have not yet been successful and the actual duration of the work has substantially exceeded initial estimates for planned duration. Work is ongoing to restore the system to full capability. Restoration plans include a functional test coordinated with the NRC ERDS center to demonstrate the system performs as required.
"This follow-up call is made to update the original call placed 10-11-2011 and to affirm that the current lack of a functional ERDS system represents a major loss of emergency preparedness capability consistent with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Previously credited compensatory measures remain in effect and rely on existing CGS Emergency Response procedures to provide plant data via the Emergency Notification System to the NRC Operations Center until the ERDS can be returned to service. Members of the CGS Emergency Response Organization have been trained on contingencies required during an Emergency Plan activation with loss of ERDS capability. No other emergency response functions are impacted by this ongoing work. The resident inspector has been briefed. A follow up notification will be made when the maintenance work has been completed." | |