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Event Notification Report for October 12, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/11/2011 - 10/12/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47324 47334 47335 47337 47338

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Agreement State Event Number: 47324
Rep Org: KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: FRONTIER EL DORADO REFINING COMPANY
Region: 4
City: EL DORADO State: KS
County:
License #: 22-B145-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/06/2011
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER ON PROCESS GAUGE

The following report was received from the Kansas Department of Health and Environment via facsimile:

" The licensee attempted to close the shutter [on a process gauge] in preparation for a job. The shutter would not close. There were no personnel exposures [associated with this event]. Because of the location [of the gauge], there are no likely exposures due to this failure. The source is located approximately 12 feet above the ground on a tank. Access is by portable ladder. Operations and maintenance personnel were notified.

"The shutter in question is on an Ohmart/VEGA model SHF1 B-45 source holder (S/N 7294CN) containing 100 milli-Curies of Cs-137 in a sealed source.

"The manufacturer, [Ohmart] VEGA, has been contacted and is working to schedule their service technician to [make repairs].

"Sealed Source and Device Registry OH-0522-D-01 02-B states 'Commonly reported device failures associated with this device series includes stuck shutters, shutter handles breaking off, and broken screws. A review of these failures indicate common root cause issues are associated with: operating the devices outside the normal conditions of use; failure to seek appropriate device service when shutters start becoming difficult to operate; shutter binding due to environmental contaminant intrusion into the shutter; and, forcing operation of shutter instead of seeking corrective action. The most commonly involved series is the SH-F2 which is the model typically installed in harsh environmental conditions'."

Kansas Report Number: KS110011

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Agreement State Event Number: 47334
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: JOHNSON AND JOHNSON
Region: 1
City: RARITAN State: NJ
County:
License #: 110001-507655
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL CSASZAR
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/09/2011
Notification Time: 10:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
DIANA DIAZ-TORO (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVER EXPOSURE OF RADIATION WORKERS

The following is a compilation of information received from a verbal report from the State of New Jersey; an e-mail from the State of California; and discussions with the RSO involved in the incident:

On October 8, 2011 at approximately 1000 EDT, three contractor personnel were loading Co-60 sources on a GammaCell 220 irradiator at a Johnson & Johnson facility located in Raritan, New Jersey. During the activity, an 8 inch 1210 Curie Co-60 source was somehow dislodged from its shielded position and approximately 4 inches of the source were exposed in an unshielded configuration. In addition, the insertion tool prevented the workers from re-inserting the source quickly. The workers were able to take a titanium shield and force the source into place by breaking off the insertion tool. The source was then confirmed to be in a shielded configuration and safely secured. The total time the source was exposed was estimated to be 25 to 30 seconds. The two individuals loading the source are employed by Foss Therapy, a California Agreement State licensed service provider. The third individual involved in the activity was the RSO employed by Gamma Irradiator Service (GIS) under a Pennsylvania Agreement State license. Based on readings from the electronic dosimetry being used by the workers, the two Foss Therapy employees are estimated to have received whole body doses of 8.1 R and 7.7 R respectively. The RSO working for GIS is estimated to have received a dose of 8.5 R. Extremity exposure has been estimated at between 50 R to 60 R for the two Foss Therapy workers. The workers were also wearing fresh TLDs and finger badging. More detailed dose information will be forthcoming after analysis of this dosimetry.

See event report from the State of California: EN # 47335

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Agreement State Event Number: 47335
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: JOHNSON AND JOHNSON
Region: 4
City:  State: CA
County:
License #: UNKNOWN
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN FASSELL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/09/2011
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
DIANA DIAZ-TORO (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVER EXPOSURE OF RADIATION WORKERS

The following is a compilation of information received from a verbal report from the State of New Jersey; an e-mail from the State of California; and discussions with the RSO involved in the incident:

On October 8, 2011 at approximately 1000 EDT, three contractor personnel were loading Co-60 sources on a GammaCell 220 irradiator at a Johnson & Johnson facility located in Raritan, New Jersey. During the activity, an 8 inch 1210 Curie Co-60 source was somehow dislodged from its shielded position and approximately 4 inches of the source were exposed in an unshielded configuration. In addition, the insertion tool prevented the workers from re-inserting the source quickly. The workers were able to take a titanium shield and force the source into place by breaking off the insertion tool. The source was then confirmed to be in a shielded configuration and safely secured. The total time the source was exposed was estimated to be 25 to 30 seconds. The two individuals loading the source are employed by Foss Therapy, a California Agreement State licensed service provider. The third individual involved in the activity was the RSO employed by Gamma Irradiator Service (GIS) under a Pennsylvania Agreement State license. Based on readings from the electronic dosimetry being used by the workers, the two Foss Therapy employees are estimated to have received whole body doses of 8.1 R and 7.7 R respectively. The RSO working for GIS is estimated to have received a dose of 8.5 R. Extremity exposure has been estimated at between 50 R to 60 R for the two Foss Therapy workers. The workers were also wearing fresh TLDs and finger badging. More detailed dose information will be forthcoming after analysis of this dosimetry.

See event report from the State of New Jersey: EN # 47334

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47337
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: G. S. GRIFFIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/11/2011
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 05:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

60 DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"On August 12, 2011, while removing the Unit 2, Division II 24/48 volt DC Cabinet 2B from service for planned maintenance, Unit 2 secondary containment and partial Group II primary containment isolation signals were initiated upon disconnecting the battery with the following systems and components successfully started and actuated as designed:
- Unit 1 and 2 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) systems automatically started
- Complete actuation of Unit 2 secondary containment isolation devices in system 2T41
- Partial Group 2 primary containment isolation devices in systems in Division II associated with the 2D11, 2P33, and 2T48 systems.

"The procedure for rotating the affected battery chargers did not contain adequate direction to ensure the charger was functioning properly before disconnecting the associated battery in preparation for its replacement. This actuation was confirmed to be an invalid actuation as an unplanned response associated with this maintenance activity. Therefore, the event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv), since it was not a valid actuation. In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) the option of reporting this event as a telephone notification within 60 days is being used. The event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) because the actuations were not planned and were not expected to occur. In this case the systems to which the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) apply are general containment (primary and secondary) isolation signals as described in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) for the 'B' logic resulting in isolation of the associated valves on Unit 2, thereby affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Control room personnel restored the Unit 2, Division II 24/48 volt DC Cabinet 2B and the condition was cleared."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47338
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RON FELLOWS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/12/2011
Notification Time: 02:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2011
Event Time: 23:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE AUTO STOP VALVE CLOSURE

"Automatic Reactor Trip due to Turbine Auto Stop Valve Closure and Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System.

"At 2328 on 10/11/2011, the reactor tripped due to a RPS actuation Signal from a turbine trip, which was caused by a Turbine Auto Stop signal. All control rods inserted on the trip, RCS pressure is currently 2235 psig and stable, and RCS average temperature is 547 degrees and stable. Decay heat removal is being controlled by auxiliary feedwater which auto started as expected and steam generator atmospheric relief valves. The licensee is investigating the cause of the Auto Stop Signal. The plant will be maintained in MODE 3 until the cause of trip is determined.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

There is no primary to secondary leakage. Offsite power is normal and all EDG's are available.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012