| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/07/2011 - 10/11/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47277 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SHANE HARVEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 09/19/2011
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 10:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text SPDS AND ERDS UNAVAILABLE DURING REPLACEMENT OF PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM
"At 1007 CDT on September 19, 2011, the Unit 2 Plant Process Computer (PPC) was removed from service for a planned replacement in the current Unit 2 Refueling Outage. The Unit 2 PPC feeds the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) used in the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Unit 2 PPC also feeds the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPCs also feed the Plant Parameters Display System (PPDS) used in the MCR, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Meteorological data will remain available. The dose assessment program will remain functional as the Unit 1 PPC will be capable of providing the necessary data through PPDS to run the program. The dose assessment program is not affected by the Unit 2 PPC being out of service. As compensatory measures, a proceduralized backup method to fax or communicate via a phone circuit applicable data to the NRC, TSC, and EOF exists. There is no impact on the Emergency Notification System (ENS) or Health Physics Network (HPN) communication systems.
"The new Unit 2 PPC is scheduled to be functional on September 25, 2011. However, based on the Mode Unit 2 will be in, this will limit the number of points that would provide usable data. The Unit 2 PPC will be tested as Mode changes occur. The Unit 2 PPC is planned to be declared functional by Mode 2. A follow-up ENS call will be made once the Unit 2 PPC is declared functional.
"The loss of SPDS and ERDS is a 'major loss of assessment capability' and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS call."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/08/11 AT 2130 EDT FROM WELT TO HUFFMAN * * *
"As of 1800 CDT on October 8, 2011, the Unit Two PPC is considered operational with respect to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Therefore, a major loss of assessment capability no longer exists on Unit 2. The Byron EP manager contacted the NRC ERDS Center yesterday on 10/7/11 to conduct an ERDS test for Unit 2 to ensure the data was being satisfactorily sent to the NRC. Unit-1 and Unit-2 ERDS data to NRC was tested satisfactory IAW EP-AA-124-F-01.
"The NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS update."
R3DO (Phillips) notified. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47321 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK KEMPKES
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/05/2011
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2011
Event Time: 07:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text TWO LOOPS OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE
"Unit 2 was shut down at 1048 CDT on October 4, 2011 due to 22 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) low seal leak off flow. At 0727 CDT on October 5, 2011 with Unit 2 in Mode 4 and 22 RCP secured, 21 RCP was also secured due to low seal leak off flow.
"It was determined that the station would not consider RHR [residual heat removal] available for decay heat removal per Technical Specification (TS) due to a procedural issue related to component cooling shutdown lineups. RCS temperature is being maintained stable in Mode 4 between 320 and 340 degrees Fahrenheit using natural circulation and the steam dump to the condenser. No operations were permitted that would have caused introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the Shutdown Margin.
"At approximately 1329 CDT, 21 RCP was restarted after the flow transmitters were vented and 21 RCP seal leak off flow was determined to be acceptable. The RHR procedural issue has been resolved.
"Per TS LCO 3.4.6, 'Two loops consisting of any combination of RCS loops and residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE, and one loop shall be in operation.' This condition is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)."
During this event, RHR could not be credited because the utility was not able to valve in component cooling water to a SFP heat exchanger due to procedural issues. With the restart of 21 RCP and shutdown cooling water alignment, TS 3.6.4 A and B statements have been met and exited. 21 RCP loop in operation and 22 RHR is operable and can be aligned for shutdown cooling. Both Unit 2 EDG's are available and offsite power is normal electrical lineup. The licensee is no longer in any TS LCO statements.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/7/11 AT 1146 EDT FROM DAMMANN TO SNYDER * * *
"An eight hour report (EN #47321) per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) was conservatively reported because both trains of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system and both trains of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) were thought to be unavailable.
"Additional review indicated that 21 RCP and 22 RCP were undamaged, functional, and available for loop operation; therefore, there was no loss of safety function as RCPs were available.
"The station evaluated 21 and 22 RCP seal leak off flow performance and subsequently restarted 21 RCP and restored forced cooling. The 21 RCP seal leak off flow has remained stable in the acceptable range. 21 RCP was available throughout this evolution. If needed in Mode 4, 22 RCP was also available.
"The procedures that were in place and available to the operators prior to 1320 CDT on October 5, 2011, would have allowed RHR operation; however, to supply RHR to Unit 2, Unit 1 would have entered an LCO (for supplying Component Cooling (CC) water to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) heat exchangers) to maintain RHR's safety function. After 1320 CDT, procedure revisions allowed operation of RHR without an associated Unit 1 LCO entry. RHR remained operable throughout this evolution.
"In summary, a loss of safety function for both trains of RHR and RCS did not exist and the 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) report (EN # 47321) is retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
R3DO(Phillips) notified. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47324 | Rep Org: KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: FRONTIER EL DORADO REFINING COMPANY
Region: 4
City: EL DORADO State: KS
County:
License #: 22-B145-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/06/2011
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER ON PROCESS GAUGE
The following report was received from the Kansas Department of Health and Environment via facsimile:
" The licensee attempted to close the shutter [on a process gauge] in preparation for a job. The shutter would not close. There were no personnel exposures [associated with this event]. Because of the location [of the gauge], there are no likely exposures due to this failure. The source is located approximately 12 feet above the ground on a tank. Access is by portable ladder. Operations and maintenance personnel were notified.
"The shutter in question is on an Ohmart/VEGA model SHF1 B-45 source holder (S/N 7294CN) containing 100 milli-Curies of Cs-137 in a sealed source.
"The manufacturer, [Ohmart] VEGA, has been contacted and is working to schedule their service technician to [make repairs].
"Sealed Source and Device Registry OH-0522-D-01 02-B states 'Commonly reported device failures associated with this device series includes stuck shutters, shutter handles breaking off, and broken screws. A review of these failures indicate common root cause issues are associated with: operating the devices outside the normal conditions of use; failure to seek appropriate device service when shutters start becoming difficult to operate; shutter binding due to environmental contaminant intrusion into the shutter; and, forcing operation of shutter instead of seeking corrective action. The most commonly involved series is the SH-F2 which is the model typically installed in harsh environmental conditions'."
Kansas Report Number: KS110011 |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 47330 | Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: GERARD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/07/2011
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2011
Event Time: 16:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
MICHELE SAMPSON (NMSS)
| Event Text DIMENSION OF SNM CARRYING PAILS DIFFERENT FROM VALUE IN SAFETY ANALYSIS
"It was reported to [the licensee's Environmental Health and Safety organization] on Oct 7, 2011 that the measurements on the 1.5 gallon pails used in the facility were found to be non-compliant with the governing Criticality Safety Evaluation, CSE-16-K Rev. 3, 'Common Containers.' This CSE authorized the deployment of 1.5-gal steel pails for miscellaneous use with SNM-bearing liquids. The safety basis for the design of these pails is addressed in credible scenario 4.1.4 in CSE-16-K. The primary contingency is passive engineered control FLOOR-115 which specifies the following dimensional requirements for the pails:
Top ID : 8.059 to 8.559"
Bottom ID: less than or equal to 6.309"
Inner Height: less than or equal to 8.217"
Wall Thickness No Limit
"The controls, PROCUR-901 and -902, cover the ordering and inspection upon receipt for the pails, to meet the criteria of FLOOR-114. In June 2011 all of the pails were inspected by the Product Assurance (PA) department and judged to meet the dimensional requirements. The pails were then deployed to the floor and have been in use since then.
"On October 7, 2011, NCS Engineering was informed that the PA department had determined that their measurement methodology for the pails was incorrect. As a result, the actual top ID of the pail exceeded the IROFS limit by a margin of [approximately] 0.25 [inch]. This results in the facility being in a state that is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (i.e. the governing CSE). All other dimensions specified by the control FLOOR-115 are met, but the diameter aberration appears to affect all pails. As a result, the passive engineered IROFS FLOOR-115 is judged to have failed, eliminating the primary contingency.
"Calculation results modeling an infinite array of in tolerance pails containing oil-moderated UO2 with 6 [inch] S/S spacing for this condition results in a 95/95 Keff of 0.8569. Preliminary calculation results with the increased diameter case results in a 95/95 Keff of 0.8610. Therefore, with the proper spacing maintained (12 [inch] per control FLOOR-116), with no stacking (control FLOOR-104), an infinite array of the as-built pails would not exceed the SNM-1107 license 0.95 criterion.
"This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery due to the facility being in a state that is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (i.e. the governing CSE). The performance requirements for this accident sequence require the Overall Likelihood Index (OLI) be Highly Unlikely. With this failure the sequence is Unlikely.
"Immediate Corrective Actions:
-- Upon identification of the issue operations staff removed the pails from the main process areas and segregated to prevent use.
-- The event is being entered into the Corrective Action Process and a casual analysis initiated.
"The Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility is subject to Subpart H of 10 CFR 70 and this issue is addressed in the corresponding Integrated Safety Analysis."
The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and state authorities. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47331 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MATTESSICH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/07/2011
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2011
Event Time: 13:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS DUE TO CUT FIBER OPTIC CABLE
"On 10/07/11, at approximately 1320 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 received multiple annunciators related to the offsite power tone monitoring system. These annunciators were subsequently determined to have been caused by damage to an offsite fiber optic cable line. The damaged fiber optic cable also disabled the Emergency Notification System (ENS) and Radiological Emergency Communication System (RECS) communication lines, which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(3)(b)(xiii).
"ENS is the Control Room's primary method for communicating with the NRC headquarters during emergency conditions. If an emergency is declared with the ENS line inoperable, the Control Room maintains the ability to make notification to offsite agencies using commercial telephone lines.
"Control Room personnel have been briefed on the required contingent actions with the ENS line inoperable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local agencies.
See related event notification EN #47332. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47332 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE DEFILLIPPO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/07/2011
Notification Time: 21:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2011
Event Time: 13:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS DUE TO CUT FIBER OPTIC CABLE
"At 1320 on October 7, 2011, with the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, a vehicle accident on NYS Rte 104 resulted in a loss of Communications equipment at the site. The JAF dedicated Emergency Notification System (ENS) and Health Physics Network (HPN) phone lines are not functioning as a result of this accident. The Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) phone connection to the Nine Mile Point 1 and Nine Mile Point Unit 2 units is also lost as a result of this failure, but communications with the county and state has been verified to function. Nine Mile Point units have also reported a loss of ENS capability.
"This communication failure impacts the ability to readily receive and transmit information to the NRC for the JAF Nuclear Power Plant. The loss of both the ENS and the HPN constitutes a major loss of communications capability and meats NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Alternate commercial telephone lines remain available and have been verified to function to support communications between NRC headquarters and JAF.
"The Communications provider has been contacted to enact repairs to the affected communications circuit.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed."
See related event notification EN #47331.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE DEFILLIPPO TO PETE SNYDER AT 0356 EDT ON 10/8/11 * * *
All communications systems previously identified as out of service have been restored. Notified R1DO(Gray). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47333 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: BORIS BOLF
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 10/08/2011
Notification Time: 20:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2011
Event Time: 16:19 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2011 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
ELMO COLLINS (RA)
JACK GROBE (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
PATRICK HILAND (NRR)
FLINTER (DHS)
CASTO (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO SEVERE ELECTRICAL FAULT IN RCP JUNCTION BOX
"Reactor Coolant Pump 2A tripped at approximately 1535 MST, resulting in numerous simultaneous electrical distribution alarms. A walkdown of containment was performed and at 1609 MST it was determined that a junction box, supplying power to the 2A Reactor Coolant Pump, had failed, resulting in the pump tripping on overcurrent protection and an 86 lockout. The plant was operating in forced circulation and had one train of shutdown cooling in service. As a result, an Emergency Classification of HU2.2, Explosion was declared due to the junction box failure and noise that had been heard in containment.
"The plant is currently stable with one train of shutdown cooling in service, the opposite train of shutdown cooling is available to be placed in service. The Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System is currently at 160 degrees Fahrenheit and 375 psia with the 1A Reactor coolant pump in service for forced circulation.
"The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee has notified appropriate state and local agencies.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN DAILEY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2306 EDT ON 10/8/2011 * * *
The Notification of Unusual Event at Palo Verde Unit 1 was terminated at 1916 MST on 10/8/2011. The termination was based on conducting inspections which did not reveal any additional damage or plant impact as a result of this event. Unit 1 remains stable in Mode 5 with RCPs 1A and 1B in service along with one train of RHR in service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and appropriate state and local agencies.
Notified R1DO (Gray), NRR EO (Hiland), IRD (Grant), DHS (Flinter), and FEMA (Castro). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47336 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN KEENAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/10/2011
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2011
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE HAS A POSITIVE CONFIRMED TEST FOR AN ILLEGAL DRUG
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive test for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |