Event Notification Report for October 07, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/06/2011 - 10/07/2011
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 47330
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: GERARD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: GERARD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/07/2011
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2011
Event Time: 16:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2011
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2011
Event Time: 16:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
MICHELE SAMPSON (NMSS)
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
MICHELE SAMPSON (NMSS)
DIMENSION OF SNM CARRYING PAILS DIFFERENT FROM VALUE IN SAFETY ANALYSIS
"It was reported to [the licensee's Environmental Health and Safety organization] on Oct 7, 2011 that the measurements on the 1.5 gallon pails used in the facility were found to be non-compliant with the governing Criticality Safety Evaluation, CSE-16-K Rev. 3, 'Common Containers.' This CSE authorized the deployment of 1.5-gal steel pails for miscellaneous use with SNM-bearing liquids. The safety basis for the design of these pails is addressed in credible scenario 4.1.4 in CSE-16-K. The primary contingency is passive engineered control FLOOR-115 which specifies the following dimensional requirements for the pails:
Top ID : 8.059 to 8.559"
Bottom ID: less than or equal to 6.309"
Inner Height: less than or equal to 8.217"
Wall Thickness No Limit
"The controls, PROCUR-901 and -902, cover the ordering and inspection upon receipt for the pails, to meet the criteria of FLOOR-114. In June 2011 all of the pails were inspected by the Product Assurance (PA) department and judged to meet the dimensional requirements. The pails were then deployed to the floor and have been in use since then.
"On October 7, 2011, NCS Engineering was informed that the PA department had determined that their measurement methodology for the pails was incorrect. As a result, the actual top ID of the pail exceeded the IROFS limit by a margin of [approximately] 0.25 [inch]. This results in the facility being in a state that is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (i.e. the governing CSE). All other dimensions specified by the control FLOOR-115 are met, but the diameter aberration appears to affect all pails. As a result, the passive engineered IROFS FLOOR-115 is judged to have failed, eliminating the primary contingency.
"Calculation results modeling an infinite array of in tolerance pails containing oil-moderated UO2 with 6 [inch] S/S spacing for this condition results in a 95/95 Keff of 0.8569. Preliminary calculation results with the increased diameter case results in a 95/95 Keff of 0.8610. Therefore, with the proper spacing maintained (12 [inch] per control FLOOR-116), with no stacking (control FLOOR-104), an infinite array of the as-built pails would not exceed the SNM-1107 license 0.95 criterion.
"This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery due to the facility being in a state that is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (i.e. the governing CSE). The performance requirements for this accident sequence require the Overall Likelihood Index (OLI) be Highly Unlikely. With this failure the sequence is Unlikely.
"Immediate Corrective Actions:
-- Upon identification of the issue operations staff removed the pails from the main process areas and segregated to prevent use.
-- The event is being entered into the Corrective Action Process and a casual analysis initiated.
"The Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility is subject to Subpart H of 10 CFR 70 and this issue is addressed in the corresponding Integrated Safety Analysis."
The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and state authorities.
"It was reported to [the licensee's Environmental Health and Safety organization] on Oct 7, 2011 that the measurements on the 1.5 gallon pails used in the facility were found to be non-compliant with the governing Criticality Safety Evaluation, CSE-16-K Rev. 3, 'Common Containers.' This CSE authorized the deployment of 1.5-gal steel pails for miscellaneous use with SNM-bearing liquids. The safety basis for the design of these pails is addressed in credible scenario 4.1.4 in CSE-16-K. The primary contingency is passive engineered control FLOOR-115 which specifies the following dimensional requirements for the pails:
Top ID : 8.059 to 8.559"
Bottom ID: less than or equal to 6.309"
Inner Height: less than or equal to 8.217"
Wall Thickness No Limit
"The controls, PROCUR-901 and -902, cover the ordering and inspection upon receipt for the pails, to meet the criteria of FLOOR-114. In June 2011 all of the pails were inspected by the Product Assurance (PA) department and judged to meet the dimensional requirements. The pails were then deployed to the floor and have been in use since then.
"On October 7, 2011, NCS Engineering was informed that the PA department had determined that their measurement methodology for the pails was incorrect. As a result, the actual top ID of the pail exceeded the IROFS limit by a margin of [approximately] 0.25 [inch]. This results in the facility being in a state that is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (i.e. the governing CSE). All other dimensions specified by the control FLOOR-115 are met, but the diameter aberration appears to affect all pails. As a result, the passive engineered IROFS FLOOR-115 is judged to have failed, eliminating the primary contingency.
"Calculation results modeling an infinite array of in tolerance pails containing oil-moderated UO2 with 6 [inch] S/S spacing for this condition results in a 95/95 Keff of 0.8569. Preliminary calculation results with the increased diameter case results in a 95/95 Keff of 0.8610. Therefore, with the proper spacing maintained (12 [inch] per control FLOOR-116), with no stacking (control FLOOR-104), an infinite array of the as-built pails would not exceed the SNM-1107 license 0.95 criterion.
"This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery due to the facility being in a state that is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (i.e. the governing CSE). The performance requirements for this accident sequence require the Overall Likelihood Index (OLI) be Highly Unlikely. With this failure the sequence is Unlikely.
"Immediate Corrective Actions:
-- Upon identification of the issue operations staff removed the pails from the main process areas and segregated to prevent use.
-- The event is being entered into the Corrective Action Process and a casual analysis initiated.
"The Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility is subject to Subpart H of 10 CFR 70 and this issue is addressed in the corresponding Integrated Safety Analysis."
The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and state authorities.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47331
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MATTESSICH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MATTESSICH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/07/2011
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2011
Event Time: 13:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2011
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2011
Event Time: 13:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS DUE TO CUT FIBER OPTIC CABLE
"On 10/07/11, at approximately 1320 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 received multiple annunciators related to the offsite power tone monitoring system. These annunciators were subsequently determined to have been caused by damage to an offsite fiber optic cable line. The damaged fiber optic cable also disabled the Emergency Notification System (ENS) and Radiological Emergency Communication System (RECS) communication lines, which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(3)(b)(xiii).
"ENS is the Control Room's primary method for communicating with the NRC headquarters during emergency conditions. If an emergency is declared with the ENS line inoperable, the Control Room maintains the ability to make notification to offsite agencies using commercial telephone lines.
"Control Room personnel have been briefed on the required contingent actions with the ENS line inoperable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local agencies.
See related event notification EN #47332.
"On 10/07/11, at approximately 1320 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 received multiple annunciators related to the offsite power tone monitoring system. These annunciators were subsequently determined to have been caused by damage to an offsite fiber optic cable line. The damaged fiber optic cable also disabled the Emergency Notification System (ENS) and Radiological Emergency Communication System (RECS) communication lines, which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(3)(b)(xiii).
"ENS is the Control Room's primary method for communicating with the NRC headquarters during emergency conditions. If an emergency is declared with the ENS line inoperable, the Control Room maintains the ability to make notification to offsite agencies using commercial telephone lines.
"Control Room personnel have been briefed on the required contingent actions with the ENS line inoperable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local agencies.
See related event notification EN #47332.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47332
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE DEFILLIPPO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE DEFILLIPPO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/07/2011
Notification Time: 21:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2011
Event Time: 13:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2011
Notification Time: 21:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2011
Event Time: 13:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS DUE TO CUT FIBER OPTIC CABLE
"At 1320 on October 7, 2011, with the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, a vehicle accident on NYS Rte 104 resulted in a loss of Communications equipment at the site. The JAF dedicated Emergency Notification System (ENS) and Health Physics Network (HPN) phone lines are not functioning as a result of this accident. The Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) phone connection to the Nine Mile Point 1 and Nine Mile Point Unit 2 units is also lost as a result of this failure, but communications with the county and state has been verified to function. Nine Mile Point units have also reported a loss of ENS capability.
"This communication failure impacts the ability to readily receive and transmit information to the NRC for the JAF Nuclear Power Plant. The loss of both the ENS and the HPN constitutes a major loss of communications capability and meats NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Alternate commercial telephone lines remain available and have been verified to function to support communications between NRC headquarters and JAF.
"The Communications provider has been contacted to enact repairs to the affected communications circuit.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed."
See related event notification EN #47331.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE DEFILLIPPO TO PETE SNYDER AT 0356 EDT ON 10/8/11 * * *
All communications systems previously identified as out of service have been restored. Notified R1DO(Gray).
"At 1320 on October 7, 2011, with the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, a vehicle accident on NYS Rte 104 resulted in a loss of Communications equipment at the site. The JAF dedicated Emergency Notification System (ENS) and Health Physics Network (HPN) phone lines are not functioning as a result of this accident. The Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) phone connection to the Nine Mile Point 1 and Nine Mile Point Unit 2 units is also lost as a result of this failure, but communications with the county and state has been verified to function. Nine Mile Point units have also reported a loss of ENS capability.
"This communication failure impacts the ability to readily receive and transmit information to the NRC for the JAF Nuclear Power Plant. The loss of both the ENS and the HPN constitutes a major loss of communications capability and meats NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Alternate commercial telephone lines remain available and have been verified to function to support communications between NRC headquarters and JAF.
"The Communications provider has been contacted to enact repairs to the affected communications circuit.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed."
See related event notification EN #47331.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE DEFILLIPPO TO PETE SNYDER AT 0356 EDT ON 10/8/11 * * *
All communications systems previously identified as out of service have been restored. Notified R1DO(Gray).