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Event Notification Report for September 29, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/28/2011 - 09/29/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


46807 47295 47296 47299 47300 47301

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Part 21 Event Number: 46807
Rep Org: ABB INC
Licensee: ABB INC
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/02/2011
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
PART 21 E-MAIL GROUP ()

Event Text

NOTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL DEFECT IN SOLID STATE RELAY

Identification of the subject component is as follows: SS5 Solid State Relay, Part Number 611130-T13-N.

"The instantaneous trip function of the relay may actuate at 16 times normal current instead of the design value of 24 times normal current.

"On 3 March, 2011, ABB was notified by Progress Energy - Brunswick plant that spare relays being tested prior to being placed in service were tripping at approximately 4700 amps instead of the expected 7200 amps. Brunswick stated that their applications require having a short time delay for all faults up to the 24 times instantaneous value is critical for system design and compliance with their design basis and licensing documents.

"Subsequent evaluation by ABB Engineering determined that the relay works as intended. However, if there is a fault at the same time the relay is energized, the instantaneous unit becomes more sensitive, and will operate at lower than expected current level.

"For conditions where a fault occurs downstream of an associated in-service circuit breaker, the relay works as intended, for single phase, phase to phase, and three phase fault conditions.

"Sales records show that only four orders of the subject relay were ever shipped, and each of these four orders was with Progress Energy, with the orders all being processed via ABB Medium Voltage Service, in Florence, SC. The order numbers and quantities are as follows, with the first three orders being shipped from ABB Coral Springs, FL and the fourth order shipped from ABB Allentown, PA: AA027730 qty. 10, AA319168 qty. 7, AA319152 qty. 7, and PC06895 qty. 3.

"ABB is taking, or has taken, the following corrective actions:
- Reworked Qty. 23 units for Brunswick to convert the units to Part Number 611130-T11-N, by removing the target circuit. This prevents the pre-mature trip at lower current.
- One additional unit has been retained at ABB Coral Springs to support continued testing to confirm the fault condition.
- Three units have not been accounted for, and are assumed to be in service. (Purchased by ABB Florence for Progress Energy Brunswick 4/11/08, Sales Order PC06895, Relay Serial Numbers 85948, 85949, and 85950)
- The 611130-T13-N relay has been obsoleted to prevent future sales.
- ABB Engineering is determining whether other similar relays of different ratings have a similar defect. Action to complete by July 1, 2011.

"ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, so we are informing the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that the purchasers or affected licensees may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(a).

"ABB recommends that the affected licensees evaluate their specific application and determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their design basis. If the licensee determines that it does, the relays may be returned to ABB for conversion by removing the target circuit."

* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS BATOVSKY TO JOE O'HARA AT 1529 ON 9/28/11 * * *

This update information regarding the notification of a failure to comply with specifications associated with the SS5 Relay, Part Number 611130-T13-N.

"The instantaneous trip function of the relay may actuate at 16 times normal current instead of the design value of 24 times normal current.

"Subsequent evaluation by ABB Engineering determined that the relay works as intended. However, if there is a fault at the same time the relay is energized, the instantaneous unit becomes more sensitive, and will operate at lower than expected current level.

"For conditions where a fault occurs downstream of an associated in-service circuit breaker, the relay works as intended, for single phase, phase to phase, and three phase fault conditions.

"ABB Engineering determined that other similar relays of different ratings may have a similar deviation from technical specifications.

"ABB is taking, or has taken, the following corrective actions:
- Affected relay part numbers have been made obsolete to prevent future sales.
- Stopped production of all affected relays until corrective action is implemented.
- The Circuit board assembly, 611856-T1, T2, T3, will be made obsolete and replaced by 611857-T1, T2, T3 accordingly, which do not exhibit this deviation.
- ABB acknowledges the response time for this report is beyond the required reporting window and has initiated a separate corrective action to address this problem.

"ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, so we are informing the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that the purchasers or affected licensees may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10CFR 21.21 (a).

"ABB recommends that the affected licensees evaluate their specific application and determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their design basis. If the licensee determines that it does, the licensee should contact ABB to determine appropriate corrective action."

Notified R2DO(Nease) and Part 21 GRP via e-mail

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Agreement State Event Number: 47295
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: ATLANTIC GEOTECHNICAL SERVICES, INC
Region: 1
City:  State: VA
County: GOOCHLAND
License #: 085-263-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/26/2011
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)
ERIC BENNER (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED PORTABLE MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received via facsimile:

"On Friday, September 23, 2011 the Radioactive Materials Program (RMP) received notification from the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) regarding a transportation accident on I-64 at mile marker 167 in Goochland County. The accident involved a moisture density gauge. The RMP contacted the on-scene Incident Commander (IC) to receive details. The IC stated that a truck carrying the gauge had lost control and the gauge was breached on the road. The driver of the vehicle was available and a conversation was held during which he stated he had lost control and the transport case handle was broken off allowing it to become free from the back of his truck. He stated the case opened and the gauge was destroyed. The driver contacted the RSO who then drove to the incident. The RSO brought a survey meter and another transportation case. The RSO stated the source rod had been sheared off at the shielding base but that radiation readings were within tolerance. The RSO packaged the shield and other gauge parts into the new transport case and returned the transport case to their office location. An RMP employee was dispatched to the licensee's office to investigate the incident and perform surveys of the transport case. The investigation is ongoing including interviews of the RSO and driver. The manufacturer (lnstroTek) was contacted and instructions were discussed. A leak test wipe was taken and is being sent to lnstro Tek for analysis."

Event Report No: VA - 11 - 09

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Agreement State Event Number: 47296
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
Region: 1
City: BLACKSBURG State: VA
County:
License #: 121-225-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/26/2011
Notification Time: 15:33 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING 8 MILLICURIE NICKEL 63 SOURCE

The following report was received via facsimile:

"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for Virginia Tech notified the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program on September 23, 2011 that a leaking source had been identified on June 28, 2011. The source was an 8 millicurie (April 1989) nickel-63 source used in a Varian gas chromatograph. The source was contained in a detector kit model 02-001972-00, serial number A7074. The gas chromatograph was no longer used. While preparing the unit to be surplussed, the RSO identified contamination of 0.07 microcurie in the area where the ECD (electron capture detector) had been installed. The RSO reported that he did not report the leaking source in June because leak tests of the ECD itself showed no continuing leakage. The RSO indicated that the gas chromatograph would be decontaminated and that procedures would be modified to specify the required five-day reporting requirement for a leaking source to prevent recurrence of late reporting."


Event Report No: VA - 11 - 10

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47299
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RAY SWAFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/28/2011
Notification Time: 08:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2011
Event Time: 04:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A TURBINE TRIP

"At 0414 [CDT] on 9/28/2011, the Unit 3 reactor automatically scrammed due to actuation of the Reactor Protection System [RPS] from a turbine trip. Preliminary indications show the turbine tripped on a generator trip with generator neutral overvoltage (359GN) relay actuation. Cause of relay actuation is under investigation. Seven Safely Relief Valves (SRVs) cycled due to the reactor pressure transient with reactor pressure automatically controlled by the Main Turbine Bypass Valves. All systems responded as expected to the turbine trip. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) reactor water level initiation set points were reached. Primary containment isolation and initiation signals for groups 2, 3, 6 & 8 were received as expected. Reactor water level is being automatically controlled by the feedwater system.

"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the RPS when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

All control rods fully inserted. The plant is being supplied from offsite power and is in a normal shutdown configuration. The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. There was no impact on Units 1 or 2.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47300
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/28/2011
Notification Time: 12:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2011
Event Time: 10:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 91 Power Operation 91 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION OUT OF SERVICE

"Due to unsatisfactory performance of TSC HVAC operation per Condition Report 355263, the TSC HVAC is considered non-functional until performance of the corrective work activity is performed. If an emergency condition occurs during the time these work activities are being performed, which requires activation of the TSC, the contingency plan calls for utilization of the TSC, as long as radiological conditions allow for habitability of the facility. Procedure 73EP-EIP-063-0, Technical Support Center Activation, provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room and TSC support personnel to the Simulator Building to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC so that TSC functions can be continued.

"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 1 since this activity affects the functionality of the TSC emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution."

The licensee corrected an issue with the electrical power fuse block and returned the unit to service at 1210. The licensee cleared the associated action statement for this issue at 1350.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

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Part 21 Event Number: 47301
Rep Org: AMETEK
Licensee: AMETEK
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GEORGE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/28/2011
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2011
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
PART 21 GRP EMAIL ()

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - DIODE FAILURES DUE TO DETERIORATION

The following was received via fax:

"Component Description: International Rectifier (IR) and Vishay 150 amp clamp diodes with either forward or reverse bias These are Ametek Solid-state Controls part numbers 07-600150-00 and 07-600151-00. Diodes can be either installed in Ametek Solid-state Controls UPS equipment or provided as a spare part.

"The diode failures due to this suspected defect have occurred generally at around the third or fourth year of operating life of the device. There are no warning signs that a failure is imminent, or detection method for predicting an approaching failure.

"The investigation has revealed that the diode failures were due to voltage transients or punch through. A failure analysis by Southwest Research concluded that the device having an 'alloy junction' can deteriorate after three to four years of operation resulting in a 'punch through' condition within the device causing the diode to short.

"The actual cause has not been determined; however it is suspected that the alloy junction type device may have sensitivity to age or voltages causing the device to more rapidly degrade.

"The failures described above, could result in loss of output voltage and transfer of the static switch to the bypass source which could result in a potential damage to the load.

"We have only two known failures in systems at this voltage level. We feel the failure rate has been extremely low and the risk is minimal. Each operating facility will need to evaluate the potential risk to their operation."

The licensee did not indicate which NRC licensees, if any, are affected by this notice.

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