Event Notification Report for September 19, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/18/2011 - 09/19/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
472834745047280472824727747278
Agreement State
Event Number: 47283
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CARIBBEAN INSPECTION & NDT SERVICES INC
Region: 4
City: PORT LAVACA State: TX
County:
License #: 06420
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: CARIBBEAN INSPECTION & NDT SERVICES INC
Region: 4
City: PORT LAVACA State: TX
County:
License #: 06420
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/20/2011
Notification Time: 16:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 19:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2013
Notification Time: 16:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 19:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)
POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE DUE TO FAULTY RADIOGRAPHY DEVICE
The following was received via e-mail:
"On September 19, 2011, at 1943 hours, the Agency [state] received an email stating that a radiography trainee may have received an over exposure to his right hand and was seeking medical attention. The email stated that the overexposure occurred because the radiography device used on the job was faulty, but did not provide any information on when or how the possible overexposure occurred.
"On September 20, 2011, the Agency received an email from a licensee Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) stating that an overexposure may have occurred to an employee's hands. The email stated that the licensee had not received any information from the individual who was reported to have received the exposure. The RSO was in route to a hospital in Houston, Texas where the radiographer trainee was reported to have gone for treatment. The employee's film badge has been sent for processing, but no results are available at this time. The licensee is reviewing records to determine where and when the trainee worked during the two months he has been employed. Individuals that worked with the trainee are being interviewed.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident # I-8886
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/21/2011 AT 1820 EDT* * *
The following information was received by facsimile:
"The licensee has reported that the trainee stated that on September 12, 2011, while conducting radiography operations in the field, he removed the guide tube from an Amersham 660 D radiography camera containing [an Iridium - 192 source] and saw that the source was protruding out of the camera. The licensee stated that they did not know how far the source was protruding or how it was returned to the fully shielded position. The Agency [state] has contacted the trainee and conducted an interviewed with him over the phone.
"The licensee stated that the results of the trainee's film badge indicated that he received 1,410 millirem on the film badge he was wearing at the time of the event. The trainee is in a Houston, Texas hospital. His doctors are conferring with [the] Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) regarding his medical treatment. An on-site investigation will be performed by the Agency at the licensee's location on September 22, 2011."
Notified the R4DO (Walker) and FSME (O'Sullivan).
* * * UPDATE AT 1806 EST ON 1/9/13 FROM ART TUCKER TO HUFFMAN * * *
The following update was received from the State of Texas Radiation Branch Investigation Unit via e-mail:
"This Agency has closed the investigation into this event, but due to the unique nature of this event this update is being provided.
"On January 2, 2013, the Agency was contacted by the mother of the individual injured in this event. She stated that his right hand was worse than before and they were concerned. She stated they had sought medical help from two health care providers in the Houston, Texas, area, but neither could provide assistance. She asked if the Agency had any recommendations. The Agency suggested that she contact a physician who works at REAC/TS and provided the contact information. She stated that she would contact him. She provided the Agency with pictures of the individual's hand which have been sent to the NRC Region IV Headquarters.
"On January 2, 2013, the Agency contacted the physician. He stated he had received copies of the radiographer trainee's medical records and a few recent pictures of his hand. The physician expressed concerns over the condition of the radiographer trainee's hand based on the pictures he had seen. He stated he would like to see the individual, but could provide the contact information for a physician he had trained and who practiced medicine in the Houston area. On January 8, 2013, the mother notified the Agency that she had been in contact with the REAC/TS physician and were working to get in contact with the physician in the Houston area recommended by REAC/TS. She stated that her son was in a lot of pain and his hand was getting worse each day.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and e-mailed a copy to FSME Events Resource.
The following was received via e-mail:
"On September 19, 2011, at 1943 hours, the Agency [state] received an email stating that a radiography trainee may have received an over exposure to his right hand and was seeking medical attention. The email stated that the overexposure occurred because the radiography device used on the job was faulty, but did not provide any information on when or how the possible overexposure occurred.
"On September 20, 2011, the Agency received an email from a licensee Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) stating that an overexposure may have occurred to an employee's hands. The email stated that the licensee had not received any information from the individual who was reported to have received the exposure. The RSO was in route to a hospital in Houston, Texas where the radiographer trainee was reported to have gone for treatment. The employee's film badge has been sent for processing, but no results are available at this time. The licensee is reviewing records to determine where and when the trainee worked during the two months he has been employed. Individuals that worked with the trainee are being interviewed.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident # I-8886
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/21/2011 AT 1820 EDT* * *
The following information was received by facsimile:
"The licensee has reported that the trainee stated that on September 12, 2011, while conducting radiography operations in the field, he removed the guide tube from an Amersham 660 D radiography camera containing [an Iridium - 192 source] and saw that the source was protruding out of the camera. The licensee stated that they did not know how far the source was protruding or how it was returned to the fully shielded position. The Agency [state] has contacted the trainee and conducted an interviewed with him over the phone.
"The licensee stated that the results of the trainee's film badge indicated that he received 1,410 millirem on the film badge he was wearing at the time of the event. The trainee is in a Houston, Texas hospital. His doctors are conferring with [the] Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) regarding his medical treatment. An on-site investigation will be performed by the Agency at the licensee's location on September 22, 2011."
Notified the R4DO (Walker) and FSME (O'Sullivan).
* * * UPDATE AT 1806 EST ON 1/9/13 FROM ART TUCKER TO HUFFMAN * * *
The following update was received from the State of Texas Radiation Branch Investigation Unit via e-mail:
"This Agency has closed the investigation into this event, but due to the unique nature of this event this update is being provided.
"On January 2, 2013, the Agency was contacted by the mother of the individual injured in this event. She stated that his right hand was worse than before and they were concerned. She stated they had sought medical help from two health care providers in the Houston, Texas, area, but neither could provide assistance. She asked if the Agency had any recommendations. The Agency suggested that she contact a physician who works at REAC/TS and provided the contact information. She stated that she would contact him. She provided the Agency with pictures of the individual's hand which have been sent to the NRC Region IV Headquarters.
"On January 2, 2013, the Agency contacted the physician. He stated he had received copies of the radiographer trainee's medical records and a few recent pictures of his hand. The physician expressed concerns over the condition of the radiographer trainee's hand based on the pictures he had seen. He stated he would like to see the individual, but could provide the contact information for a physician he had trained and who practiced medicine in the Houston area. On January 8, 2013, the mother notified the Agency that she had been in contact with the REAC/TS physician and were working to get in contact with the physician in the Houston area recommended by REAC/TS. She stated that her son was in a lot of pain and his hand was getting worse each day.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and e-mailed a copy to FSME Events Resource.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47450
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ERIC STEELE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ERIC STEELE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 11/17/2011
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2011
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID GROUP 6 ISOLATION SIGNAL
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting more than one system.
"On September 19, 2011, at 1000 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), during the performance of a maintenance activity on the Reactor/Refueling Zone Ventilation Radiation Monitor BFN-3-RM-090-0141/143, Browns Ferry Unit 3 received a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 isolation. This resulted in isolation of the reactor and refuel zone ventilation systems, initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (Trains A, B and C), and the initiation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (Trains A and B). All plant systems responded as designed.
"There are two divisions of Reactor/Refueling Zone Ventilation Radiation Monitors: BFN-3-RM-090-0140/142 and BFN-3-RM-090-0141/143. A downscale or inoperable signal in both divisions will initiate the PCIS Group 6 isolation. Prior to the performance of the maintenance activity, BFN-3-RM-090-0140/142 was functional. However, during a field walkdown after the PCIS Group 6 isolation, relay BFN-3-RLY-064-16AK62A for BFN-3-RM-090-0140/142 was discovered to be chattering. A chattering relay could cause momentary loss of continuity between the contacts which would effectively generate a spurious isolation signal from that division. Thus, when 3-RM-090-0141/143 was made inoperable by the surveillance, the PCIS Group 6 logic was made-up.
"The PCIS Group 6 isolation was reset at 1008 CDT. This event was entered in the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 434799. There were no safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of these events. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting more than one system.
"On September 19, 2011, at 1000 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), during the performance of a maintenance activity on the Reactor/Refueling Zone Ventilation Radiation Monitor BFN-3-RM-090-0141/143, Browns Ferry Unit 3 received a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 isolation. This resulted in isolation of the reactor and refuel zone ventilation systems, initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (Trains A, B and C), and the initiation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (Trains A and B). All plant systems responded as designed.
"There are two divisions of Reactor/Refueling Zone Ventilation Radiation Monitors: BFN-3-RM-090-0140/142 and BFN-3-RM-090-0141/143. A downscale or inoperable signal in both divisions will initiate the PCIS Group 6 isolation. Prior to the performance of the maintenance activity, BFN-3-RM-090-0140/142 was functional. However, during a field walkdown after the PCIS Group 6 isolation, relay BFN-3-RLY-064-16AK62A for BFN-3-RM-090-0140/142 was discovered to be chattering. A chattering relay could cause momentary loss of continuity between the contacts which would effectively generate a spurious isolation signal from that division. Thus, when 3-RM-090-0141/143 was made inoperable by the surveillance, the PCIS Group 6 logic was made-up.
"The PCIS Group 6 isolation was reset at 1008 CDT. This event was entered in the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 434799. There were no safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of these events. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 47280
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: SOUTH EAST MEDICAL IMAGING SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: DELRAY BEACH State: FL
County:
License #: 3629-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: SOUTH EAST MEDICAL IMAGING SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: DELRAY BEACH State: FL
County:
License #: 3629-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/20/2011
Notification Time: 08:12 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2011
Notification Time: 08:12 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING CO-57 FLOOD SOURCE
The following information was received from the State of Florida via email:
"During a routine inspection, a Co-57 flood source was determined to be missing. Source was accounted for on 18 Aug 11. [A state] inspector surveyed the area and could not locate the source. Licensee believes the source may be at a doctor's office; they will continue to look for it and will notify us [Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] if found. Any further action is referred to [Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] Radioactive Materials [Branch]."
The Co-57 source strength was reported as 414 microcuries.
FL Incident Number: FL11-081
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The following information was received from the State of Florida via email:
"During a routine inspection, a Co-57 flood source was determined to be missing. Source was accounted for on 18 Aug 11. [A state] inspector surveyed the area and could not locate the source. Licensee believes the source may be at a doctor's office; they will continue to look for it and will notify us [Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] if found. Any further action is referred to [Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] Radioactive Materials [Branch]."
The Co-57 source strength was reported as 414 microcuries.
FL Incident Number: FL11-081
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Agreement State
Event Number: 47282
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TICONA POLYMERS, INC
Region: 4
City: BISHOP State: TX
County:
License #: 02441
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: TICONA POLYMERS, INC
Region: 4
City: BISHOP State: TX
County:
License #: 02441
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/20/2011
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 07:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2011
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 07:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INDUSTRIAL GAUGE SHUTTER FAILED OPEN
The following was received from the State of Texas via e-mail:
"On September 19, 2011, the licensee reported that while conducting routine inspections and maintenance, the shutter on a Ohmart Corporation model SH-F2 nuclear gauge containing 100 millicuries of Cesium (Cs) - 137 was found to be stuck in the normally opened position. No significant exposure has occurred due to this event. The licensee will contact the manufacture for repairs or replacement of the gauge. The cause for the event is under investigation. Additional information will be provided as it is received IAW SA 300."
Texas Incident Number # I-8885
The following was received from the State of Texas via e-mail:
"On September 19, 2011, the licensee reported that while conducting routine inspections and maintenance, the shutter on a Ohmart Corporation model SH-F2 nuclear gauge containing 100 millicuries of Cesium (Cs) - 137 was found to be stuck in the normally opened position. No significant exposure has occurred due to this event. The licensee will contact the manufacture for repairs or replacement of the gauge. The cause for the event is under investigation. Additional information will be provided as it is received IAW SA 300."
Texas Incident Number # I-8885
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47277
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SHANE HARVEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SHANE HARVEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 09/19/2011
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 10:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2011
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 10:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
SPDS AND ERDS UNAVAILABLE DURING REPLACEMENT OF PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM
"At 1007 CDT on September 19, 2011, the Unit 2 Plant Process Computer (PPC) was removed from service for a planned replacement in the current Unit 2 Refueling Outage. The Unit 2 PPC feeds the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) used in the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Unit 2 PPC also feeds the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPCs also feed the Plant Parameters Display System (PPDS) used in the MCR, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Meteorological data will remain available. The dose assessment program will remain functional as the Unit 1 PPC will be capable of providing the necessary data through PPDS to run the program. The dose assessment program is not affected by the Unit 2 PPC being out of service. As compensatory measures, a proceduralized backup method to fax or communicate via a phone circuit applicable data to the NRC, TSC, and EOF exists. There is no impact on the Emergency Notification System (ENS) or Health Physics Network (HPN) communication systems.
"The new Unit 2 PPC is scheduled to be functional on September 25, 2011. However, based on the Mode Unit 2 will be in, this will limit the number of points that would provide usable data. The Unit 2 PPC will be tested as Mode changes occur. The Unit 2 PPC is planned to be declared functional by Mode 2. A follow-up ENS call will be made once the Unit 2 PPC is declared functional.
"The loss of SPDS and ERDS is a 'major loss of assessment capability' and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS call."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/08/11 AT 2130 EDT FROM WELT TO HUFFMAN * * *
"As of 1800 CDT on October 8, 2011, the Unit Two PPC is considered operational with respect to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Therefore, a major loss of assessment capability no longer exists on Unit 2. The Byron EP manager contacted the NRC ERDS Center yesterday on 10/7/11 to conduct an ERDS test for Unit 2 to ensure the data was being satisfactorily sent to the NRC. Unit-1 and Unit-2 ERDS data to NRC was tested satisfactory IAW EP-AA-124-F-01.
"The NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS update."
R3DO (Phillips) notified.
"At 1007 CDT on September 19, 2011, the Unit 2 Plant Process Computer (PPC) was removed from service for a planned replacement in the current Unit 2 Refueling Outage. The Unit 2 PPC feeds the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) used in the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Unit 2 PPC also feeds the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPCs also feed the Plant Parameters Display System (PPDS) used in the MCR, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Meteorological data will remain available. The dose assessment program will remain functional as the Unit 1 PPC will be capable of providing the necessary data through PPDS to run the program. The dose assessment program is not affected by the Unit 2 PPC being out of service. As compensatory measures, a proceduralized backup method to fax or communicate via a phone circuit applicable data to the NRC, TSC, and EOF exists. There is no impact on the Emergency Notification System (ENS) or Health Physics Network (HPN) communication systems.
"The new Unit 2 PPC is scheduled to be functional on September 25, 2011. However, based on the Mode Unit 2 will be in, this will limit the number of points that would provide usable data. The Unit 2 PPC will be tested as Mode changes occur. The Unit 2 PPC is planned to be declared functional by Mode 2. A follow-up ENS call will be made once the Unit 2 PPC is declared functional.
"The loss of SPDS and ERDS is a 'major loss of assessment capability' and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS call."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/08/11 AT 2130 EDT FROM WELT TO HUFFMAN * * *
"As of 1800 CDT on October 8, 2011, the Unit Two PPC is considered operational with respect to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Therefore, a major loss of assessment capability no longer exists on Unit 2. The Byron EP manager contacted the NRC ERDS Center yesterday on 10/7/11 to conduct an ERDS test for Unit 2 to ensure the data was being satisfactorily sent to the NRC. Unit-1 and Unit-2 ERDS data to NRC was tested satisfactory IAW EP-AA-124-F-01.
"The NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS update."
R3DO (Phillips) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47278
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE NIEMEYER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE NIEMEYER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/19/2011
Notification Time: 11:59 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2011
Notification Time: 11:59 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ACID LEAK ONSITE
"A report has been made to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality concerning leakage of BULA 7016 (phosphoric acid) from a tank and berm at the Service Water Intake Structure. The berm is cracked, therefore the material is leaking into the soil surface. No chemicals have reached the reservoir."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"A report has been made to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality concerning leakage of BULA 7016 (phosphoric acid) from a tank and berm at the Service Water Intake Structure. The berm is cracked, therefore the material is leaking into the soil surface. No chemicals have reached the reservoir."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.