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Event Notification Report for August 15, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/12/2011 - 08/15/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


46230 46776 47135 47138 47140 47151 47152

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General Information Event Number: 46230
Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DALE E. PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 09/03/2010
Notification Time: 15:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
MIKE CHEOK (NRR)
PART 21 GP via email ()

Event Text

PART 21 - FAILURE TO INCLUDE SEISMIC INPUT IN REACTOR CONTROL BLADE CUSTOMER GUIDANCE

The following is text of a facsimile submitted by the vendor:

"GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) has identified that engineering evaluations that support the guidance provided in SC 08-05, Revision 1, do not address the potential impact of a seismic event on the ability to scram as it relates to the channel-control blade interference issue. Note that the seismic loads are not a consideration in the scram timing, but rather the ability to insert the control blades. In other words, the control blades must be capable of inserting during the seismic event, but not to the timing requirements of the Technical Specifications. GEH is evaluating the impact of the seismic loads between the fuel channel and the control blade associated with an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE), and a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) on BWR/2-5 plants. The scram capability is expected to be affected due to the added seismic loads at low reactor pressures in the BWR/2-5 plants. The ability to scram for the BWR/6 plants is not adversely affected by the seismic events. Additional evaluation is required to determine to what extent the maximum allowable friction limits specified for the BWR/2-5 plants in SC 08-05 Revision 1 is affected by the addition of seismic loads.

"GEH issues this 60-Day Interim Report in accordance with the requirements set forth in 10 CFR 21.21 (a)(2) to allow additional time to for this evaluation to be completed."

Affected US plants previously notified by vendor and recommended for surveillance program include: Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2; Fermi 2; Columbia; FitzPatrick; Pilgrim; Vermont Yankee; Grand Gulf; River Bend; Clinton; Oyster Creek; Dresden, Units 2 and 3; LaSalle, Units 1 and 2; Limerick, Units 1 and 2; Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3; Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2; Perry, Unit 1; Duane Arnold; Cooper; Monticello; Brunswick, Units 1 and 2; Hope Creek; Hatch, Units 1 and 2; and Browns Ferry, Units 1and 2.

Affected US plants previously notified by vendor and provided information include: Susquehanna, Units 1 and 2 and Browns Ferry, Unit 3.

* * * UPDATE FROM DALE PORTER TO ERIC SIMPSON AT 1556 ON 09/27/2010 * * *

The following update was received via fax:

"This letter provides a revision to the information transmitted on September 2, 2010 in MFN 10-245 concerning an evaluation being performed by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) regarding the failure to include seismic input in channel-control blade interference customer guidance. Two changes have been made in Revision 1:

"1) A statement was added regarding the applicability of this issue to the ABWR and ESBWR design certification documentation.

"2) The original MFN 10-245 referenced the Safety Communication SC 08-05 R1 that was transmitted to the US NRC via MFN 08-420. The references to SC 08-05 were changed to MFN 08-420 to prevent possible confusion.

"As stated herein, GEH has not concluded that this is a reportable condition in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR 21.21(d) and continued evaluation is required to determine the impact of a seismic event on the guidance contained in MFN 08-420."

Notified the R1DO (Gray), R2DO (Hopper), R3DO (Orth), R4DO (Farnholtz), NRR EO (Lee) and Part 21 Group (via email).

* * * UPDATE FROM DALE PORTER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ AT 1723 ON 12/15/2010 * * *

The following update was received via fax:

"This letter provides information concerning an on-going evaluation being performed by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) regarding the failure to include seismic loads in the guidance provided in MFN 08-420. As stated herein, GEH has not concluded that this is a reportable condition in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR21.21(d) and continued evaluation is required to determine the impact of a seismic event on the guidance contained in MFN 08-420.

"GEH has not completed the evaluation of the impact of the seismic loads between the fuel channel and the control blade associated with an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE), and a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) on BWR/2-5 plants."

GEH expects the task to be completed by August 15, 2011.

Notified the R1DO (Holody), R2DO (Henson), R3DO (Kozak), R4DO (Werner), NRR EO (Evans) and Part 21 Group (via email).

* * * UPDATE AT 1808 EDT ON 08/11/11 FROM DALE PORTER TO JOE O'HARA * * *

The following was received via fax:

"GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) identified, in July 2010, that engineering evaluations did not address the potential impact of a seismic event on the ability to scram as it relates to the channel-control blade interference issue. GEH provided status of the on-going evaluation in [December 2010]. GEH has not completed the evaluation of the impact of the seismic loads between the fuel channel and the control blade associated with a bounding Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) on BWR/2-5 plants. The scram capability is expected to be affected due to the added seismic loads at low reactor pressures [less than 1000 psig] in the BWR/2-5 plants. Additional evaluations are required to determine to what extent the maximum allowable friction limits specified for the BWR/2-5 plants are affected by the addition of SSE seismic loads at low reactor pressures.

"GEH issues this 60-Day Interim Report in accordance with the requirements set forth in 10CFR 21.21 (a)(2) to allow additional time for this evaluation to be completed."

The following sites are noted as having channel-control blade concerns:
Region 1: Nine Mile Point, Fitzpatrick, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, Oyster Creek, Limerick, Peach Bottom, Susquehanna, and Hope Creek
Region 2: Browns Ferry, Brunswick, Hatch,
Region 3: Fermi, Clinton, Dresden, LaSalle, Quad Cities, Perry, Duane Arnold, Monticello
Region 4: Columbia, Grand Gulf, River Bend, Cooper.

Notified R1DO (Powell), R2DO (Hopper), R3DO (Dickson), R4DO (Farnholtz) and NRR Part 21 Grp via email.

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Part 21 Event Number: 46776
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY GILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/22/2011
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/22/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
PART 21 GROUP ()
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)

Event Text

POTENTIAL DEFECT IN SUBMERSIBLE VALVE POSITION SENSORS

"This letter is issued to provide notification of a potential defect in QualTech NP Top Potted Generation 3 Quick Disconnect Connector Pin Side assemblies installed on Topworx C7 and SV7 switches. All assemblies supplied prior to April 20, 2011 are potentially affected. These assemblies were supplied to Topworx [as] submergence qualified in accordance with our Test Report EGS-TR-23009-14. It was discovered during supplemental qualification testing that previously supplied assemblies may not properly seal against moisture intrusion if utilized in a submergence application.

"The recommended corrective action for existing assemblies is to pressure test and, if required, repair them. Corrective actions already implemented will be effective in preventing recurrence of this condition. Additionally, all future assemblies will be required to pass pressure testing prior to acceptance.

"It has been confirmed that all assemblies previously supplied are for use in Chinese Nuclear Power Plants and therefore, no US plants are affected." Most of the assemblies are still in this country and the remainder are in Switzerland awaiting shipment. All assemblies will be recalled and pressure tested.


* * * UPDATE RECEIVED VIA FAX FROM TONY GILL TO JOE O'HARA AT 1545 ON 8/12/11 * * *

"The purpose of this letter is to provide additional information concerning the status of all affected assemblies. As stated in the previous notifications all serial numbers affected by this defect have been identified and to date only 30 production units remain to be returned for testing/repair. We are still experiencing 100% success when repair is needed.

"It was previously reported that 'all affected assemblies were for use in Chinese Nuclear Power Plants and therefore no US Plants are affected'. This is no longer a correct statement. Our customer, Topworx, notified us on August 9 that one of their customers, Flowserve, had supplied valve packages containing 16 of these assemblies to Pilgrim Station in Plymouth, MA. It has been reported to us that these assemblies were never installed and are in the process of being returned for testing/repair.

"These 16 assemblies are included in the 30 production units remaining to be tested/repaired. It has been identified that 4 of the remaining assemblies are still in China and the other 10 were supplied to Flowserve.

"Additional information concerning these assemblies will be provided as it becomes available. A final letter will be issued once corrective actions for these 30 assemblies are complete."

Notified R1DO(Powell), Part 21 GRP via e-mail

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Agreement State Event Number: 47135
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UW-MADISON
Region: 3
City: MADISON State: WI
County:
License #: 025-1323-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS TIMMERMAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 08/09/2011
Notification Time: 12:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - THERASPHERE TREATMENT TO WRONG LOBE OF LIVER

The following was received via fax:

"The Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS) received a phone call from the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) on August 8, 2011 that a patient received a dose of 1.05 GBq of Y-90 Theraspheres on July 7, 2011 to the wrong side of the liver as documented on the written directive. The patient was scheduled for treatment of 1.04 GBq Y-90 Theraspheres for multinodular hepatocellular cancer (HCC) to the left lobe of the liver. The dosimetry for Y-90 Theraspheres was based on volume (mass) of the lobe bearing the tumors (the patient has tumors on both lobes, right and left). A treatment plan was created for the left lobe (using the volume of the left lobe) but during the procedure the right lobe was treated with the prescribed dose for the left lobe.

"DHS will be conducting an investigation on August 12, 2011 and the licensee will be submitting a 15 day written report concerning the medical event."

WI Event Number: 110012

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47138
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF MIELL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/10/2011
Notification Time: 02:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2011
Event Time: 01:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POTENTIAL LOSS OF TSC OPERABILITY WHILE PERFORMING PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"A planned maintenance evolution at the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) will have the potential to remove the plant computer systems (Plant Process Computer, Intranet, and Internet) from service. The TSC would be rendered non-functional with the loss of all computer systems. The replacement and testing of the automatic power transfer relay is expected to de-energize the computer systems for less than 20 minutes at any time.

"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Maintenance will be terminated and power will be restored to the plant computer systems. The restoration of power to all computer systems is estimated to take less than one hour.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the plant computer systems power supplies have been restored to normal operation."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE BREWER TO CHARLES TEAL ON 08/10/11 AT 1305 EDT * * *

The TSC has been restored to operational status.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Dickson).

* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT SPADING TO JOE O'HARA ON 08/12/11 AT 2205 EDT * * *

The licensee is performing planned maintenance on the TSC automatic power transfer relay which could render the TSC inoperable if power to the TSC computers is lost. Maintenance is expected to commence at 2130 CDT.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Peterson).

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Agreement State Event Number: 47140
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: WOOD RIVER REFINERY
Region: 3
City: ROXANA State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01282-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/10/2011
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE

The following information was received by e-mail:

"On August 8, 2011 the licensee's radiation safety officer called to advise the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] of a gauge shutter failure. During the performance of routine operability checks and area surveys on July 22, 2011 it was found that the shutter lever on a Kay- Ray/Sensall 7062P could not be completely closed. The gauge is permanently mounted to a 12 inch pipeline in a remote area of the refinery. The line runs overhead at a height of approximately 10 to 12 feet. Arrangements were made to have personnel with duties in the area to be notified of the shutter failure and to prohibit any work in the immediate area. The nearest work station was determined to be over 200 feet away. Radiation levels at one foot from the gauge were measured at less than 1 milliR/h.

"After contacting the manufacturer on August 8 to determine the best course of action, the licensee applied a lubricant to the shutter area. Subsequently, after waiting a day, attempts to close the shutter were successful. The shutter is now operating as expected. Arrangements have been made to have a service licensee visit the site to ensure operation is as expected. As the failure was noted during performance of routine tests designed to detect such failures, no changes to the licensee's procedures or protocols are anticipated. The licensee was reminded of the importance of promptly reporting such events in the future."

The sealed source gauge is a Kay-Ray/Sensall model 7700-Y containing 0.14 Ci of CS-137. The fixed gauge is a Kay-Ray/Sensall, Model number 7063P; Serial number S96G1816.

Illinois Event Number IL11105

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47151
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP PRATER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 08/12/2011
Notification Time: 20:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 14:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO VALVE BODY LEAK

"On Friday August 12, 2011 at 1429 CDT, a through-wall leak was discovered on the body of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inlet Drain Pot Inboard Drain valve to the Main Condenser, AOV 2-2301-29. This is a safety-related, ASME Code Class 2 valve. Dresden Technical Requirements Manual 3.4.a, Condition B requires the leak to be isolated which renders the HPCI System Inoperable. The Unit 2 HPCI system was isolated and declared inoperable at 1646 CDT, and Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition G has been entered. The HPCI system is a single train system.

"The event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.'

T.S. 3.5.1 condition G is a 14 day LCO and the utility can make the repair at power. The unit is in a normal electrical lineup with offsite power available and all EDG's are operable. There was a slight increase in plant risk to "yellow" as a result of this issue.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 47152
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
                   LEU FABRICATION
                   LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/13/2011
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(5) - DEV FROM ISA
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
THOMAS HILTZ (NMSS)

Event Text

INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS (ISA) - UNANALYZED CONDITION

"As part of the ongoing GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis, accident sequences associated with hydrogen piping are being evaluated. As part of this evaluation, facility walk downs of the piping were performed that identified a configuration that had not previously been analyzed. Based on a review of this as found condition, it was determined at approximately 12 p.m. on August 12, 2011 that the system was improperly analyzed in the ISA and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements.

"Hydrogen supply to the affected piping system inside the building has been isolated. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated.

"This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery."

The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and appropriate state and local authorities.

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