Event Notification Report for May 20, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/19/2011 - 05/20/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
46866468684686946870
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46866
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS LYCKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS LYCKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/20/2011
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2011
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | 0 | Refueling Shutdown |
MEDIA CONCERN ABOUT BOAT NEAR THE SITE
"On 05/20/2011 at approximately 0728, an unidentified man was reported to be floating on a raft in the James River offshore of the Hog Island Wildlife Management Area. The individual had chains wrapped around his body and a suitcase and duffel bag in the raft. Station Security responded to facilitate local law enforcement actions. The individual in the raft was pulled to the shore and taken into custody. At no time was the operation of Surry Power Station threatened by the man's actions.
"The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"This notification is being transmitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) to ensure that the NRC is made aware of issues that may cause heightened public concern for the safety of the station."
The man was approximately a mile offshore during this incident.
"On 05/20/2011 at approximately 0728, an unidentified man was reported to be floating on a raft in the James River offshore of the Hog Island Wildlife Management Area. The individual had chains wrapped around his body and a suitcase and duffel bag in the raft. Station Security responded to facilitate local law enforcement actions. The individual in the raft was pulled to the shore and taken into custody. At no time was the operation of Surry Power Station threatened by the man's actions.
"The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"This notification is being transmitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) to ensure that the NRC is made aware of issues that may cause heightened public concern for the safety of the station."
The man was approximately a mile offshore during this incident.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46868
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PETER MOODIE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PETER MOODIE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/20/2011
Notification Time: 22:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2011
Event Time: 18:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2011
Notification Time: 22:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2011
Event Time: 18:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION MARINE LIFE INSIDE AFW PIPING
"The past operability of the 2A train of Auxiliary Feedwater has been called into question based on finding clam shells in the safety related water source piping. During performance of valve strokes on 5/9/2011 per an Operations Department surveillance, clam shells were found while draining a section of the safety related water source piping. System Engineering collected the shells as part of troubleshooting. Based on analysis performed by System Engineering, the 2A Train of Auxiliary Feedwater was not operable with clam shells in the pipe. The amount of shells present would have caused an unacceptable differential pressure across the 2A train Auxiliary Feedwater System flow control valves. The extent of condition has been evaluated for the other Auxiliary Feedwater trains for both units and it has been determined that the only affected train is 2A. The 2B Auxiliary Feedwater train has also been inoperable at various times over the past 3 years for maintenance.
"The clams were flushed out of the 2A Train Auxiliary Feedwater suction piping during a recent refueling outage and both trains of Auxiliary Feedwater on Unit 2 are operable. "
The licensee has not implemented any compensatory measures nor are they in any LCO's as a result this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"The past operability of the 2A train of Auxiliary Feedwater has been called into question based on finding clam shells in the safety related water source piping. During performance of valve strokes on 5/9/2011 per an Operations Department surveillance, clam shells were found while draining a section of the safety related water source piping. System Engineering collected the shells as part of troubleshooting. Based on analysis performed by System Engineering, the 2A Train of Auxiliary Feedwater was not operable with clam shells in the pipe. The amount of shells present would have caused an unacceptable differential pressure across the 2A train Auxiliary Feedwater System flow control valves. The extent of condition has been evaluated for the other Auxiliary Feedwater trains for both units and it has been determined that the only affected train is 2A. The 2B Auxiliary Feedwater train has also been inoperable at various times over the past 3 years for maintenance.
"The clams were flushed out of the 2A Train Auxiliary Feedwater suction piping during a recent refueling outage and both trains of Auxiliary Feedwater on Unit 2 are operable. "
The licensee has not implemented any compensatory measures nor are they in any LCO's as a result this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Agreement State
Event Number: 46869
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: URSINUS COLLEGE
Region: 1
City: COLLEGEVILLE State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0952
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: URSINUS COLLEGE
Region: 1
City: COLLEGEVILLE State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0952
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/20/2011
Notification Time: 23:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2011
Notification Time: 23:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
The following report was received via fax:
"On 5/20/2011, the PA DEP [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) was notified by the Safety Manager from Ursinus College, explaining that during their dormitory inspection performed this morning, a tritium exit sign with perhaps 10 to 20 curies of H-3 is missing and presumed stolen."
Pennsylvania Event: PA110011
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The following report was received via fax:
"On 5/20/2011, the PA DEP [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) was notified by the Safety Manager from Ursinus College, explaining that during their dormitory inspection performed this morning, a tritium exit sign with perhaps 10 to 20 curies of H-3 is missing and presumed stolen."
Pennsylvania Event: PA110011
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46870
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID HALL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID HALL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/21/2011
Notification Time: 01:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2011
Event Time: 22:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2011
Notification Time: 01:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2011
Event Time: 22:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 22 | Power Operation | 22 | Power Operation |
HPCI CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE RESULTS IN SYSTEM LEAKAGE DURING MAINTENANCE
"On 5/20/2011 at 2217 [CDT], while performing 1-SR-3.5.1.1(HPCI) MAINTENANCE OF FILLED HPCI DISCHARGE PIPING, operators opened 1-FCV-73-44, HPCI Injection Valve, to fill and vent portions of the system. Once open, the HPCI discharge piping rapidly pressurized to 1000 psig. Operators immediately shut the 1-FCV-73-44 valve. A flood level alarm was received in the control room and water was confirmed to have been leaking from the Gland Seal Condenser. All leakage has stopped.
"It is suspected that leakage past 1-CKV-73-45, HPCI TESTABLE CHECK VALVE, caused the rise in discharge piping pressure. An investigation into this event is ongoing.
"In accordance with TS LCO 3.6.1.3 Condition A, the affected line has been isolated by one closed and deactivated valve.
"This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) as 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: d. Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The volume of leakage was not specifically known but the leakage resulted in approximately 2 inches of water on the HPCI pump room floor before it was isolated.
"On 5/20/2011 at 2217 [CDT], while performing 1-SR-3.5.1.1(HPCI) MAINTENANCE OF FILLED HPCI DISCHARGE PIPING, operators opened 1-FCV-73-44, HPCI Injection Valve, to fill and vent portions of the system. Once open, the HPCI discharge piping rapidly pressurized to 1000 psig. Operators immediately shut the 1-FCV-73-44 valve. A flood level alarm was received in the control room and water was confirmed to have been leaking from the Gland Seal Condenser. All leakage has stopped.
"It is suspected that leakage past 1-CKV-73-45, HPCI TESTABLE CHECK VALVE, caused the rise in discharge piping pressure. An investigation into this event is ongoing.
"In accordance with TS LCO 3.6.1.3 Condition A, the affected line has been isolated by one closed and deactivated valve.
"This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) as 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: d. Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The volume of leakage was not specifically known but the leakage resulted in approximately 2 inches of water on the HPCI pump room floor before it was isolated.