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Event Notification Report for May 20, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/19/2011 - 05/20/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


46693 46855 46863

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 46693
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID HURT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 03/24/2011
Notification Time: 06:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2011
Event Time: 23:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS NEEDED FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SUCTION PATH NOT ANALYZED FOR POTENTIAL HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK

"While performing an extent of condition review of high energy line break (HELB) analyses, a detailed review of the auxiliary steam system was being performed. During this review, sections of pipe that run through rooms 1206/1207 in the Auxiliary Building were identified that have design ratings indicating that they could possibly be classified as high energy lines.

"The pipes were verified to have not been considered in the current HELB analyses. This condition affects pressure transmitters ALPT0037, 38, & 39 which are not qualified for operation in a harsh environment. These pressure transmitters provide the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump [AFW] Suction Transfer signal on low suction pressure from the non safety Condensate Storage Tank to the Safety Related supply (Essential Service Water).

"Technical Specification [TS] 3.3.2-6.h bases state: "since these detectors are in an area not affected by HELBs or high radiation, they will not experience any adverse environmental conditions and the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties."

"Based upon the above bases, with the identified aux steam lines in service, the pressure transmitter's operability could not be assured. This represented an unanalyzed condition and had the potential to affect equipment used for accident mitigation. TS 3.0.3 was entered at time 2354 [CST] on 3/23/2011. At 0009 [CST] on 3/24/2011, Aux Steam valves FBV0158, FBV0I48, FAV0002, and FAV0003 were isolated, removing the HELB concern [TS 3.0.3 was exited at this time]. These are the active feed [isolation valves] to the lines passing through the Aux Building Rooms 1206/1207."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1525 ON 5/19/2011 FROM DAVID BONVILLIAM TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"On March 23, 2011, event notification EN 46693 documented that a harsh environment from a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) could affect pressure transmitter ALPT0037, 38 and 39. These pressure transmitters provide the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump suction transfer signal on low suction pressure from the Condensate Storage Tank to the safety-related water supply (Essential Service Water). This break was postulated to occur on auxiliary steam lines in Auxiliary Building rooms 1206 And 1207. This condition was initially reported both as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety and as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

"When EN 46693 was reported, it was assumed that breaks were required to be postulated at any intermediate fitting, welded attachment, or valve on the subject auxiliary steam lines. Subsequent analysis shows that these sections of auxiliary steam piping are able to withstand safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) loadings and rupture loadings. For piping of this qualification, breaks at all intermediate fittings, welded attachments, and valves do not need to be postulated. Instead, line breaks are only required to be assumed at the terminal ends of the lines and at the locations specified for ASME Class 2 and 3 piping. None of these postulated break locations are located inside rooms 1206 and 1207.

"Analysis has been performed on these auxiliary steam lines for the remaining break locations that are required to be postulated. This analysis demonstrates reasonable assurance that safety related equipment, including pressure transmitters ALPT0037, 38 and 39, would have performed their safety functions following a postulated break of these auxiliary steam lines. Therefore, this condition does not meet the reporting requirements for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety or a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

"Event notification 46693 is hereby retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."

Notified the R4DO (Shannon).

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Agreement State Event Number: 46855
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: LOWELL GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: LOWELL State: MA
County:
License #: 44-0060
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENATH O. TRAEGDE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/17/2011
Notification Time: 14:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DOSE TO FETUS DURING THYROID SCAN

The following report was received from the state via fax:

"A patient having a thyroid scan was administered 4 mCi of I-131 while in a pregnant condition. The circumstances under which the dose was administered are under investigation. The dose to the developing fetus is also under investigation. The whole body dose to the fetus is estimated to be 1 rad at this time.

"The discovery date [of 4/15/11] is an estimate. The real dose of discovery will be reported during the investigation. Also, the licensee was allowed 15 working days to issue a report to [the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program]. [The Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] received that report on May 12, 2011."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46863
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PAT MINAHAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/19/2011
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2011
Event Time: 14:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AFTER A MAIN CONDENSER TUBE LEAK

"At 1407 CDT CPNPP [Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant] Unit-2 was manually tripped due to indication of a main condenser tube failure. The trip was uncomplicated, all control and shutdown banks fully inserted, neither emergency diesel generator started, all safety systems functioned as designed. Both motor driven and the turbine driven AFW [auxiliary feedwater] pumps started as required to restore steam generator level as a result of the trip. The turbine driven AFW pumps has been returned to auto start status. Currently Unit-2 is in mode 3, no-load Tave 557 degrees F with temperature being maintained with AFW and steam dumps to the main condenser. Recovery actions are currently being planned. All electrical busses are powered from offsite power and grid conditions are stable."

The reactor was manually tripped because of rising sodium concentration in the main condenser/feedwater.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State of Texas, and local government.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012