| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/15/2011 - 04/18/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 46749 | Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OLLIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/13/2011
Notification Time: 09:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/13/2011
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(3) - ACUTE CHEMICAL EXPOSURE
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KING STABLEIN (NMSS)
| Event Text ACUTE CHEMICAL EXPOSURE FROM HYDROGEN FLUORIDE TO A MAINTENANCE WORKER
"A maintenance employee was involved in a pipe replacement project in the Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) Building. The employee was leaning on a pipe and received a HF exposure through his PPE [personal protective equipment and clothing] onto his abdomen. The employee was immediately placed under a safety shower and an on-site emergency response was initiated. EMT's applied calcium gluconate and the employee was transported to on-site medical clinic. The employee was not contaminated with any radioactive material. The employee was later transferred to off-site medical. The employee's abdomen was reddened and had some blistering, but exposure is not considered life threatening.
"AII work in the HF building has been stopped pending the completion of an investigation."
The licensee stated that the pipe had been flushed with water and steam prior to starting the maintenance evolution. The amount of fluid in the pipe was described as residual. There was no ongoing release of HF and no other employees were involved. The licensee is providing this as a notification under 10CFR70 App A (a) and 10CFR70.61(b)(4).
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Regional Staff (Thomas).
* * * UPDATE FROM PHILLIP OLLIS VIA FAX TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1226 EDT ON 4/13/11 * * *
"The employee was released from the hospital with no restrictions. As such, the event classification is being amended to 10 CFR 70.61(c)(4)."
Notified NMSS (King Stablein), R2DO (Kathleen O'Donohue)
* * * UPDATE FROM PHILLIP OLLIS (VIA FAX) TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1548 EDT ON 4/15/11 * * *
"As a result of the root cause analysis, additional IROFS [Items Relied On For Safety] are needed and will be declared. Additional reporting for this event to include 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(b)(1) as the GNF [Global Nuclear Fuels] ISA [Integrated Safety Analysis] did not consider HF as a high consequence event."
Notified NMSS (Stablein) and R2DO (O'Donohue). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46750 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 1
City: CHARTIERS TOWNSHIP State: PA
County: WASHINGTON
License #: PA-1176
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/13/2011
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2011
Event Time: 10:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE IN PORTABLE DARKROOM
The following information was received from the state via email:
"On 4/12/2011, at 10:35AM the corporate RSO for TEAM Industrial Services informed the PA DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) of a temporary job site fire which occurred earlier in the day. This event type is 'An unplanned fire... damaging any licensed material or any device, container, or equipment containing licensed material' which is reportable under 10CFR30.50(b)(4).
"A fire occurred in the portable darkroom which was housed within the bed of a pickup truck at the job site. A QSA Model 880 Delta radiographic exposure device containing approximately 75 curies of Iridium-192 (Ir-192) was stored in its metal over-pack inside the darkroom. The metal over-pack sustained significant fire damage, however, the radiographic exposure device was undamaged with the exception of a melted plastic handle. Surveys revealed radiation levels to be in the normal range and consistent for the source being in the locked position. It appears that the Ir-192 source was undamaged by the fire, however, the housing and source will be returned to the manufacturer for examination. Early indications are that an electrical problem started the fire.
"An immediate reactive inspection occurred on 4/12/11. BRP responded, examined the damaged truck and confirmed radiation surveys and measurements taken by the licensee. The camera was taken out of service and will be returned to QSA for inspection once a suitable shipping container is received. Further details [from the State] will be reported as received."
PA Event Report No. PA110007 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46751 | Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DON TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/13/2011
Notification Time: 16:15 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2011
Event Time: 04:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"This is a voluntary notification for planned maintenance that affects the TSC ventilation system.
"At approximately 0400 EDT an April 14, 2011 the North Anna TSC [Technical Support Center] air conditioning and filtration systems will be rendered non-functional to perform preventive maintenance on electrical buses supplying power. This condition has the potential to render the TSC unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation and filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Temporary ventilation is being established for the TSC computer room. The maintenance is expected to last less than 24 hours. Compensatory measures exist to relocate the TSC to alternate locations, if needed.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM PATRICK FRENCH TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1738 EDT ON 4/15/11 * * *
The maintenance on the TSC ventilation system has been completed and the TSC has been returned to service.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue). |
| General Information | Event Number: 46757 | Rep Org: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 3
City: HAMMOND State: IN
County:
License #: 42-32219-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE TEBO
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/15/2011
Notification Time: 14:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
LAURA PEARSON (ILTA)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
ADELAIDE GIANTELLI (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Category 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA LOST DURING SHIPPING
On 4/13/11, two radiography cameras were picked up by the shipper from the licensee facility in Hammond, IN. The cameras were being sent to QSA in Baton Rouge, LA. On 4/14/11, one camera arrived at QSA while the other was still shown in the shipper's hub in Memphis, TN. On 4/15/11, the licensee contacted the shipper when tracking indicated that the camera was still in Memphis. The shipper could not find the package and is conducting a search of the facility at this time.
The missing camera is a QSA 8880D, serial no. D4264 and contains a 15.9 Ci Ir-192 source, serial no. 66411B.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID TEBO TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1545 EDT ON 04/15/11 * * *
At 1540 EDT, the licensee was notified by the shipper that the missing camera was returned to the licensee's office in Hammond, IN. The licensee confirmed that the missing camera is now at their office, the source is in the camera, and the serial number matches. Licensee is investigating this matter further.
Notified R2DO (O'Donohue), R3DO (Orth), ILTAB (Pearson), IRD MOC (Gott), and FSME EO (Giantelli)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Although IAEA categorization of this event is typically based on device type, the staff has been made aware of the actual activity of the source, and after calculation determines that it is a Category 3 event.
Note: the value assigned by device type "Category 2" is different than the calculated value "Category 3" |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 46758 | Rep Org: VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS
Licensee: VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTESVILLE State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD G. PICCOLO
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/15/2011
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
PART 21 - FSME ()
| Event Text POTENTIAL DEFECT IDENTIFIED IN A VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS HIGH DOSE RATE AFTERLOADER
On March 23, 2011, a technician was installing a VariSource High Dose Rate (HDR) Afterloader - Model VariSource IX when the active wire composed of a 10 Ci Ir-192 source failed to extend. After troubleshooting it was discovered that the wire was stuck on the wedge block which is part of the emergency retract mechanism. (See NRC Event Notice 46695)
Engineering evaluation by the vendor, Varian Medical Systems, Inc., has identified a very small amount of material in the wedge block which has a small bore that the source wire passes through. Otherwise, nothing remarkable was identified.
This machine is a new unit with a very low number of source extensions. There is no history of similar events with new units of this type.
The vendor has issued a Tech Tip for all new sites and is investigating a new design for the wedge block with a goal of implementing any new design by April 30, 2012. Additionally, all VariSource HDR customers have received a copy of Customer Technical Bulletin CTB-VS-640A that discusses the potential of source wire path constriction and source wire jamming. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 46759 | Rep Org: ABB, INC.
Licensee: ABB, INC.
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JON RENNIE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/15/2011
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
PART 21 GRP - EMAIL ()
| Event Text POTENTIAL DEVIATION IN SEISMIC RATINGS OF ABB, INC. KF RELAY FAMILY
ABB, during an internal review, discovered that their KF family of relays were originally qualified to meet IEEE-STD-344 (1971) but were incorrectly certified to meet IEEE-STD-344 (1975/1987), which requires different testing.
Relay samples have been sent to an independent lab to determine if the subject relays would meet IEEE-STD-344 (1975/1987). Expected date of the final engineering evaluation is July 1, 2011. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 46760 | Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/15/2011
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP email ()
| Event Text POTENTIAL DEFECT IN MAGNETROL LEVEL SWITCH FROM ENGINE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED
"Engine Systems, Incorporated (ESI) began an evaluation of a level switch on February 16, 2011. Monticello Nuclear Plant returned a level switch for failure evaluation. The reported condition was that the switch mechanism would not actuate throughout the entire level range. ESI supplied the level switch in July, 2008. The switch was functionally tested prior to shipment and it worked properly at that time. It remained in customer inventory until recently when it was tested and the problem was identified.
"This level switch is used in the fuel oil day tank of some EMD 999 emergency diesel generators and controls the fuel transfer pump. Malfunctioning of this switch could prevent the fuel transfer pump from operating and therefore the diesel generator could shut down due to insufficient fuel supply; thus preventing the diesel generator from performing its safety related function. The EMD 999 fuel system also incorporates a backup fuel transfer pump that is controlled by the level alarm switch within the day tank. The backup transfer pump turns on when the low level alarm is actuated and turns off when the high level alarm actuates.
"ESI has been conducting tests and inspections of the returned level switch and will be coordinating with the manufacturer (Magnetrol) to complete our evaluation. To date, no other similar failures with this Magnetrol level switch have been reported to ESI."
Component: Magnetrol level switch, ESI P/N: 8277780-ESI, Magnetrol type A10
Report No: 10CFR21-0101-INT |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46761 | Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GEOFFREY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/16/2011
Notification Time: 19:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2011
Event Time: 18:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2011 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
VICTOR MCCREE (RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
ALLEN HOWE (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | | 2 | A/R | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER FROM TORNADO DAMAGE
"At 1849 hrs, Surry Power Station (SPS) Unit 1 and Unit 2 experienced an automatic Reactor Trip from a Loss of Offsite Power, as a result of a tornado touching down in the station's switchyard. Unit 1 reactor tripped as a result of a Loss of Coolant Flow > P-8 (35% power), and the Unit 2 reactor tripped as a result of a 500 kV Leads Differential Turbine-Generator trip. Both units responded as designed.
"Unit 1 electrical power is being provided by Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to the 1H emergency bus, with the Station Blackout (SBO) diesel loaded on to the 1J emergency bus. Unit 2 electrical power is being supplied by the number 2 EDG to the 2H emergency bus, with the number 3 EDG loaded on to the 2J emergency bus.
"All Unit 1 control rods inserted on the reactor trip, and all Unit 2 control rods inserted on its respective reactor trip. The Low Level Intake Structure (LLIS) is without power. All three Emergency Service Water Pumps are running to supply the intake canal. Efforts are underway to restore Bus 7, which will give each unit an emergency bus powered by offsite power (Unit 1 1J, Unit 2 2H) and restore power to the LLIS.
"Decay heat is being removed by auxiliary feedwater on both units and atmospheric steam release via the steam generator PORVs. Both units are currently on natural circulation. All other system parameters are normal and stable.
"At 1855 hrs a NOUE was declared due to a loss of offsite power (applicable to U1 and U2). Additionally, due to an estimated 100 gallon fuel oil spill from an above ground storage tank near the station's garage, the Virginia State Department of Environmental Quality was notified at 2041 and the Surry County Local Emergency Planning Coordinator was notified at 2114. At 2334, the Virginia State Department of Environmental Quality was notified and the Surry County Local Emergency Planning Coordinator was notified at 2336, due to an estimated 200 gallon oil leak to the ground from a station switchyard transformer damaged during the tornado.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and is on-site."
Notified DHS (Rickerson), FEMA (Boscoe), DOE (Turner), HHS (Hoskins), and USDA (Russell).
See related EN #46762 |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46763 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE O'DELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 04/17/2011
Notification Time: 04:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2011
Event Time: 22:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD BALDWIN (R2 I)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO LUBE OIL PRESSURE LOW OUT OF BAND
"Event Description: On 4/16/2011 at 2252 [EDT], the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable due to the determination that its Lube Oil System was not providing adequate lube oil pressure and flow to the HPCI Turbine/Pump bearings. This was determined following the high steam pressure operability run (i.e., within 48 hours of achieving adequate test pressure following a scheduled refueling/maintenance outage) as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.7. The HPCI system is inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3){v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Initial Safety Significance Evaluation: The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system, Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). and Low Pressure Emergency Core Cooling systems (ECCS) remain operable at this time. Actions have been taken to protect redundant safety systems.
"Corrective Actions: The HPCI system remains inoperable pending further troubleshooting of the low lube oil pressure condition."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LEE GRZECK TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2051 EDT ON 4/17/11 * * *
"Upon further review, it has been determined that the HPCI system was not rendered inoperable as a result of the condition identified on April 16, 2011. During performance of 0PT-09.2, the Control Room received a HPCI turbine bearing oil pressure low alarm. Following 0PT-09.2, preventive maintenance procedure 0PM-TRB507, 'High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Operational Inspection', was performed. During performance of 0PM-TRB507, the turbine governor end oil pressure was found indicating 8.5 psig. The procedure specifies a normal value of 10-12 psig. Due to the above condition, HPCI was conservatively declared inoperable at 2252 [EDT] on April 16, 2011.
"Subsequent Engineering evaluation has determined that HPCI could have run long enough to complete its intended safety function [24 hrs.]. Pressure outside of the normal band specified in 0PM-TRB507 is a condition that requires correction, but is not detrimental to the bearing itself. The critical characteristic of proper bearing lubrication is to assure a film of oil between the tilting pads and the rotating shaft of the HPCI turbine. Bearing outlet temperatures are recorded during each performance of 0PT-092 for trending and no abnormal temperatures were noted during the last performance of 0PT-09.2 on April 16, 2011. This indicates there was a film of lubrication between the rotating shaft and the tilting pads of the journal bearing. The two hour turbine operation of the most recent 0PT-09.2 performance resulted in higher oil temperature, which can result in lower oil pressure. Adjustments can be made to the ball valve of the HPCI governor end bearing to attain the specified supply pressure to each bearing. These adjustments are not unexpected, as discussed in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) maintenance guide for HPCI turbines. A slight adjustment was made to the HPCI governor end bearing on April 17, 2011 to establish pressure at 11.5 psig. At 1009 hrs. on April 17, 2011, 0PT-09.2 was performed satisfactorily, with the HPCI governor end oil bearing supply pressure verified to be within the 10-12 psig range at 2100 rpm and 4100 rpm. Oil flow to and from the bearing is required only for lubrication and cooling and does not provide any lift or other force to assist the bearing in performing its function. The oil flow during this event was still adequate to provide sufficient lubrication and cooling of the bearings. Therefore, the slight decrease in oil pressure to the HPCI governor end bearing did not indicate degradation in performance.
"On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and this issue is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 460134.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction."
Notified R2DO (O'Donohue). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 46764 | Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: BOB STOKES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/17/2011
Notification Time: 11:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2011
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KING STABLEIN (NMSS)
| Event Text AIR MONITORING VACUUM PUMPS DISABLED
"The air monitoring vacuum pumps were disabled for approximately 30 minutes. The soft water supply to the air monitoring vacuum pump seals on the 2nd floor of the Feed Materials Building (FMB) was shut down for Annual Shut Down. These pumps provide vacuum for the stack monitoring and personnel area monitoring systems in the FMB. While the soft water system was shut down, a sanitary well water supply was being used for the vacuum pump seals. A back flow preventer in the sanitary water supply line malfunctioned and interrupted flow to the pump seals. This caused the vacuum pumps to be shut down until a temporary water supply could be established. A temporary water supply was reestablished to the pump seals. The pumps were restored to service at approximately 1500 [CDT]. The back flow preventer has been replaced and the system is currently working properly."
There were no indications that activities performed in the FMB caused a release during the time period that the stack and personnel monitoring system was out of service.
The licensee notified R2 (Hartland). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46765 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL ARENS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/18/2011
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) has been rendered non-functional due to a pre-planned and scheduled maintenance period for the Technical Support Center ventilation system. The maintenance activities include replacement of the evaporator coil, fan, and expansion valve. The TSC ventilation maintenance will be worked with high priority and is expected to be complete prior to 1200 EDT on 4/19/11 .
"Pre-arranged compensatory measures for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities were put in place prior to the beginning of the TSC ventilation maintenance and will remain in place for the duration of the maintenance period. These measures include the relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency IF the Emergency Director deems the TSC uninhabitable."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |