| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/08/2011 - 04/11/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46597 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KIETH DUNCAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 02/07/2011
Notification Time: 17:18 [ET]
Event Date: 02/07/2011
Event Time: 09:18 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ANALYSIS FOR AUX STEAM TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING
"On December 15, 2009, Callaway Plant reported a condition in which valve FBV0146, an isolation valve on an auxiliary steam line in the Auxiliary Building, was found to be kept normally open. With FBV0146 open, the auxiliary steam line downstream of FBV0146 must be considered a high energy line. This configuration was not consistent with the analysis of record for High Energy Line Break (HELB) events. Valve FBV0146 was closed upon discovery of the condition.
"This condition was reported under EN # 45571 as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. EN #45571 was then retracted on January 21, 2010 when analysis showed that no safety-related components would be rendered inoperable in a postulated HELB event due to the condition. Based on this analysis, FBV0146 was reopened.
"Subsequent review of this condition now shows that, with FCV0146 open, a harsh environment from a postulated HELB downstream of FBV0146 could be transmitted to other areas of the Auxiliary Building. This would occur via a flow path through door gaps and an Auxiliary Building elevator shaft. This flow path had not been considered by the previous analysis.
"The areas that could be affected by a postulated line break contain safe shutdown equipment (such as equipment for the Component Cooling Water system) that is not assumed to experience harsh conditions. Because of the potential impact on this equipment, this condition is considered to have met the criteria for reporting under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"FBV0146 is now closed.
"This review was performed as part of the ongoing evaluation of HELB Program deficiencies described in Callaway Plant License Event Report (LER) 2010-009-00.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The auxiliary steam line in the Auxiliary Building feeds non-safety related components.
* * * UPDATE AT 1519 EDT ON 4/8/11 FROM KEITH DUNCAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"On 02/07/2011, EN #46597 documented that a harsh environment from a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) could be transmitted to areas of the Auxiliary Building not qualified for harsh environments. This break was postulated to occur on an Auxiliary Steam line downstream of valve FBV0146 when FBV0146 is open. This condition was initially reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.
"When EN #46597 was reported, the analysis of the Auxiliary Steam line included postulated break locations at any intermediate fitting, welded attachment, or valve. Subsequent analysis shows that this section of Auxiliary Steam piping is able to withstand safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) loadings and rupture loadings. For piping of this qualification, line breaks are only assumed to occur at terminal ends and at the locations specified for ASME Class 2 and 3 piping. Breaks at intermediate fittings, welded attachments, and valves are not required to be assumed.
"Postulated breaks of this Auxiliary Steam line at the locations described above have been analyzed. This analysis demonstrates reasonable assurance that safety-related equipment would have performed their safety functions following a postulated break of this Auxiliary Steam line. Therefore, this condition is not an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Event notification #46597, made on 02/07/2011, is hereby retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
Notified R4DO (O'Keefe). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46726 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TOWNSEND
Region: 1
City: MONCURE State: NC
County:
License #: 019-1564-0G
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 04/05/2011
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
JOHN CARUSO (R1DO)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - FIVE TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS DESTROYED
The following information was received via facsimile:
On February 4, 2011, the NC Radiation Protection Section (NCRPS) received notice of a bankruptcy sale for Townsend in Pittsboro, NC. On March 15, 2011, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for Townsend was contacted to check the status of 5 exit light signs they had registered. The Townsend RSO informed NCRPS that Townsend had paperwork for the signs, however, in October 2003 the facility had been changed from a chicken slaughter facility to a chicken process facility. During this construction, the 5 exit signs were destroyed. On March 30, 2011, NCRPS performed an inspection at the facility and no exit signs or evidence of signs containing tritium were found. A total of 71.9 Curies of tritium were destroyed at the facility and NCRPS considers the incident closed. NC Report #11-22.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46732 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: DUPONT DELISLE PLANT
Region: 4
City: PASS CHRISTIAN State: MS
County:
License #: MS-919-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 04/06/2011
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2010
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK GAUGE SHUTTERS
The following information was provided by the State of Mississippi via e-mail:
"During inspection and review of licensee's gauge service reports, two gauges were discovered to have stuck shutters. Both gauges are Ronan models SA1-F37. Ronan service engineering was called in to repair gauges and determined that on gauge serial # 9473GG, the bottom bushing was found frozen to the shutter shaft. On gauge serial # M4122, the roll pin was broken and the shutter handle was rotated 45 degrees out of alignment. Both gauges were repaired.
Both gauges had a Cs-137 source. Gauge #M4122 was 5 millicuries and gauge #9473GG was 200 millicuries.
MS Report: MS-11003. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46733 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TICONA POLYMERS INC
Region: 4
City: BISHOP State: TX
County:
License #: 02441
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/06/2011
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON OHMART MODEL SH-F1 GAUGE
"On April 6, 2011 the Agency [State of Texas] was informed by the licensee that on April 6, 2011, while conducting shutter operational checks, the shutter on an Ohmart Model SH-F1 containing 60 millicuries of Cesium (Cs) -137 was found to be stuck in the open position. The licensee stated that this is the normal operating position for the gauge and because of its location it does not create an exposure risk to any individuals. The licensee has contacted a contractor to repair the gauge. The cause for the failure is under investigation. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300."
Texas Incident Number I-8832 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46734 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: CHEVRON PRODUCTS COMPANY
Region: 4
City: PASCAGOULA State: MS
County:
License #: MS-413-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/06/2011
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISLODGED FROM OHMART VEGA MODEL SHLM-BR
The following was received via e-mail:
"Licensee's RSO notified DRH [state] by phone on 3-22-11, and by letter received on 3-22-11, of a dislodged source from an Ohmart Vega Model SHLM-BR, fixed gauge Ser. No. 13530993. The source became dislodged from the main rod during the gauge's shutter test and fell into the gauge well. The licensee's surveys around the gauge well were less than 0.5 mR/hr. A gauge representative has been called in to repair the gauge.
"DRH [state] requested licensee send in manufacturer's service report with the licensee's written 30-day report."
The source is 40 millicurie Cs-137, ser. No. 6965GK.
Mississippi Incident Number MS-11004.
* * * UPDATE FROM JAYSON MOAK TO JOE O'HARA VIA E-MAIL AT 1200 EDT ON 4/7/11 * * *
"Licensee was contacted [by the state] on 4/7/11, for further clarification of the location of the source. The licensee's RSO said the source was at the bottom of the well inside a vessel. This would also be the case during normal operations. Surveys were also confirmed by the RSO to be 0.5 mR/hr around the vessel. Licensee's RSO said a new well is being built for the vessel and a service representative has been notified. Source retrieval and replacement of the gauge is scheduled for the middle of April once the new well is built, and the material in the vessel has cooled."
Notified R4DO(O'Keefe) and FSME(McIntosh) |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46739 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: TOM STECKLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/07/2011
Notification Time: 19:22 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2011
Event Time: 16:07 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2011 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)
ART HOWELL (DRA)
THOMAS BLOUNT (NRR)
MIKE BLANKENSHIP (FEMA)
NINA MCDONALD (DHS)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO HYDROGEN BURN DURING MAINTENANCE
"[The licensee declared an Unusual Event at 1607 PDT due to a] small hydrogen burn when opening the stator cooling water system for maintenance. There were no injuries or equipment damage."
The licensee entered EAL 93U3 'Toxic Gases inside the Protected Area Boundary.'
The licensee notified state/local agencies and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee plans to issue a press release.
* * * UPDATE FROM MATT HUMMER TO DONG PARK AT 0003 EDT ON 04/08/11 * * *
"[At 2053 PDT,] Columbia has terminated the Unusual Event declared at 1607 [PDT] on 04/07/11. Conditions throughout the plant have remained stable. Columbia has confirmed there is no hazard to personnel safety nor a challenge to safe plant operation."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (OKeefe), NRR EO (Blount), IRD (Grant), DHS (Jenkins), and FEMA (O'Connell).
* * * UPDATE FROM MATT HUMMER TO JOE O'HARA AT 2318 ON 4/8/11 * * *
"At 1922 EDT on April 7, 2011, NRC was notified of an Unusual Event at Columbia Generating Station (EN#46739), The NRC was notified the event was terminated at 2353 EDT on April 7, 2011.
"Based on further investigation, this event is being retracted.
"The stator cooling water system contains a mixture of water and hydrogen when in operation. The system had been removed from service, drained and blanketed with nitrogen prior to commencing maintenance. There was no active source of hydrogen in the system. Although the system had been tested for hydrogen and none was detected, the event occurred when workers cut into a section of the system piping where a small amount of residual hydrogen remained.
"Immediately following the event, tape was placed over the cut to prevent any debris from entering the pipe. Hydrogen measurements were taken in the vicinity of the cut section of pipe and in the general area and concentrations were below hazardous levels. The only elevated reading occurred directly at the cut location when the tape was removed, This indicated that hydrogen, residual in nature, was confined to the inside of the pipe. Since the system was not in use and the residual hydrogen was confined, plant operations were not affected,
"As a result of this event, no personnel were injured, no equipment was damaged, and there was no impact to structures needed for plant operation.
"The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, the media, and local, state, and other government agencies of this update."
Notified R4DO(O'Keefe) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46740 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 04/08/2011
Notification Time: 01:02 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2011
Event Time: 17:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF THE CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM
"At approximately 1740 hours on April 7, 2011, a loss of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system occurred. At the time of the event, the plant was performing 0MST-DG13R. 'DG-3 Loading Test.' During performance of this test, the 480 VAC Emergency Bus E-7 main feeder breaker tripped unexpectedly. As a result, the CREV emergency makeup damper 2-VA-2J-D-CB closed on this loss of power, resulting in two CREV subsystems required by TS 3.7.3, 'CREV System,' being inoperable. As a result, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for this system. Brunswick has a shared control room, but only Unit 1 was required to enter TS 3.7.3 Required Action C.1. for two CREV subsystems inoperable (i.e., be in Mode 3 within 12 hours). Unit 2 was operating in Mode 4 for a scheduled refueling outage and did not meet any applicability conditions for TS 3.7.3.
"Operability of the CREV subsystems was restored and the related LCO was exited at 1931 hours following the restoration of CREV damper 2-VA-2J-D-CB. Investigation of the E-7 bus trip is ongoing. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The condition existed for approximately 1 hour and 51 minutes. Plant staff took immediate action to return the equipment to service. For the brief time the CREV systems were inoperable, performance of plant personnel and equipment in the Control Room was not adversely affected."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46741 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/08/2011
Notification Time: 13:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2011
Event Time: 10:24 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNSEALED FLOOD BARRIER PENETRATION
"During investigations of flood barrier penetrations, one approximately 4 inch conduit has been identified that is not sealed. Reducers are installed in the conduit on the exterior side. This conduit penetrates the auxiliary building into room 56. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of the station's safety related equipment in the auxiliary building to perform their design accident mitigation functions.
"During investigations of flood barrier penetrations, a drain flow path from the CARP building into Room 23 of the Auxiliary Building [was identified]. There is no specific procedural guidance to isolate this flow path in the event of a flood above 1007 feet. Flooding through this flow path could have impacted the ability of the station's safety related equipment to perform their design accident mitigation functions.
"This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D).
"The penetrations and CARP building drains are at an approximate elevation of 1007 feet. The river level has been less than 997 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) since prior to December 1, 2010. The safety related equipment is currently operable. There are not any indications of conditions that might result in a flood. Compensatory actions have been identified."
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46742 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/08/2011
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2011
Event Time: 06:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER INOPERABLE
"Technical Support Center (TSC) was non-functional due to inability to maintain pressure boundary for function of the TSC HVAC system. This morning the latch to one of the doors to the TSC was discovered broken. The door would not latch shut. The station has repaired the door. Compensatory measures were in place for the nonfunctional facility. The TSC is now functional."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46744 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 04/10/2011
Notification Time: 06:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2011
Event Time: 03:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 12 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP WHILE PERFORMING A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN
"On April 09, 2011, at 2349 [EDT], Beaver Valley Power Station [BVPS] Unit No. 2 was operating at 15% power while preparing to synchronize the main unit generator to the grid. At that time, the 'A' Auxiliary Feedwater Injection Header was declared inoperable due to a water leak identified from a vent valve fillet weld between the inside and outside Containment Isolation Valves (outside of containment) for containment penetration X-79.
"In accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, Condition D, at 0345 [EDT], April 10, 2011, BVPS Unit 2 commenced a Reactor Shutdown to Mode 3. Required action is to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours. This event is being reported as a Technical Specification required shutdown pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), 4 hour notification. Repairs are in progress. The following additional shutdown actions may be required from the time the Injection Header/Containment Penetration was declared inoperable: Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition D, Mode 4 in 18 hours and Technical Specification 3.6.1, Condition A, Mode 5 within 37 hours. This event is also being reported as a degraded condition for Containment pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 8 hour notification.
"Additionally, at 0357 [EDT], during the Reactor Shutdown, at 4.6% Reactor Power, the BVPS Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped due to reaching a pre-established manual trip criteria of 25% Steam Generator Level for the 21A Steam Generator. This was conservative criteria set above automatic actuation setpoint of 20.5% level. This event is being reported as a RPS Actuation pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 4 hour notification.
"Control room personnel entered Emergency Operating Procedure E-0, 'Response to Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.' Safety systems and equipment functioned as designed following the manual reactor trip.
"Due to the cooldown and subsequent shrink of level in the 21A Steam Generator, an automatic start of the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump [2FWE-P22] occurred at 20.5%. This event is being reported as an Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 8 hour notification."
All control rods fully inserted into the core. The plant electrical system is aligned to normal offsite power sources. Decay heat from the reactor coolant pumps is being directed to atmospheric dump valve. There is no primary to secondary leakage. There was no impact on Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46745 | Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRANK KICH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/10/2011
Notification Time: 10:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2011
Event Time: 08:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1DO)
RONNIE (DOE)
PALAZZOLO (EPA)
RUSSELL (USDA)
HOSKINS (HHS)
BARDEN (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF AN OIL SHEEN IN THE DISCHARGE CANAL
"Report has been made to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation and the Westchester County Department of Health related to a visible oil sheen identified on the discharge canal. NRC report required per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to notification of other government agencies."
Initially, the National Response Center was not notified as it does not appear that the oil had reached the Hudson River from this occurrence. After further discussion with the Indian Point Environmental Supervisor, the National Response Center and the Coast Guard were notified concerning this event.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |