| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/22/2011 - 03/23/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46562 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE TERRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 01/21/2011
Notification Time: 22:25 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2011
Event Time: 15:39 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text STEAM EXCLUSION DOOR DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On 1/21/2011 at 1539 CST, the NRC Resident Inspector informed the Control Room that the lower Cane bolt was disengaged on Steam Exclusion Door 3, between Emergency Diesel Generator Room B and the Cardox Room. While the Cane bolt was not engaged, the barrier was Non-Functional and, in accordance with TRM 3.0.9, all equipment supported by that steam exclusion barrier was immediately declared inoperable. This included both Emergency Diesel Generators A & 8, safety-related 4160 V Busses 5 & 6, Service Water Trains A & B, and safety-related 480 V Busses 51, 52, 61. & 62. In addition, with Service Water inoperable, the following equipment was also inoperable in accordance with TRM 3.3.1: Component Cooling Trains A & B, Safety Injection Trains A & B, Residual Heat Removal Trains A & B, Containment Spray and Cooling Trains A & B, Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps A & B, and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. With all three AFW pumps inoperable. TS 3 A.b.2 was entered to immediately initiate action to restore one AFW Train to operable status and suspend all LCOs requiring mode changes until one AFW Train is restored to operable status.
"Steam Exclusion Door 3 was properly secured at 1545 CST on 1/21/2011, and LCO 3.0.c and TS 3 A.b.2 were exited at that time. All equipment affected by the steam exclusion barrier is operable.
"This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function,' and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM CRAIG J. NEUSER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1427 EDT ON 3/22/2011 * * *
"Retraction of EN #46562 Non-Functional Steam Exclusion Door.
"On January 21, 2011, EN #46562 provided notification that both trains of ESF equipment (e.g., SI, RHR, ICS, etc ) were inoperable following discovery that the lower cane bolt was disengaged on steam exclusion Door 3, between emergency diesel generator Room B and an adjacent equipment room in the turbine building. With the lower cane bolt disengaged, the steam exclusion barrier was considered non-functional.
"A subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the Door 3 lower cane bolt was not required for Door 3 to fulfill its function as a steam exclusion barrier. The previously reported condition would not have resulted in an environment that would have adversely impacted the equipment protected by Door 3. Therefore, the door remained functional and the supported ESF equipment remained operable. Consequently, this condition did not meet the reportability criteria in 10CFR50.72.
"As a result, the notification made on January 21, 2011, in EN #46562 is hereby retracted.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO(Cameron). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46677 | Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS WEICHLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/17/2011
Notification Time: 00:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2011
Event Time: 16:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On 03/16/11, at 1647 [EST], Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 declared the High Pressure Coolant Injection system inoperable for a condition found during testing which could cause the system to malfunction when swapping suction sources. While lined up to the suppression pool suction flow path, unsatisfactory results were obtained while venting for system fill verification, indicating potential voiding of a portion of the pump discharge piping. Unit 2 HPCI remains available while aligned to its normal suction, the condensate storage tank.
"This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC resident has been informed of this notification." |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46684 | Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BOISE CASCADE PAPER CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: INTERNATIONAL FALLS State: MN
County:
License #: 5011-100-36
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRANDON JURAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/18/2011
Notification Time: 17:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DENSITY GAUGE STUCK SHUTTER
"The licensee Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was performing a routine shutter check on a density gauge (Berthold model LB7440); the shutter was difficult to turn so the RSO used pliers to move the shutter to the indicated closed position. The shutter did not close. The detector on the gauge was still reading the same as when the shutter was indicated open. The RSO contacted the manufacturer and is in the process of scheduling them to service the device. The RSO tagged the gauge with a do not operate tag warning people of the problem." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46689 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT KROS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/22/2011
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 10:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTAINMENT COOLERS DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 10:58 CDT, today during the performance of IC-ST-IA-3010B, I&C found NG-HCV-400A-A3, CCW INLET VALVE HCV-400A NITROGEN SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE, closed which is required to remain open for VA-3A to remain operable. This valve supplies backup nitrogen to VA-3A CCW cooler isolation valve HCV-400A on loss of instrument air to maintain cooling flow to the ventilation during an accident condition. While the nitrogen valve NG-HCV-400A-A3 was closed, performance of IC-ST-IA-3010B on VA-3B, CONTAINMENT AIR RECIR FAN, placed the containment cooler in an inoperable status. This led to Technical Specification 2.0.1 entry due to both trains of cooling being inoperable. The cause for the mispositioning of NG-HCV-400A-A3 is unknown at this time. The inoperability of VA-3A along with VA-3B rendered the containment cooling trains unavailable to perform their safety function during an accident condition. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(V)(D) for mitigating the consequences of an accident. FCS entered into Technical Specification at 10:58 CDT and exited Technical Specification at 11:14 CDT."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46690 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/22/2011
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 13:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL FLOODING OF RAW WATER PUMP
"During ongoing investigations of flood barrier penetrations at the station, a weakness in the flood protection strategy that would prevent protection of the raw water pumps for floods above 1007'-6" Mean Sea Level (MSL) was discovered. Cell in-leakage through penetrations at 997' 10" MSL would be beyond the capacity of the raw water pumps. During the preparation of a calculation to demonstrate the validity of this method it was determined that the grid backwash pipe for each grid and the surface sluice penetrate the east wall of the intake structure through an unsealed penetration (a total of 7 penetrations). The grid backwash line is an 18" pipe passing through a 24" sleeve. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of the station's raw water pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions.
"This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v).
"The penetration is at an elevation of 997'10" MSL. The design flood for the station is at 1014' MSL. The raw water pumps would not be affected until a river level of 1007'6" MSL was reached. The river level is currently approximately 993.5' MSL and has been less than 995'MSL since prior to December 1, 2010. The raw water pumps are currently operable. The National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office is predicting a rise in river level of 2 feet over the next 5 days. Actions are in progress to seal the penetration."
The licensee has instituted a temporary plug contingency plan dependant on river level.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |