United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2011 > February 23

Event Notification Report for February 23, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
02/22/2011 - 02/23/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


46622 46632 46633 46634 46636 46637

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 46622
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RMA GROUP
Region: 4
City: RANCHO CUCAMONGA State: CA
County:
License #: 2700-36
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 02/17/2011
Notification Time: 20:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2011
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()
MEXICO VIA FAX ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE SOURCE

The following information was received by email:

"On February 16, 2011, RHB [California Radiologic Health Branch] South RM [Radiologic Materials] was contacted by the [licensee] RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of RMA Group, concerning a loss of the Cs-137 source from a Troxler model 3430 (S/N 25220) moisture density gauge (8 mCi Cs-137, SN 758021, 40 mCi Am:Be-241, SN 4721490). [The licensee RSO] stated that the Troxler gauge was in use at a construction site located at the on/off ramp of Interstate 10 at North Indian Canyon Drive, near Palm Springs in early February (sometime between Feb. 3 and Feb. 8, 2011). [The licensee RSO] stated that operator noticed that the readings taken had dropped significantly from his previous readings and thought that the computer in the gauge had malfunctioned and the gauge was returned to their facility and stored until it was taken in for service at Southwest Calibration and Training LN 7567 (SWCT) on February 14 or 15. On the afternoon of February 16, 2011, [The licensee RSO] was contacted by SWCT that the Cs-137 source pellets were missing due to the cap of the source capsule breaking off at the weld. [The licensee RSO] stated that Troxler service was consulted and that they were informed that this was an issue that had occurred twice previously in the past 6 years and that they had requested that the source rod be returned to them to allow them to determine how the break had occurred.

"[The licensee RSO] stated that he had been given a survey meter to be used to attempt to find the source. [The licensee RSO] stated that a survey of the storage area of their Rancho Cucamonga facility (all of the other gauges were out being used at the time) and the vehicle used to transport the gauge when the incident was likely to have occurred and did not find the source. [The licensee RSO] stated that he would attempt to find the sources at the construction site in the morning when he had determined the area that the gauge was in use when the incident occurred. [The licensee RSO] stated that the source may have already been buried under 10 inches of fill (soil) and 8-10 inches of asphalt, but he was not absolutely sure. [The licensee RSO] was informed that a 30 day report was required to be submitted to [the RHB] office.

"On February 17, 2011, [RHB] confirmed that the damaged gauge had never had any incidents or trauma that potentially could have resulted in damage to the source capsule and that the construction site was on N. Indian Canyon Drive at one of the on/off ramps to Interstate 10. The results of the search for the missing source and a confirmation of the exact location of the incident will be forwarded to NMED when the RSO has confirmed the information. An investigation into the cause of the damage of the source capsule and possible location of the source capsule is ongoing."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 46632
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: 01-39-04
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIA SCHMITT
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 02/20/2011
Notification Time: 22:30 [ET]
Event Date: 02/20/2011
Event Time: 08:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FLY ASH GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE

The licensee uses industrial fixed gauges for measuring densities in fly ash hoppers. The industrial fixed gauges contain a 50 milliCurie Cesium 137 sealed source. The sources were manufactured and installed by Kay Ray, Inc. While the licensee was performing maintenance on the gauges, the remote source closure mechanism on 3 of the gauges did not operate as designed and the shutter did not close when operated by the handle on the floor. The chain that operates the source shutter mechanism 20 feet above the floor was disconnected which allowed the spring loaded shutter to close. No personnel were exposed to radiation during this event.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 46633
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: BRADFORD ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/22/2011
Notification Time: 02:23 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2011
Event Time: 20:01 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
FREDERICK BROWN (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

AUTO START AND LOAD OF EDGs ON UNITS 1&3 FOLLOWING LOSS OF START-UP TRANSFORMER

"On February 21, 2011, at approximately 2001 Mountain Standard Time (MST) a valid actuation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Train 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and Unit 3 Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator occurred as a result of undervoltage on their respective safety buses. Both EDGs started and loaded as designed to energize the respective safety buses. No Emergency Plan declaration was made and none was required.

"The loss of power to the Unit 1 and Unit 3 safety buses was the result of protective relay actuations on the A-E-NANX02 Startup Transformer which deenergized the transformer and the Unit 1 13.8KV Intermediate Bus 1-E-NAN-S06 and the Unit 3 13.8KV Intermediate Bus 3-E-NAN-SOS. The affected intermediate buses provide power to the Unit 1 safety bus 1-E-PBB-S04 and the Unit 3 safety bus 3-E-PBA-S03 respectively. The Auxiliary Operators responded to inspect the Startup Transformer and affected buses and determined that there was no fire or smoke and no obvious equipment damage to transformers or associated 13.8 KV Buses. At the time of the actuations, the Unit 1 Control Room received alarms for Startup Transformer A-E-NAN-X02 'Phase, Winding Ground Differential Trip'.

"Subsequent inspection by the Electricians identified damage to the cabling from the 'Y' winding of A-E-NAN-X02 Start-Up Transformer to the alternate supply breaker on Unit 2 Intermediate Bus 2-E-NAN-SOS. Unit 1 and Unit 3 entered Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, Condition 'A', for one (of two) required offsite circuits inoperable. Unit 2 currently has the 'B' EDG out of service for a planned maintenance outage and the Unit 2 safety buses and required offsite circuits were unaffected by the Startup Transformer trip. Unit 2 safety buses are being supplied by Startup Transformers A-E-NAN-X01 and A-E-NAN-X03.

"Both Unit 1 and Unit 3 were at approximately 100% power, at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to and following the EDG actuations. No other ESF actuations occurred and none were required. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event.

"The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the ESF actuations and this ENS notification."

The licensee is working to restore normal electrical power to the affected safety buses from alternate available sources on Startup Transformers X01 and X03. The licensee stated that no significant non-safety related equipment has been deenergized. The licensee noted that while the cause of the damaged cabling noted in the above report is still under investigation, water intrusion repairs were recently conducted near the location where the current damages were found.

* * * UPDATE AT 0356 EST ON 2/22/11 FROM ROBINSON TO HUFFMAN * * *

The licensee has restored offsite power to the affected safety buses. The Unit 3 safety bus was restored from Startup Transformer X03 at 0106 MST. The Unit 1 safety bus was restored from Startup Transformer X01 at 0153 MST. The EDGs are in the process of being shutdown and reset. The LCO for required offsite power source to the buses has been exited.

R4DO (Gaddy) and NRR (Brown) notified.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 46634
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: KENT CHAVET
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 02/22/2011
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2011
Event Time: 09:09 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO LOSS OF POTABLE WATER SUPPLY

"Arizona Public Service Co. made an offsite notification to the Maricopa County Environmental Services Division at 0909 MST on February 22, 2011, to report a loss of power to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station drinking water supply pumps which resulted in the depressurization of the site domestic water supply header. The pumps were out of service on February 21, 2011, between the hours of 2001 and 2300 MST. Full service has been restored.

"The loss of power was related to the loss of Startup Transformer A-E-NAN-X02 as reported in ENS #46633 at 0023 on February 21, 2011.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 46636
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: FRANK WINTER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/22/2011
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2011
Event Time: 11:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO NONCOMPLIANT PARTIAL LAKE BYPASS OPERATION

"At 1120 [CST] on February 22, 2011, Dresden Station transitioned to indirect open cycle (Partial Lake Bypass). This was done to control level in the Hot Discharge Canal, which was rising due to a failure of the 2/3 'E' Lift Pump on neutral over current earlier in the day. This is a noncompliance of the NPDES [National Pollution Discharge Elimination System] permit, which does not allow operation in lake bypass except when both units are shutdown. This noncompliance is reportable to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. The site representative for the Illinois Emergency Management Agency was also notified."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 46637
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MCCARTHY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/22/2011
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2011
Event Time: 14:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 57 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO SERVICE WATER PIPING LEAK

"At approximately 1030 hours, the Control Room received notification of a leak in the Unit 3 West Service Water (SW) valve pit of approximately 150 gpm on the SW piping downstream of SW valves SWN-6 and SWN-7. The piping supplies conventional essential SW loads. Abnormal operating procedure 3-AOP-SW-1 (SW Malfunction) was entered due to a report of approximately 3 feet of water in the West valve pit in the area of SW valves SWN-6/SWN-7 and SWN-1111/SWN-1112. Adjustments were made to equipment to reduce the leak and pumps placed in the pit to reduce the pit water level. At 1203 hours, Technical Specification 3.7.9, 'Service Water System' (SWS), Condition E, 'SWS piping and valves inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, B, C or D with no loss of safety function' was entered.

"After further assessment of the condition, it was determined at 1425 hours, that the condition would prevent the credited method of isolating the SW loads in the event of cold leg recirculation during a DBA due to inaccessibility to the valve pit for valve operation. This condition constituted a loss of safety function, and the plant entered TS 3.0.3. In accordance with TS 3.0.3, the unit initiated actions to shut down the plant at 1524 hours. This condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any plant shutdown required by the plants TS,' and an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures, or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Investigations of the condition are in progress."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012