| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/26/2010 - 07/27/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 46112 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MEADWESTVACO TEXAS LLP
Region: 4
City: SILSBEE State: TX
County:
License #: 01095
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 07/21/2010
Notification Time: 08:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2010
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PROCESS GAUGE STUCK SHUTTER
The following was received via fax from the State of Texas:
"On July 20, 2010, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that while performing a routine test of the shutter on a Ronan Engineering nuclear gauge, the shutter failed to close. The gauge is a model SA-1 serial number 9724 GG containing 10 milliCuries (original activity) of Cesium (Cs) 137 and is used for level detection. The RSO stated that while they were trying to close the shutter, they applied too much pressure to the operating arm, and the operating pin which attaches the arm to the shutter sheared off. The shutter is stuck in the open position, which is the normal operating position for this gauge. The RSO stated that the current radiation level at one foot from the gauge is 0.015 millirem per hour, and presents no additional risk of radiation exposure to any individual. The gauge is located approximately 10 to12 feet off of the ground in an area that is not routinely occupied by individuals. This gauge, along with three additional gauges, are currently only used as a back up system. The RSO believes the gauge was installed in the late 1990s. The RSO stated that they will contact a service provider and either repair the gauge, or dispose of it."
Texas Incident # I-8763 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46116 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: BRIGHAM AND WOMEN'S HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: BOSTON State: MA
County:
License #: 44-0004
Agreement: Y
Docket: 09-0003
NRC Notified By: KENATH O. TRAEGDE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 07/22/2010
Notification Time: 09:24 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIALLY LOST RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following was received via fax from the State of Massachusetts:
"On June 3, 2010, two packages containing I-125 seeds were received by the Medical Physicist [MP], who brought them to the radiation oncology hot lab. The MP removed the paperwork and left the packages in the lab while he went back to his office to update the inventory system. He returned to the hot lab to place the cartridges containing the seeds in the vault. He put one cartridge in the vault next to a cartridge that was left over from a canceled treatment. The MP thought that the other cartridge already in the vault was from one of the packages just received, and proceeded to remove the labels from the packages and survey the packages before discarding them. Since the seeds are shielded by a stainless steel cartridge, the survey measurement was indistinguishable from background. The event was discovered by him on Tuesday, June 8, when he was preparing for a treatment and noticed the serial numbers on the cartridges did not match the ones in the inventory system. He reported his findings to the Radiation Safety Officer. The event was reported to Massachusetts Radiation Control Program on Thursday, June 10.
"Approximately 43 milliCuries of I-125 seeds were disposed in the clean trash system. Attempts to locate the material in the trash were unsuccessful and they concluded on Tuesday, June 8, that the package had left the premises via the trash."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46118 | Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: OK DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 4
City: ORIENTA State: OK
County: MAJOR
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 07/22/2010
Notification Time: 19:38 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2010
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
TERRENCE REIS (FSME)
VICTOR DRICKS (R4PA)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State of Oklahoma reported that on 7/22/10, at about 1530 CDT, a moisture density gauge at a construction site in Orienta, OK south of the intersection of Highway 60 and Highway 412, was run over by a tractor-trailer rig followed by 3 other vehicles. None of the drivers stopped.
The road was closed so that the area could be searched to locate the gauge. Initially the source rod (typically containing a Cesium-137 source) was not found after searching the scene.
The Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) was the licensee and owner of the gauge. The ODOT Radiation Safety Officer was contacted. At the time of this report the source rod was located and the RSO determined the source to be intact.
A major newspaper in the area posted information on the issue on their website. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46127 | Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ASHLEY VALONE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 07/26/2010
Notification Time: 14:18 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2010
Event Time: 13:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text 60-DAY OPTIONAL REPORT FOR INADVERTENT SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION
"At 1314 hours [EDT] on May 25, 2010, with the unit defueled during Refueling Outage 26, an inadvertent Safety Injection (SI) Signal occurred. The signal was received when Safeguards Train 'A' breaker DP-A-20 was closed during the performance of procedure PIC-020, 'Time Delay Relay Calibration Safeguards Train 'A'.' The SI Signal resulted in a containment phase 'A' isolation, containment ventilation isolation, control room ventilation transfer to emergency pressurization mode, and Radiation Monitors R-11 and R-12 (Containment Vessel Airborne Particulate and Gas Monitors) isolation. Emergency Bus 1 and Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' were under clearance, including the Train 'A' sequencer. Therefore, automatic loading of the 'A' Train Sequencer did not occur and no actual injection into the reactor vessel occurred. The affected systems actuated as expected.
"The cause of the inadvertent SI Signal resulted from SI Initiation Latching Relay SIA1 when power was restored to Safeguards Rack 51. Subsequent investigation determined the SIA1 relay was in an unexpected position (i.e., latched). The SIA1 relay likely became inadvertently latched while performing cable pulls in Safeguards Rack 51 for work associated with Water Cooled Condensing Unit 1A.
"Corrective actions include a revision to a procedure to address additional steps to require reset of SI Initiation Latching Relays SIA1 and SIA2 after cleaning and lubrication and development of a planning tool to better assess the risk associated with work being performed [on] plant equipment. In addition, a procedure will be developed for Operations to manually reset safeguards SI Initiation Latching Relays SIA1 and SIA2 prior to restoring system power. These actions are expected to be completed before or on December 16, 2010."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46128 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ED BURKETT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 07/26/2010
Notification Time: 20:46 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2010
Event Time: 11:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 24-HOUR FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT
A licensed (not active) employee supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46129 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KARL COSSEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 07/26/2010
Notification Time: 22:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2010
Event Time: 20:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 19 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM
"On 7/26/2010 at 2001 [hrs. CDT], Control Room personnel initiated a manual reactor trip from approximately 19% reactor power. Unit 1 was in the process of coming off-line to support Main Generator repair. The generator breaker had just been opened and load transferred to condenser steam dumps when a loss of condenser vacuum occurred. The reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of main condenser vacuum with reactor power above P-10 permissive. All systems functioned as expected. All control rods fully inserted. Main Steam Isolation valves were manually shut. All reactor coolant system parameters are as expected, with reactor coolant temperature being maintained by atmospheric steam dumps."
Currently, the plant is at normal operating temperature and pressure with the steam generators being fed by the main feed pumps. Feedwater is being supplied via the condenser and condensate storage tank. There were no lifts of safeties or reliefs during the transient. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical line-up with no effect on Unit 2. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. The cause of the loss of vacuum is under investigation.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |