| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/04/2010 - 06/07/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 45815 | Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS SHORTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/06/2010
Notification Time: 06:11 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2010
Event Time: 22:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION TO CONTROL THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
"At 2145 [EDT] hours on April 5, 2010, a loss of electrical power to the Division 1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) initiation logic occurred. Control room annunciators for 'Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Out of Service', 'Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Out of Service', and 'RCIC/RHR D2 to D1 00 File Power Loss' were received. At 2250 hours, the Control Room staff determined a loss of isolation function existed. The operators entered Technical Specification (TS) action statements for Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation (TS 3.3.5.1), RCIC Instrumentation (TS 3.3.5.2), and Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation (TS 3.3.6.1). The power loss was caused by a blown fuse which occurred during surveillance testing. The surveillance test was suspended and plant personnel commenced troubleshooting and investigation efforts. A recovery plan is being developed to back out of the surveillance test and replace the fuse to re-energize the logic, while ensuring the plant does not experience an undesirable actuation of the logic.
"The power loss caused five containment isolation valves to lose automatic isolation function. These valves have no associated inboard automatic isolation valve powered by Division 2. As a result of the power loss, the valves cannot automatically close on demand to isolate and therefore cannot perform their automatic function to isolate the containment.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
The licensee entered a 12-hour shutdown action statement for the loss of containment isolation function as a result of the power failure.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LLOYD ZERR TO PETE SNYDER ON 6/4/2010 AT 1126 * * *
"On April 6, 2010, at 0611 hours, notification was made to NRC Operations Center of an event that at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material [10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c)]. A blown fuse during surveillance testing caused a loss of electrical power to the Division 1 Loss of Coolant Accident initiation logic. The power loss caused five containment isolation valves to lose their automatic isolation function. These valves have no associated inboard automatic isolation valve powered by Division 2. As a result of the power loss, the valves could not automatically close on demand and therefore, could not perform their automatic function to isolate containment.
"Following further evaluation, it was determined that a loss of safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material did not occur. Based on review of valve leak rate test history and compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria, the penetrations and Containment were capable of performing their intended design function. The associated inboard valves and/or water seals were capable of automatically isolating containment. Additionally, all required Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operation were complied with for the identified issue, and therefore, no operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications existed.
"Since the event or condition reported in Event Notification 45815 would not have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material, this event or condition is not reportable and the notification is retracted. Additionally, based on not meeting any 10 CFR 50.73 reporting criteria, no Licensee Event Report is required. The evaluation (i.e., Reportability Determination) for this event or condition is documented in Condition Report 10-74904.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R3DO (Pelke). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45970 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: MISSISSIPPI DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 4
City: Southhaven State: MS
County:
License #: MS-261-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DANIEL BRANTLEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 06/01/2010
Notification Time: 17:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2010
Event Time: 02:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
| Event Text MISSISSIPPI AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE SOURCE UNABLE TO BE RETRACTED TO SHIELDED POSITION
The following information was obtained from the State of Mississippi via email:
"On May 24, 2010 around 2:00 a.m. [CDT], a Portable Moisture Density gauge was run over by an asphalt roller. The casing of the gauge was damaged. DRH [Mississippi Division of Radiation Health] was notified and supplied with the following measures of radiation, 22 mR/hr at the surface of the damaged gauge and 0.75 mR/hr at approx. 3 feet from the gauge. DRH [was] informed that the gauge could be safely placed in a sealable carrying case. It was determined that the Cs-137 source was not returning to its fully shielded position. A DRH official went to the site the next morning with a small lead pig. The source holder was extended a few inches in order to tape the pig on the rod's end. The damaged gauge was then taken to MDOT [Mississippi Dept. of Transportation] storage site and a leak test was performed. The wipes were analyzed by the MSDH [Mississippi State Department of Health] Radiological Health Lab. The measured activity was well below the regulatory upper limit of .005 microCuries. Wipe analysis was received 5/26/2010."
Isotope(s): Cs-137, 8 mCi and Am-241:Be, 44 mCi.
Report No: MS-10004 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45972 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: SHAW ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 06/02/2010
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB (via email) (ILTA)
CANADA (via fax) ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text OHIO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - THREE TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS MISSING
The following information was obtained from the State of Ohio via email:
"A contractor installed tritium self-illuminating exit signs between March 2004 and October 2005 at various locations as part of a US Army Corps of Engineers contract to renovate military recruiting centers. The contractor recently conducted an inventory of the signs it had installed and discovered that some signs were not located where the installation records indicated that they had been installed.
"The signs in question are SRB Technologies, Model BetaLux-E, containing 10 Ci of H-3. Three (3) signs identified as missing in Ohio are: S/N 004222, installation address 1300 State Street, Alliance, Ohio, 44601 and S/Ns 009242 and 009243, installation address 2531 Franks Way, Columbus, Ohio, 43232.
"The signs were not located during a physical inspection of the properties. Interviews with personnel currently occupying the sites provided no information as to the disposition of the signs. The contractor is currently replacing the H-3 signs with electric signs and is returning the H-3 signs to the manufacturer for proper disposal.
"Contractor: Shaw Environmental, Inc. of Stoughton, MA."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45974 | Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: HINKLE CONTRACTING CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: STANTON State: KY
County:
License #: 201-472-51
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARISSA VEGA VELEZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 06/02/2010
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2010
Event Time: 11:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
"Kentucky Department for Public Health Protection and Safety was notified on May 25, 2010, by the RSO for Hinkle Contracting Corporation that a radiological incident involving an accidental crushing of a density gauge occurred at Georgetown Municipal Airport 6206 Paris Pike, Georgetown, KY. Gauge was identified by [the RSO] as a Troxler 4640B Thin Layer Density Gauge. Troxler Gauge containing 9 milliCuries of Cs-137 had been crushed when an asphalt roller struck it. Based upon exposure rate measurements, visual verification, and review of Troxler 4640B specification data, it was determined by the [State of Kentucky] Radiation Health Branch that the radiation source had not been compromised." |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 45976 | Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/04/2010
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2010
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
| Event Text ACTIVE CRITICALITY CONTROLS NOT IN IROFS
"During a GNF-A [Global Nuclear Fuels - America] review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was determined at 9:30 AM today (6/4/10) that the list of Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) associated with the Dry Scrap Recycle Furnace operation was incomplete in the ISA Summary. Although criticality controls exist and these controls associated with moderation intrusion and geometry remained in place, functional, and maintained with appropriate management measures, they were not declared or documented in the ISA as IROFS.
"The existing criticality safety analyses of the operation bound the situation, were effective, and were not challenged. At no time was an unsafe condition present.
"The affected equipment has been shut down pending revision of the ISA to document IROFS for this process. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported for administrative reporting pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery."
The licensee will be changing the list of IROFS to include these criticality controls.
The licensee will notify Region II (Gibson). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45977 | Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: LEWIS SELLERS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/04/2010
Notification Time: 13:40 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2010
Event Time: 10:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45979 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL WARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/06/2010
Notification Time: 03:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2010
Event Time: 02:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2010 | Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
MELANIE GALLOWAY (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
JACK GROBE (NRR)
MARK SATORIUS (R3)
MARY ANN DOYLE (DHS)
DWIGHT FULLER (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
"Reactor shutdown. All control rods inserted. Maintaining reactor vessel level with reactor core isolation cooling. Maintaining reactor vessel pressure with reactor core isolation cooling. [Automatic] Reactor scram due to loss of division 2 offsite power. Classification code: Unusual Event (HU1) Natural Destruction Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area."
The licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event at 0253 EDT. All rods fully inserted and decay heat is being removed by the main condensers. Division 1 buses are being powered by 1 of 3 offsite feeds and division 2 buses are being powered by the Emergency Diesel Generators.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO DONG PARK AT 0425 EDT ON 6/6/2010 * * *
"Division 2 power provided by Emergency Diesel Generators number 13 and 14. Classification Alert Code: (HA1) Natural Destruction Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area. Main condenser is the heat sink."
The licensee declared an Alert at 0417 EDT. The reactor remains stable in Mode 3. Physical damage to the auxiliary and the turbine buildings were noticed after an initial inspection.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3RA (Satorius), NRR (Grobe), IRD (Morris), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway), DHS (Doyle), FEMA (Guy), DOE(Morrone), USDA (Ussery), HHS (Standifer), and CNSC (Gdesnryxrs).
* * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO DONG PARK AT 0603 EDT ON 6/6/2010 * * *
"At 0238 [EDT], severe weather caused a loss of 345KV [switchyard power]. Reactor scrammed from a turbine trip. Plant is stabilized with RPV [Reactor Pressure Vessel] water level in normal band and RPV pressure at 820 psig. RPV Pressure is being controlled on turbine BPV [By Pass Valve]. Division 2 EDG's [Emergency Diesel Generator] are supplying power to division 2 buses. Plant is currently in Alert due to physical damage to plant due to severe weather."
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector is on-site. Notified IRD (Morris), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway).
* * * UPDATE FROM ED KOKOSKY TO DONG PARK AT 0247 EDT ON 6/7/2010 * * *
"There is no release of radiological materials. No further potential exists for uncontrolled release of radioactive materials to the environment. The Reactor is shut down. Reactor pressure and temperature are within normal bands. Offsite electrical feeds to the site have been restored. An overall damage assessment has been prepared and reviewed to ensure no conditions exist that would create an entry condition to the Emergency Plan. Plant repairs will be accomplished through site processes."
At 0220 EDT on 6/7/10, the licensee has terminated from the Alert classification.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3RA (Satorius), NRR (Grobe), IRD (Grant), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway), DHS (Doyle), FEMA (Blankenship), DOE(Bailey), USDA (Ussery), HHS (Peagler), and CNSC (Gdesnryxrs). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45980 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIM STREET
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 06/06/2010
Notification Time: 12:37 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2010
Event Time: 11:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/06/2010 | Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
MELANIE GALLOWAY (NRR)
JACK GROBE (NRR)
LUIS REYES (R2 R)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
MIKE INZER (DHS)
DENNIS VIA (FEMA)
THOMAS YATES (DOE)
FICK TURNER (HHS)
APRIL TYSON (USDA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BRUNSWICK DECLARED ALERT DUE TO HALON DISCHARGE IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING
At 1137 EDT, Brunswick Units 1 & 2 declared an Alert condition due to a discharge of Halon gas into the basement of the emergency diesel generator building (EAL H.A.3.1 for toxic gas discharge into a vital area). Initial inspection indicates that there is no fire. No offsite assistance was required and no personnel injuries as a result of the discharge. Both reactors continue to operate at 100% power. The licensee is investigating the cause of the discharge and will terminate the Alert when the area is ventilated and can be reoccupied.
The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE TO ABRAMOVITZ FROM CINDRIC AT 1616 EDT ON 6/6/10 * * *
The licensee terminated the Alert at 1614 EDT based on restoring normal atmosphere conditions in the emergency diesel generator building. The initiating cause of this event is still being investigated. State and local authorities have been notified and the Resident Inspector will be notified.
The NRC Operations Center has notified the Federal Agencies initially notified of this event. R2DO (Vias), NRR EO (Galloway) and IRD (Grant) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45981 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL DUVALL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/07/2010
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 19:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 86 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"Invalid actuation of ECCS for boiling water reactors (BWRs) including: high-pressure and low-pressure core spray systems; high pressure coolant injection system; low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system.
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system checked above. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On April 16, 2010, at 1717 EDT, Unit 1 received a false ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) Loss Of Cooling Accident (LOCA) signal on high drywell pressure. Based on plant data, all plant conditions were normal prior to event. Investigation identified an ATTS Slave Card failed in one of the Card File Racks. The Card File Rack contains ten (10) cards with two (2) being Master Trip Units (MTUs) that actuate on high drywell pressure. For initiation of an ECCS LOCA signal, both of the MTUs in the card file rack would have had to actuate. Cause of the event appears to be a momentary drop in supply voltage on the card file rack due to the failed slave card that lowered the set point of the MTUs to a point where they tripped. The set point is an internal voltage setting within the MTU. The failed ATTS cards have been replaced.
"Actuations: Core Spray A and B pumps started; Residual Heat Removal A, B, C, D pumps started; Diesel Generator 1A, 1B, and 1C started; Standby Plant Service Water Pump started; Plant Service Water 1A pump started (it had been in standby); Plant Service Water Valves 1P41-F310A, B, C, D closed (These are the Turbine Building isolation valves); Turbine Building Chiller B tripped; Main Control Room Environmental Control trains A and B started; HPCI Started but was secured prior to injection; Cooling Tower fans on towers A, B, C tripped.
"Reactor Water Level was normal at +37 inches and the highest Drywell Pressure indicated was 1.25 psig."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |