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Event Notification Report for April 5, 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/02/2010 - 04/05/2010

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45803 45805 45806 45808 45809 45810 45811 45812

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45803
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 1
City: SELMA State: VA
County:
License #: 760-437-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/31/2010
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2010
Event Time: 14:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED PORTABLE MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile from the Commonwealth of Virginia:

On Tuesday, March 30, 2010, a Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) employee was using a Model #3440 moisture density gauge (Serial #31899). This gauge was damaged when a compaction roller ran over it. The time of the incident was approximately 2:15 pm. The VDOT inspector had left the gauge unattended to go to her pick-up to get the gauge tools needed to perform a density test. Upon arriving back at the gauge, the inspector noticed that the gauge had been hit by the compaction roller. The location where this event occurred was at a construction site on route 696 in Selma, VA in the Staunton District area, on the South side of the bridge, at Abutment A, station number 101+ 75.

The inspector roped off the area, stopped the compaction roller, and called the District RSO from the Staunton District. The District RSO arrived at approximately 4:15 pm. The District RSO took a survey of the area and recorded readings of 1.2 to 1.7 mr/hr. The District RSO checked the source rod and determined that it was still in the shield. The gauge was transported to VDOT's home office at 6200 Elko Tract Road and is now in storage. No personnel were injured as a result of this event.

Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-10-01

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 45805
Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: KENNY KIRBY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 04/01/2010
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2010
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)
EARL EASTON (NMSS)
FUEL OUO GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

FAILED ACTIVE ENGINEERED CONTROL ON A ULTRASONIC TESTING SMART CRANE

"On March 29, 2010, Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) was notified that a UT Smart Crane had failed its functional test. The Smart Crane is an active engineered control that prevents simultaneous immersion in water of two fuel bearing components of concern in an Ultrasonic Testing (UT) tank. Earlier in the morning the crane tripped into fault mode while being moved to a storage position; there was no fuel bearing component attached to the crane at the time. Plant Maintenance personnel reset the crane's PLC [Programmable Logic Controller] and the required functional tests were performed per procedure prior to returning the crane to service. When the functional test was performed on Tank #3, the crane failed the test. Tank #3 was loaded with a component of concern (> 500 lbs) and the crane failed to prevent movement of a test weight into the tank's exclusion zone. The Smart Crane should have recognized Tank #3 as loaded and should have stopped the test weights at the edge of the tank's exclusion zone.

"The crane's PLC was subsequently checked and it was determined that it did not indicate Tank# 3 as loaded with a component of concern. The PLC was manually set to identify Tank #3 as loaded with a component of concern and testing resumed. The crane then failed a test on Tank #1. The UT tank did not contain a component of concern (i.e., it weighed < 500 lbs). As such, the operator using the crane should have been able to transfer the test weights into tank's exclusion zone, but the crane's safety interlock stopped the weights at the zone boundary.

"Initially, these failures were thought to be caused by errors in conducting earlier tests. If the weights are inadvertently released from the crane within the exclusion zone at the conclusion of a test, the tank status (loaded/unloaded) can be affected. As a result of an earlier corrective action, forklift barriers had been erected to limit the free space around the tanks. It was anticipated that these barriers were possibly interfering with the movement of the weights in/out of the exclusion zone during test.

"Tank #1 was reset and all tanks successfully passed the required functional test. Since a definite cause could not be determined but the crane passed the functional test and operations continued. The operators were requested to log the status of the Smart Crane indicating lights as the crane moved from tank to tank. On the night of March 30, 2010, the indicating lights did not provide the correct indication of tank loaded/unloaded status. The operation was immediately shutdown and NCS was notified. On March 31, 2010, Plant Maintenance determined the crane's linear encoder was damaged and not accurately tracking the crane's position. This failure mode allowed the crane to move, but gave a false indication of crane position to the PLC.

"This type of failure did not provide the PLC with accurate data to determine the crane's position. In this state, the Smart Crane would not prevent an operator from loading two items of concern in a single tank. This is a failure of the Smart Crane as an IROFS. This determination was reached at 1530 EDT on March 31, 2010.

"There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. An operator never attempted to load two components of concern into a UT tank. However, with inaccurate position information, the Smart Crane could not be credited as an IROFS and double contingency could no longer be assured. A criticality was no longer highly unlikely.

"Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10CFR70, Appendix A(b)(2) - Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that result in failure to meet the performance requirement of 70.61.

"An investigation of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45806
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JASON WEATHERSBY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/02/2010
Notification Time: 07:28 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: 04:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 87 Power Operation

Event Text

UNIT COMMENCED SHUTDOWN AFTER DECLARING MOTOR-DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"At 0445 [EDT], VC Summer Nuclear Station commenced a shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 Action b. FCV 03541-EF, emergency motor driven feedwater flow control valve 'B', was declared inoperable due to the failure of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.b at 0154 [EDT]. In accordance with 3.7.1.2 Action b, hot standby is required to be achieved within 6 hours (0754 EDT). At approximately 87% power, FCV 03541-EF was repaired and the associated Technical Specification was exited at 0608 [EDT]. The power descent has been stopped, and all systems are functioning as required."

The licensee will inform state/local agencies and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45808
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW NORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/02/2010
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

CONTRACTOR FAILED FITNESS FOR DUTY TESTING

A contract employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a pre-access fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the plant was not granted. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45809
Rep Org: TYCO FLOW CONTROL
Licensee: CROSBY VALVE AND GAGE
Region: 1
City: WRENTHAM State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID THIBAULT
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 04/02/2010
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

POSSIBLE FAILURE OF SOLENOID VALVES WITH DUAL FUNCTION MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES

The following information was received via facsimile:

"Tyco Valves & Controls LP (TVC), a business unit of Tyco Flow Control, is a contractor to certain NRC licensees, and on behalf of itself and certain of its affiliates, hereby submits information in response to notification requirements of 10 CFR Part 21. TVC manufactures, sells, and services Pressure Relief Valves (PRVs) to NRC licensees for use in NRC licensed facilities.

"On February 4, 2010, EPRI issued a notification of a potential 10 CFR Part 21 defect for Main Steam Safety Valves manufactured by Crosby Valve & Gage (Crosby). Crosby became a brand of TVC when they were purchased by them in 1998. The reported problem stems from an issue with the solenoid valve that controls the pneumatic actuator on certain main steam safety valves that were supplied during the early 1980's.

"Following is a list of U.S. plants that may have been affected by this issue:

"Utility Unit Start Up
"PA Power & Light Susquehanna 1 & 2 1983 & 1985
"Exelon LaSalle I & 2 1984
"Energy NW Columbia 1984
"Entergy Riverbend 1986

"TVC continues to investigate the reported problem, but is requesting a 30 day extension to complete the evaluation due to the complexity of the situation."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45810
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MEYERS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/04/2010
Notification Time: 19:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2010
Event Time: 15:42 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2010
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
SHER BAHADUR (NRR)
ELMO COLLINS (R4)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
VESTAL (DHS)
VIA (FEMA)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Decommissioned 0 Decommissioned
2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown
3 N Y 50 Power Operation 50 Power Operation

Event Text

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT - EARTHQUAKE FELT ON SITE

"Seismic Recording System activation with ground motion readily felt by control room personnel. Plant inspections performed to date show no observable damage to systems or structures."

The seismic event was reported by U.S. Geological Survey as a magnitude 7.2 event occurring 26 km (16 miles) SW of Guadalupe Victoria, Baja California, Mexico. Initial ground motion analysis on site indicated 0.027 g acceleration in the transverse direction.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT MEYERS TO DONG PARK AT 2055 EDT ON 4/4/2010 * * *

The Notification of Unusual Event classification was terminated at 1725 PDT on 4/4/2010 after completion of walk downs with no equipment issues being found.

Notified R4DO (Okeefe), NRR EO (Bahadur), IRD (Gott), DHS (Vestal), and FEMA (Via).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45811
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JARED SCHANK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 04/04/2010
Notification Time: 19:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2010
Event Time: 15:42 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2010
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
SHER BAHADUR (NRR)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
ELMO COLLINS (R4 R)
VESTAL (DHS)
VIA (FEMA)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO AN EARTHQUAKE

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"An Event Classification of Unusual Event (HU1.1) was declared at 1549 MST for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station because of an earthquake that originated in Baja California, [Mexico] location 32.093?N, 115.249?W at 1542 MST. Per the USGS [U.S. Geological Survey] website, the magnitude of the earthquake was 6.9 on the Richter scale. Initial walkdowns of plant equipment and review of plant parameters have found no unusual conditions or damage to plant equipment. No abnormalities caused by the seismic event were observed. No Reactor Protection System (RPS) or Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuations occurred and none were required. Palo Verde Unit 1 is in mode 5 for a scheduled refueling outage, and Units 2 & 3 are at 100 percent power with all offsite power supplies available.

"Initial analysis of the Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation system indicated a seismic event, below the magnitude of the 0.10g spectra Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and the 0.20g spectra Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM GORDON TIMOTHY TO VINCE KLCO AT 0003 EDT ON 4/5/2010 * * *

"Emergency classification termination was declared at 4/4/10, 2045 MST. All required power block inspections were completed with no deficiencies noted. No other conditions require an emergency classification, there are no challenges to fission product barriers or radiological release, and plant conditions offer no possibility of adverse impact on health and safety of the public. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of NUE termination."

Notified the R4DO (Okeefe), NRR-EO (Bahadur), FEMA (Via), DHS (Wallace) and IRD via email (Gott).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45812
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL ARENS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/04/2010
Notification Time: 20:56 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2010
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

BOTH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) INOPERABLE

"On 4/4/10 at 1245 [CDT], three RHR system snubbers were declared inoperable due to visual inspection identifying empty reservoirs for the snubbers. The inoperability of the snubbers rendered both trains of RHR cooling inoperable. On 4/4/10 at 1545, ultrasonic testing identified voided piping on the common RWST [Refueling Water Storage Tank] suction line to the RHR pumps. This condition also resulted in inoperability of both trains of RHR for the ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] mode of operation.

"At the time of these discoveries, Unit 2 was in mode 4, proceeding to mode 5 for a refueling outage. The inoperability of both trains of RHR represents a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Replacement of the snubbers is in progress. Following completion of snubber replacement, Unit 2 will proceed to mode 5 at which point ECCS capability is not required. Resolution of the voided piping will be accomplished following mode 5 entry."

The snubbers are in containment and were last checked during the previous refueling outage. The voiding in the RHR suction line only affects suction from the RWST and not when suction is aligned to the Reactor Coolant System.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012