Event Notification Report for April 02, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/01/2010 - 04/02/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
45806458084580945962
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45806
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JASON WEATHERSBY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JASON WEATHERSBY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/02/2010
Notification Time: 07:28 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: 04:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2010
Notification Time: 07:28 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: 04:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 87 | Power Operation |
UNIT COMMENCED SHUTDOWN AFTER DECLARING MOTOR-DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 0445 [EDT], VC Summer Nuclear Station commenced a shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 Action b. FCV 03541-EF, emergency motor driven feedwater flow control valve 'B', was declared inoperable due to the failure of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.b at 0154 [EDT]. In accordance with 3.7.1.2 Action b, hot standby is required to be achieved within 6 hours (0754 EDT). At approximately 87% power, FCV 03541-EF was repaired and the associated Technical Specification was exited at 0608 [EDT]. The power descent has been stopped, and all systems are functioning as required."
The licensee will inform state/local agencies and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0445 [EDT], VC Summer Nuclear Station commenced a shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 Action b. FCV 03541-EF, emergency motor driven feedwater flow control valve 'B', was declared inoperable due to the failure of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.b at 0154 [EDT]. In accordance with 3.7.1.2 Action b, hot standby is required to be achieved within 6 hours (0754 EDT). At approximately 87% power, FCV 03541-EF was repaired and the associated Technical Specification was exited at 0608 [EDT]. The power descent has been stopped, and all systems are functioning as required."
The licensee will inform state/local agencies and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45808
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW NORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW NORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/02/2010
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2010
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)
JAMES MOORMAN (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
CONTRACTOR FAILED FITNESS FOR DUTY TESTING
A contract employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a pre-access fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the plant was not granted. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A contract employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a pre-access fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the plant was not granted. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45809
Rep Org: TYCO FLOW CONTROL
Licensee: CROSBY VALVE AND GAGE
Region: 1
City: WRENTHAM State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID THIBAULT
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: CROSBY VALVE AND GAGE
Region: 1
City: WRENTHAM State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID THIBAULT
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 04/02/2010
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2010
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
POSSIBLE FAILURE OF SOLENOID VALVES WITH DUAL FUNCTION MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES
The following information was received via facsimile:
"Tyco Valves & Controls LP (TVC), a business unit of Tyco Flow Control, is a contractor to certain NRC licensees, and on behalf of itself and certain of its affiliates, hereby submits information in response to notification requirements of 10 CFR Part 21. TVC manufactures, sells, and services Pressure Relief Valves (PRVs) to NRC licensees for use in NRC licensed facilities.
"On February 4, 2010, EPRI issued a notification of a potential 10 CFR Part 21 defect for Main Steam Safety Valves manufactured by Crosby Valve & Gage (Crosby). Crosby became a brand of TVC when they were purchased by them in 1998. The reported problem stems from an issue with the solenoid valve that controls the pneumatic actuator on certain main steam safety valves that were supplied during the early 1980's.
"Following is a list of U.S. plants that may have been affected by this issue:
"Utility Unit Start Up
"PA Power & Light Susquehanna 1 & 2 1983 & 1985
"Exelon LaSalle I & 2 1984
"Energy NW Columbia 1984
"Entergy Riverbend 1986
"TVC continues to investigate the reported problem, but is requesting a 30 day extension to complete the evaluation due to the complexity of the situation."
The following information was received via facsimile:
"Tyco Valves & Controls LP (TVC), a business unit of Tyco Flow Control, is a contractor to certain NRC licensees, and on behalf of itself and certain of its affiliates, hereby submits information in response to notification requirements of 10 CFR Part 21. TVC manufactures, sells, and services Pressure Relief Valves (PRVs) to NRC licensees for use in NRC licensed facilities.
"On February 4, 2010, EPRI issued a notification of a potential 10 CFR Part 21 defect for Main Steam Safety Valves manufactured by Crosby Valve & Gage (Crosby). Crosby became a brand of TVC when they were purchased by them in 1998. The reported problem stems from an issue with the solenoid valve that controls the pneumatic actuator on certain main steam safety valves that were supplied during the early 1980's.
"Following is a list of U.S. plants that may have been affected by this issue:
"Utility Unit Start Up
"PA Power & Light Susquehanna 1 & 2 1983 & 1985
"Exelon LaSalle I & 2 1984
"Energy NW Columbia 1984
"Entergy Riverbend 1986
"TVC continues to investigate the reported problem, but is requesting a 30 day extension to complete the evaluation due to the complexity of the situation."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45962
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: 21:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2010
Event Time: 21:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
OVERVOLTAGE CONDITION CAUSES REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On Friday April 2, 2010, Unit 1 refueling outage activities were in progress and the 1A RPS/UPS Static Inverter was being removed from service. At 2156 hours, the inverter static transfer switch was placed in 'Bypass' which transferred the load from the inverter to the secondary alternate source. The manual bypass switch was then placed in 'Bypass' which was followed by the RPS/UPS series breakers tripping on an overvoltage condition. The actuation caused a loss of power to the IA RPS/UPS power distribution panel loads which provides power to the Division 1A and IIA RPS relays and Division IA and IIA NS4 relays. This caused primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) to automatically close on more than one system. The IB and IIB channels were unaffected.
"Troubleshooting determined that the secondary, alternate source voltage was 132 VAC which exceeded the overvoltage setpoint of 126 VAC. During outages, the 13kV bus voltages are higher than on-line voltages due to low operating equipment loading on the buses. The secondary alternate source to the inverter is not regulated which can result in greater than normal voltage to the RPS/UPS loads.
"The portion of the primary containment isolation system that received an actuation signal functioned successfully. All of the affected open isolation valves automatically closed. The isolation was a partial actuation.
"This 60-day ENS report is being made per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report invalid automatic actuation of systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). The listed system that actuated was general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) closed on drywell chilled water (DWCW), reactor enclosure cooling water (RECW), primary containment instrument gas (PCIG), and suppression pool cleanup."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On Friday April 2, 2010, Unit 1 refueling outage activities were in progress and the 1A RPS/UPS Static Inverter was being removed from service. At 2156 hours, the inverter static transfer switch was placed in 'Bypass' which transferred the load from the inverter to the secondary alternate source. The manual bypass switch was then placed in 'Bypass' which was followed by the RPS/UPS series breakers tripping on an overvoltage condition. The actuation caused a loss of power to the IA RPS/UPS power distribution panel loads which provides power to the Division 1A and IIA RPS relays and Division IA and IIA NS4 relays. This caused primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) to automatically close on more than one system. The IB and IIB channels were unaffected.
"Troubleshooting determined that the secondary, alternate source voltage was 132 VAC which exceeded the overvoltage setpoint of 126 VAC. During outages, the 13kV bus voltages are higher than on-line voltages due to low operating equipment loading on the buses. The secondary alternate source to the inverter is not regulated which can result in greater than normal voltage to the RPS/UPS loads.
"The portion of the primary containment isolation system that received an actuation signal functioned successfully. All of the affected open isolation valves automatically closed. The isolation was a partial actuation.
"This 60-day ENS report is being made per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report invalid automatic actuation of systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). The listed system that actuated was general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) closed on drywell chilled water (DWCW), reactor enclosure cooling water (RECW), primary containment instrument gas (PCIG), and suppression pool cleanup."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.