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Event Notification Report for January 27, 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/26/2010 - 01/27/2010

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45644 45645 45646 45650 45655 45663

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45644
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: THERMO-NITON ANALYZERS LLC
Region: 1
City: BILLERICA State: MA
County:
License #: 55-0238
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENATH TRAEGDE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 01/21/2010
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2010
Event Time: 11:06 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL LOSS OF AN X-RAY FLUORESCENCE DEVICE SOURCE

Thermo-Niton Analyzers LLC was expecting the delivery of an X-Ray Fluorescence device. The carrier was contacted and no delivery was scheduled for that location. The carrier is reviewing records to ascertain where the package is and whether it was delivered to the licensee's previous address. The state did not know the model number of the device or if there was a radioactive source in this device.

Thermo-Niton has two Massachusetts licenses: 55-0238 and 53-0388

* * * UPDATE ON 1/22/2010 AT 1129 FROM TONY CARPENITO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following report was received via e-mail:

"On 1/8/10, Thermo-Niton Analyzers LLC (Thermo) of Billerica, MA, shipped a Niton Portable XRF Analyzer (Model XL-801S, SN U1834, Source IPL Model XFB Series) to REM Aerospace of Fort Lauderdale, FL. On 1/12/10, REM Aerospace informed Thermo the device not yet been received. Subsequent communications determined that REM Aerospace had relocated and the device had been inadvertently shipped to REM Aerospace's previous address. Thermo contacted [the carrier] who returned to the original address on several occasions to recover the package. These attempts to recover the package were unsuccessful. On 1/21/10, Thermo contacted the MA and FL Radiation Control Programs and the Fort Lauderdale Police Department."

The XRF Analyzer contains a 10 milliCi Cadmium-109 source.

Notified FSME (Camper) and R1DO (Bellamy)

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45645
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: OHMSTEDE LTD
Region: 4
City: ST. GABRIEL State: LA
County:
License #: LA-3087-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/21/2010
Notification Time: 14:52 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2009
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECTED

The following information was received by facsimile:

"On December 4, 2009, the screwed connection on the source guide tube became disconnected from a radiography camera. The radiographer turned the crank handle too far out. The handle on the crank would not turn in either direction. The Radiation Safety Officer was then contacted. The camera was an AEA 660B serial # B2326. The source was an Ir-192 sealed source, model # A424-9, serial # 57864B. The activity of the source was 78.2 Curies. The crank cable was a QSA model SAN882 with serial # 10465. The source guide tube does not have a model and serial number. While stationed outside of the x-ray cell, the crank assembly hose connections were removed from the crank assembly handle and freed up by pushing the cable back into the crank handle assembly. The sealed source was then slowly cranked back into the shielded position. The camera was surveyed, locked, and returned to storage. The crank assembly was cleaned and had maintenance performed on it the following day. There was no overexposure. The crank assembly worked properly not allowing the cable to slide out of the cranking assembly. Training will be given to make sure and check that the source guide tube is properly tightened during initial assembly. The incident is being investigated [by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality]."

Louisiana Incident Number: LA100001.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45646
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: WESTLAKE CHEMICAL CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: SULPHER State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5404-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/21/2010
Notification Time: 15:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2009
Event Time: 10:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEVEL GAUGE SOURCE DISCONNECTED

The following excerpted information was received by facsimile:

Licensee employees went to the High Pressure Separator Bay to remove a point level gauge so weld repairs could be made to the vessel. "The source was a 3M, Model 4D6L, Cs-137 5000 mCi isotope, Serial Number 71150 in a Ronan SA-10 holder.

"The retracting rod was retracted and the shutter was closed. Wanting to be sure the shutter was fully closed, the retracting rod was pushed in and stopped at the shutter. The retracting rod was again retracted, however this time the rod came completely out of the holder. The source capsule was not attached. It appeared that the pins securing the source capsule to the rod had corroded and failed. The retracting rod was reinserted and a survey was done. All present came down from the vessel, barricaded the entry point to the separator bay to prevent access and contacted Thermo-Fisher to have the source removed from the vessel. Radiation readings at the barricaded entry way were 0.1 mR/hr."

Representatives from Thermo-Fisher and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality arrived on site in order to oversee recovery of the source. On December 11, 2009, the source capsule was removed from the holder and placed into a "capture Type A container" for shipping and disposal.

Louisiana Incident Number: LA100002

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45650
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ENERGY NORTHWEST
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #: F0953
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KELEE ATTEBERY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 01/22/2010
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 12/15/2009
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOOSE SURFACE CONTAMINATION ON A SEALED SOURCE

"On 12/15/09 an Electron Capture Detector (ECD) containing Ni-63 was discovered to have loose surface contamination in excess of 0.005 microcuries. This discovery was made while removing the ECD from a Gas Chromatograph (GC) used by Energy Northwest. The ECD was removed to prepare the GC for transfer from Columbia Generating Station to the Applied Physics and Engineering Laboratory in Richland, WA. During removal, the ECD was surveyed for loose contamination by Radiation Protection staff. Analysis of the swipes obtained during the survey was completed on 12/17/09 and indicated 0.02 microcuries on the swipe of the makeup gas adapter between the ECD and GC."

Washington State Item: WA100008

Current source activity 12.3 milliCi
ECD model: G2397 A; Serial Number: U2055
GC Model: 6890

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 45655
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: GERALD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 01/25/2010
Notification Time: 18:33 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2010
Event Time: 11:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION - OVERFLOW OF URANIUM BEARING AMMONIATED WASTEWATER

"It was reported to the EH&S Management that on January 24, 2010 a spill of approximately 200 gallons of uranium bearing ammoniated (5-7%) wastewater overflowed from the 'Q' tanks into the diked area below the tanks. These tanks are the final filtration prior to transfer of this liquid effluent to the outside treatment facility. Operators received a high level alarm and responded by shutting down the process in accordance with the operational procedure, with the overflow occurring for approximately six minutes. This event was the result of a pump failure in the tank discharge line. Notification was made to the on duty Health Physics (HP) staff and the on duty Incident Commander. Health Physics staff responded within minutes and used a Drager counter to determine the ammonia concentrations present. Readings in the immediate area of the dike were as high as 256 ppm ammonia. Readings in adjacent areas of the facility were approximately 150 ppm ammonia. Non-essential personnel were evacuated and essential personnel were instructed to don PPE-respirators with ammonia cartridges.

"Operations cleanup of the area was completed and with normal plant ventilation running the ppm ammonia concentrations were returned to < 25 ppm within approximately two hours. The failed pump has been repaired and returned to service. Based on the quick response of the HP staff, evacuations and appropriate use of PPE, no workers were exposed to significant concentrations and no medical attention was necessary.

"Notification is made based on 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.' The potential for a loss of containment was recognized and evaluated in one of the Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) which constitutes the Integrated Safety Analysis for this system. The PHA identified several initiating events which could lead to a high level and loss of containment event. The appropriate safeguards were identified, including the procedural responses, the evacuation during such an emergency of the workers in the enclosed chemical area, and the use of appropriate PPE. The consequences of the event were identified as a potential for personnel inhalation and exposure hazard from the uranium bearing ammoniated wastewater. However, the PHA did not specifically indentify that the potential existed for the consequences to exceed the Intermediate Consequence criteria for credible events. In accordance with SNM-1107 License Requirements for the Columbia Plant Intermediate Consequences are those that have the potential for a worker to receive greater than or equal to ERPG-2 chemical exposures. (ERPG-2 value for ammonia is 150 ppm.) Since the Q-Tank contains comingled uranium and chemicals, the Intermediate Consequences of 10CFR70.61 apply. Failure to identify that an Intermediate Consequence event was credible led to that event not being included in the Conversion ISA Summary ISA-03 and not designating Items Relied on For Safety (IROFS) for that accident sequence.

"Corrective Actions: As stated previously, the pump which failed has been repaired and returned to service. Actions taken by the staff to mitigate the event were appropriate and in accordance with approved procedures. Normal ventilation system operation reduced the concentrations to acceptable levels. [These actions are] complete.

"The safeguards identified in the PHA will be evaluated in the ISA and appropriate selections of IROFS will be made based on that evaluation and included in the ISA summary. [These actions are] in progress."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45663
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF ISCH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 01/26/2010
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/26/2010
Event Time: 15:25 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

ENTRY INTO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN

"While operating in mode 1 at 100% power, [the licensee] identified [a] failure to comply with Technical Requirements [TR] Manual 3.7.20, Snubbers, Condition C. [The] required action C.1 requires the performance of an inspection of required snubbers affected by transient in accordance with Table TR 3.7.20-1 within 6 months of the event. WCNOC [Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation] determined that a portion of the required inspections was not completed for transients that occurred during Refueling Outage 16 (Spring 2008). TR 3.7.20, Snubbers, Condition D requires affected systems to be declared inoperable immediately. No major equipment was out of service prior to the event.

"At 1525 CST, TS [Technical Specification] LCO [Limiting Condition of Operation] 3.7.8, Essential Service Water (ESW) System, was declared not met, [and therefore], both trains of ESW [were declared] inoperable. With both trains of ESW inoperable, TS LCO 3.0.3 was entered and preparations for unit shutdown commenced. Additionally, with both trains of ESW inoperable both Emergency Diesel Generators were declared inoperable. TS LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Conditions B and F were entered.

"Actions to complete required inspections per TR 3.7.20 Table TR 3.7.20-1 have been initiated.

"Shutdown was commenced at 1618 CST.

"NRC Senior Resident was notified 1/26/2010 15:30 CST regarding entry into TS LCO 3.0.3."


* * * UPDATE FROM RICK HUBBARD TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2206 EST ON 1/26/10 * * *

The licensee completed inspection of Train "B" snubbers, and at 2013 CST, the licensee exited TS LCO 3.0.3 based on restoration of Train "B" of Essential Service Water System to operable status. Licensee is still inspecting Train "A" snubbers.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Greg Pick)

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Thursday, March 29, 2012