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Event Notification Report for January 15, 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/14/2010 - 01/15/2010

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45465 45479 45621 45626 45629 45631

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45465
Rep Org: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. A. GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/24/2009
Notification Time: 12:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
JOHN THORP(e-mail) (NRR)
O. TABATABAI(e-mail) (NRO)

Event Text

POTENTIAL AGGRESSIVE WEARING OF ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY GUIDE CARDS

"Aggressive wearing of the RCCA [Rod Cluster Control Assembly] guide card has been observed at an international plant. Such aggressive wear has not been observed in any US plants. If this issue were to remain uncorrected, it is possible for enough wear to occur during the life of the plant that the RCCAs could become unguided and may not properly insert into the core. It has not been concluded whether there is a safety hazard which would result from this deviation."

* * * UPDATE FROM GRESHAM TO CHUCK TEAL VIA FAX AT 1213 EST ON 1/14/2010 * * *

"Aggressive wearing of the Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) guide card has been observed at an international plant. Such aggressive wear has not been observed in any other plants. If this issue were to remain uncorrected, it was postulated that enough wear could occur during the life of the plant that the RCCAs could become unguided and may not properly insert into the core.

"With the exception of the one international plant in which abnormal excessive wear has been found, the conclusion from the analysis of the collection of wear data and the analysis of rodlet insertion with worn guide cards is that there is no concern for safe operation of any plant regarding guide tube wear for the 40-year design life. The engineering analysis supports this conclusion regardless of the type of RCCA guide tube or the RCCA rodlet material currently in use. For the international plant with the excessive wear, years of continued safe operation is available, and a justification for continued operation has been provided to the utility. Directives in Materials Reliability Program (MRP 227) will necessitate guide tube inspections as part of life extension licensing.

"Concerning AP 1000, a guide tube wear analysis has been performed. The analysis demonstrates operability for the 60-year design life for the shutdown control rods.

"Based on the above evaluation results, it has been determined that this issue does not represent a substantial safety hazard pursuant to the requirements delineated in I0CFR Part 21 ."

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45479
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TROXLER ELECTRONIC LABORATORIES, INC.
Region: 4
City:  State: TX
County:
License #: L01296
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 11/06/2009
Notification Time: 14:31 [ET]
Event Date: 11/06/2009
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
ANDREA KOCK (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND RECOVERED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

On November 6, 2009, the State of Texas reported that a Troxler moisture density gauge was lost and recovered by the Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc. The event occurred approximately one to two years ago. The density gauge was recovered two days after it was lost. The State of Texas will provide updates as more information is available. The gauge contained an 8 mCi Cs-137 and a 40 mCi Am/Be-241 source.

Texas Incident # I-8686

* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO CHUCK TEAL AT 1730 EST ON 1/14/10 * * *

"On November 4, 2009, while conducting a routine inspection, an agency inspector found an event that involved a Troxler moisture/density gauge model # 4640 containing one 8 millicurie Cesium (Cs) - 137 source, which was lost during shipment and returned to the licensee the next day, intact and with no damage. The gauge did not contain an Americium source. The case did not have any scuff marks on it. Neither the licensee or the shipper had notified the agency of the event. They believed that it was not reportable since there was no chance that someone could have received an exposure from it and it was lost for only one day. The licensee also believed that the shipper would be required to make any required notifications. The licensee was informed that they would have been required to notify the agency of an event [and it] would have been reportable. The licensee stated that they believed the gauge had fallen off of their truck. The truck used had a faulty latch mechanism on the door. The driver received additional instruction on securing the door."

Notified FSME (Lewis) and R4DO (Hagar).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45621
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: QSA GLOBAL
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: 12-8361
Agreement: Y
Docket: 99-0014
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/11/2010
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2010
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - QSA GLOBAL REPORT OF DEFECT

"On January 8, 2010, at 1552 hrs. EST, QSA Global, Inc. reported a product defect to the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program in accordance with 105 CMR 120.142(B)(2)(a). The affected equipment that was identified was the QSA Model 87703 source assembly for a QSA Global radiography camera. A customer had received a Model 87703 source assembly and reported problems with the assembly connection on October 21, 2009. The unit was returned to their Burlington office and QSA Global, Inc. performed an evaluation of the extent of the defect. The Model 55000-3 female connector sleeve was identified as the source of the problem.

"The defect causes the male connector to not be fully seated in the sleeve of the connector and it was, therefore, not locking in. This could give the user the false impression that the source is connected to the drive cable when there is only a partial connection. The operations manual requires that the user visually check the connection prior to use. If the user does not do a full visual inspection of the connection, the source assembly may not be secure and could dislodge inside guide tube.

"The manufacturer conducted a 100% search of a lot of 1,567 pieces in stock and found 5 to be defective. The manufacturer is sending out notice dated January 11, 2010 to all of their radiography customers describing this disconnect issue. There are 236 sources in the field with 29 different licensees that have not sent their units back to QSA Global in Burlington, MA at this time. They will continue to monitor this problem as assemblies are returned."

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45626
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: IESCO, LLC
Region: 4
City: EL SEGUNDO State: CA
County:
License #: 6571-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/12/2010
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/09/2010
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
ROBERT LEWIS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECTED

"On Saturday, January 9, 2010, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of IESCO, LLC, contacted the California Office of Emergency Services to report that a Selenium 75 (27.5 Curies) industrial radiography source disconnected from the drive cable during radiography operations at the Chevron, El Segundo Refinery. During the first exposure, the source disconnected from the drive cable. This was discovered during the radiographer's confirmatory survey, as required after the source is cranked back in the shielded position. It was discovered that the source was disconnected near the collimator and when the drive cable was retracted, the source would slide back a couple of inches and the pigtail would be caught at a bend in the guide tube, allowing the source to be partially removed from the collimator. The radiographer placed lead shielding over the exposed source to minimize radiation exposure. The radiographer then contacted the RSO. Upon arrival at the site, the RSO disconnected the guide tube from the exposure device and then assessed the situation. He placed more lead shielding on the camera until the dose rate at 6 feet was at 20 Mr/hr. He returned the drive cable to the guide tube, reinserted the drive cable into the guide tube and removed the guide tube from the collimator. The RSO was then able to connect the drive cable to the pigtail and crank it back into the exposure device. The RSO stated that the reading taken from the Direct Reading Pocket Dosimeter (DRPD) of the radiographer was 9 Mr and the DRPD of the RSO was 25 Mr.

"After inspecting the equipment and interviewing the radiographer and assistant, the RSO concluded that the source disconnect occurred due to dirt on the shutter of the drive cable preventing the cover on the pigtail from closing, preventing a secure connection. The RSO has scheduled a safety meeting to ensure that the radiographers are aware of the issue and instructed how to avoid another incident. Further investigation will be deferred until the 30 day report has been submitted and reviewed."

California Report No: 5010-010910

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 45629
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: DERECK WARFORD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/14/2010
Notification Time: 08:50 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2010
Event Time: 08:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
DAVID PSTRAK (NMSS)

Event Text

PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"At 0850 CST, on 1-13-10 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the C-333 B-Booster UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) system was inoperable due to loss of power to the system. The purpose of the PGLD System is to detect a UF6 release and alert operators in the ACR by sounding an alarm. At the time this was discovered, some areas covered by this PGLD system were operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the areas covered by this PGLD system are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the B-Booster PGLD system inoperable, none of the required heads were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.D.1 and 2.4.4.1.E.1 were entered, and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. An investigation was initiated and it was determined that power was interrupted during planned maintenance activities and there was a failure to identify that the power supply to this PGLD system would be impacted prior to performing the maintenance. Power was restored and the system was tested and declared operable at 1542 hours. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45631
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RON GIBBS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 01/14/2010
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2008
Event Time: 21:47 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 0

Event Text

LOSS OF FIRE SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY

"This is an 8-hour notification being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an event or condition that results in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

"This notification is being made as the result of the re-review of a July 7, 2008 occurrence which resulted in an inadvertent isolation of a large portion of the [fire suppression] ring header affecting all Unit 2 fire suppression and a portion of Unit 1 fire suppression. The Unit 1 ring header isolation did not have an affect on the fire safe shutdown capability of Unit 1. However, three areas in Unit 2 which credit the availability of fire suppression to assure that the safe shutdown capability could have been achieved did not have fire suppression for approximately 3 hours.

"A Licensee Event Report will be submitted within 60 days."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012