| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/10/2009 - 12/11/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45542 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: UMASS MEMORIAL HEALTH CARE
Region: 1
City: WORCESTER State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0092
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 12/07/2009
Notification Time: 11:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2009
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- POTENTIAL LOSS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via facsimile:
"On 9/11/09 a package containing 1 mCi of P-32 was received by the licensee Radiation Safety Office, [who then] opened the package to confirm RAM [radioactive material] was in the box, surveyed the package, and then delivered [the package] to the research lab. The research lab signed for the package. One week later the research lab reported to the RSO that the package did not contain the ordered P-32. A search of lab, adjacent labs, and waste removed from the lab did not locate the missing radioactive material."
MA Docket Number: 10-8699
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45545 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: TERRA MISSISSIPPI NITROGEN, INC.
Region: 4
City: YAZOO CITY State: MS
County:
License #: MS-571-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALI SHAFQAT
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 12/07/2009
Notification Time: 16:26 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2009
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
BILL VONTILL (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAUGE SHUTTER FAILS TO FUNCTION
The following information was received by email:
"On 07-14-09 while conducting a biannual inventory of gauges, licensee discovered that shutter on the Ronan X92-SA-1, Serial No. 74584, was not functioning. The licensee contacted Ronan, who repaired the shutter on 08-05-09. Although the necessary repairs were made, it was found that future service of the shutter would require replacing the current shutter with a new shutter.
"DRH was notified of the incident on 11-04-09 while doing a routine inspection of the licensee. DRH closed out with the licensee and received documentation of the incident."
The gauge contains the isotope Cs-137 with an activity of 20mCi.
Mississippi Incident Number: MS 09007 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45546 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CPN INSTROTEK
Region: 4
City: CONCORD State: CA
County:
License #: CA1100-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 12/07/2009
Notification Time: 19:48 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2009
Event Time: 11:18 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
BILL VONTILL (FSME)
MEXICO VIA FAX ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATEMENT REPORT - STOLEN NUCLEAR GAUGE FROM A DELIVERY TRUCK
The following notification was received via email:
"On December 7, 2009, CPN Instrotek, California License CA1100-07, reported that a MC-3 gauge was stolen from a delivery truck while it was being transported to CPM Instrotek. The gauge is Serial Number M36046710. The gauge contains 10mCi of CS 137 and 50mCi of Am/Be.
"This theft was reported by CPN Instrotek on Monday, December 07, 2009 1118 AM by email. The report was made by [the] Radiation Safety Officer [RSO] for CPN Instrotek. [The RSO] reported that CPN Instrotek had received a call on the morning of December 7, 2009 from the transport company that was transporting the gauge from the airport to CPN Instrotek (both in Concord California). The transport company stated that the gauge was stolen from one of their trucks between the evening of December 4th and the morning of December 7, 2009. The truck was locked. The transport company had picked up the gauge at the airport and it was being delivered to CPN Instrotek in Concord. The gauge was being returned to CPN Instrotek for disposal. The loss was reported to local law enforcement. "
California Event Number: N/A
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45555 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CURT STEFFES
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE | Notification Date: 12/09/2009
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2009
Event Time: 11:17 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text WINTER STORM POWER OUTAGES CAUSE ALERT SIREN INOPERABILITY
"On December 9, 2009, at 1117 hours, 27% of the alert sirens in the Quad Cities Station Emergency Planning Zone were determined to be inoperable for greater than 60 minutes. This is considered a major loss of the Quad Cities off site notification capability. The alert sirens were disabled due to power outages caused by a winter storm. Efforts are underway at the time of this notification to restore the sirens.
"This report is being made due to the reduction in public notification capabilities in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"A follow-up notification will be provided when the sirens have been restored."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE MACLENNAN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0849 EST ON 12/10/2009 * * *
"Follow-up Notification - Repairs to the emergency sirens were completed as of 0100 hours. All sirens are restored."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Phillips). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45557 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH POPE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 12/10/2009
Notification Time: 01:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2009
Event Time: 23:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 24 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL SCRAM FOLLOWING HIGH TURBINE VIBRATION
"At 2310 EST, Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 24% reactor power while the main turbine was rolling at 1800 rpm, preparing for synchronization to the grid.
"As Vogtle 1 was preparing to bring the Unit 1 generator on line following a forced outage, high vibration levels were experienced on the HP turbine bearings while the Turbine was at rated speed and synchronization preparations were in progress. The Turbine was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures. Vibrations continued to increase as the Turbine began to coast down, warranting that vacuum be broken in accordance with procedures.
"The reactor was manually tripped in anticipation of trip of the main feedwater pump (due to loss of condenser vacuum) and condenser vacuum was broken to slow the turbine. When condenser vacuum was broken, the in-service Main Feedwater Pump auto tripped as expected, causing an automatic actuation of the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater system.
"The cause of high vibrations on the Turbine is being investigated.
"All systems responded as expected on the trip."
All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. Atmospheric relief valves are being used to remove decay heat. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45558 | Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MEGAN SHARROW
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 12/10/2009
Notification Time: 12:48 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2009
Event Time: 10:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text BEARING COOLING WATER DISCHARGED INTO LAKE
"On December 9, 2009, at 1423 hours, Unit 2 tripped offline due to the loss of 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer. This resulted in a loss of power to one of the bearing cooling system level control valves (LCV). The affected LCV failed open, which caused the bearing cooling tower basin to overflow and release bearing cooling water to Lake Anna. By approximately 1530 hours, plant personnel had manually isolated the bearing cooling water system and the flow to the lake stopped shortly afterwards. Based on the duration of the event (approximately 70 minutes) and the maximum discharge flow rate of a bearing cooling water make-up pump (850 gpm), no more than 59,500 gal. of water were discharged to the lake. Based on visual observation of the actual flow going to the lake, it was estimated that approximately 35,000 gal. were discharged. The bearing cooling water was sampled on 12/09/09 by the Chemistry Department as part of their routine chemistry surveillance. All chemical parameters analyzed were within VPDES (Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) permit limits. There was no violation of permit parameters from this discharge and no adverse impact to the environment was observed. Bearing cooling system chemistry is maintained to meet VPDES discharge limits.
"At 1035 hours on December 10, 2009, a 24-hour notification of the unusual discharge was made to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality in accordance with the North Anna VPDES permit.
"This issue is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event where notification of other government agencies has been made.
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45559 | Facility: BELLEFONTE
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP (205),[2] B&W-R-LP (205)
NRC Notified By: ZACKERY RAD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 12/10/2009
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2009
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned | Event Text CONTAINMENT VERTICAL TENDON FAILED
"Inspection of failed Unit 1 Reactor Building Containment Vertical Tendon V9 coupling indicates a potential for an unknown common mode failure mechanism for BLN Containment vertical tendon rock anchor couplings. Unit 1 Reactor Building Containment Vertical Tendon V9 experienced a failure of the rock anchor/tendon anchor coupling on August 17, 2009 at approximately 1400 CDT. The time of failure was identified based on a loud noise bang reported by several individuals. Initial investigation failed to reveal the source of the noise. The failed tendon was discovered on August 24, 2009 during a tour of U1 Tendon Gallery, elevation 607. Unsafe conditions previously precluded an inspection of the failed coupling for proper installation or component specific damage. The failed tendon coupling was inspected on 11/23/2009 and showed no signs of component specific damage or improper installation creating the potential for an unknown common mode failure.
"Safety significance: Until the mechanism of failure is identified the extent of condition will not be known. If multiple containment tendons are found to be losing the capability to carry tendon design force and this condition was left uncorrected, this could jeopardize the ability of the containment structure to perform its design function.
"Causes of deficiency: The cause of this deficiency is unknown at this time. Further analysis is in progress and when completed, an update to this report will be provided.
"Interim progress: Grease from the lower anchor head can has been analyzed for moisture content. Results were within vendor specifications. Additional samples have been sent for further analysis as described in Regulatory Guide 1.25 'In-service Inspection of Ungrouted Tendon in Prestressed Concrete Containments.'
"After successful safe securing of the tendon load, the failed coupling was visually inspected. The visual inspection of the failed coupling did not indicate a component-specific failure mechanism or indication of visually apparent common mode failure mechanism. Based on this inspection visual inspection of additional tendon coupling tendon couplers is not warranted at this time. The coupling has been removed from both the tendon anchorhead and the rock anchor tendon anchorhead and sent to the TVA Central Lab for metallurgical analysis.
"Records are being reviewed to identify previous non-conformance reports and certificates of compliances for the coupler. An extent of condition and extent of cause investigation will apply to vertical tendons are similar in design, these tendons do not utilize an anchorhead coupler in the design. However, these tendons will be considered in the analysis.
"Future updates: TVA plans to provide an update to this report by March 31, 2010 following the completion of the metallurgical analysis." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45560 | Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM FOWLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 12/10/2009
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2009
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ONSITE FATALITY
"A mechanical maintenance employee died this afternoon from an apparent heart attack. The individual was not actively working at the time and lost consciousness in a shop area. The individual was treated by onsite EMT's who administered CPR and AED (automatic external defibrillator). The death was not the result of any industrial safety issue and did not occur in a contaminated area. He was transported via ambulance to Salem Memorial hospital where he was pronounced dead."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local authorities in Lower Alloway Creek Township. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45561 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK HANNEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 12/10/2009
Notification Time: 21:29 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2009
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INSTRUMENT LINE DETERMINED TO HAVE INADEQUATE STRUCTURAL SUPPORT
"At 1700 on 12/10/09, an operability evaluation determined that an instrument line within the primary containment did not have adequate structural support during the previous operating cycle. The evaluation determined that the instrument line would have failed during a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). This would have resulted in reactor coolant leakage within the primary containment that could not be isolated.
"The condition was identified and repaired during the recent refueling outage and full qualification and operability was restored prior to return to service."
The condition was discovered on November 3, 2009 during the Unit 2 refueling outage. The operability determination was completed on December 10, 2009. It is unknown at this time if the condition exists in Unit 3 due to inaccessibility of the drywell during power operations. | |