U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 12/03/2009 - 12/04/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 45413 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 Region: 2 City: PADUCAH State: KY County: McCRACKEN License #: GDP-1 Agreement: Y Docket: 0707001 NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 10/05/2009 Notification Time: 15:55 [ET] Event Date: 10/04/2009 Event Time: 15:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 12/03/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 76.120(c)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION | Person (Organization): MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO) DENNIS DAMON (NMSS) | Event Text UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION DURING STARTUP "On 10/04/2009 at 1500 C-331 unit 2 cell 2 was being charged and placed on stream and had just gone above atmospheric pressure when a Maintenance Mechanic observed smoke coming from the cell instrument cubicle and determined it to be UF6 outleakage from cell process instrumentation. To stop the release the cell was immediately taken back below atmospheric pressure. Investigation revealed that a UF6 release had occurred inside the instrument cubicle. The amount of material released has not yet been determined. Decontamination is underway but has not been completed inside the cabinet. The area outside the cabinet has been decontaminated. No injuries or personnel exposure occurred as a result of this event. This is being reported based on 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1)(i) (unplanned contamination event). "PGDP Problem Report Nos. ATRC-09-2435; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2009-016. Responsible Division: Operations "PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-09-2435; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2009-16; Worksheet No. Responsible Division: Operations "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." Decontamination is expected to be completed on 10/6/2009. * * * RETRACTION FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/03/09 AT 1551 EST* * * "After further review, it was determined that the amount of contamination was significantly less than five times the lowest annual limit on intake specified in Appendix B to Section 20.1001-20.2402 of 10CFR20 for the material." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie) and NMSS (Whaley). | Power Reactor | Event Number: 45530 | Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: ROBERT MATUSZAK HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 12/01/2009 Notification Time: 11:08 [ET] Event Date: 12/01/2009 Event Time: 12:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/03/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | Event Text IPCS SYSTEM OOS FOR SECURITY MODIFICATION "Beginning December 1,2009, at approximately 1200, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be removed from service to support installation of a Cyber Security Modification. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the PCS platform and will be out of service when the PCS is removed from service. These systems will be unavailable to the Control Room and all other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately six hours. By 1800, it is planned to restore IPCS, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Control Room, Operational Support Center, and the Technical Support Center. The IPCS will remain unavailable to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) as well as alternate EOF. On December 2, at approximately 1600, IPCS will be restored to the EOF but will remain unavailable to the alternate facilities. On December 3, 2009, at approximately 1600, IPCS will be restored, including alternate facilities. "During this entire duration dose assessment capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the PCS is completely restored. For the first six hours of the PCS outage, the emergency assessment capability of all Fermi 2 ERFs will be degraded by the loss of IPCS and SPDS. During this period the ERDS function will also be lost. For the following 24 hrs., the EOF will have no IPCSs capability, which includes the SPDS function. Based on the aggregate effect of these losses, this notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR,50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability." The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE AT 1753 EST ON 12/3/09 FROM MATUSZAK TO HUFFMAN * * * "On December 3, 2009, at 1530, emergency assessment capability has been restored to all on site emergency response facilities." The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Riemer) notified. | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45532 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Licensee: ECS-TEXAS LLP Region: 4 City: AUSTIN State: TX County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 12/01/2009 Notification Time: 14:45 [ET] Event Date: 02/04/2008 Event Time: 10:00 [CST] Last Update Date: 12/01/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): RICK DEESE (R4DO) BILL VONTILL (FSME) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED NUCLEAR GAUGE NOT INITIALLY REPORTED The following report was received via e-mail: "On Monday, February 4, 2008, a technician was attempting to load a gauge on a truck when he dropped the gauge on the tailgate whereupon the index probe broke off and the Cs-137 probe became extended and failed to retract to the shielded position. The gauge was then loaded into the cab of the truck and was delivered to the local site office less than ten minutes from the work site. A service company was notified and within an hour, the source rod was safely retracted into the shielded position. The gauge sources were satisfactory leak tested. No overexposures occurred in this event. The licensee required all gauge users to attend refresher training on nuclear gauge safety and procedures. The licensee was cited for a related violation. "During a record review, it was discovered that this event was reported to the NRC using the Nuclear Materials Event Database (080192) instead of to the Headquarters Operations Officer. "Texas Incident #: I-8494" | Power Reactor | Event Number: 45537 | Facility: PALO VERDE Region: 4 State: AZ Unit: [ ] [ ] [3] RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE NRC Notified By: DAVID OAKES HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/03/2009 Notification Time: 09:14 [ET] Event Date: 12/03/2009 Event Time: 04:30 [MST] Last Update Date: 12/03/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL | Person (Organization): RICK DEESE (R4DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AFTER LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR TO CONTAINMENT "On December 3, 2009 at approximately 04:30 Mountain Standard Time (MST) Palo Verde Unit 3 operators manually tripped the reactor from approximately 100% rated thermal power due to loss of Instrument Air (IA) to Containment. This loss was apparently caused by a failure (closed) of the outboard IA Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) solenoid valve. Loss of IA to Containment resulted in closure of the inboard Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) controlled seal bleedoff CIV. The RCP seal bleedoff was then being diverted via relief valve to the Reactor Drain Tank (RDT) inside Containment. "Following the manual reactor trip all CEAs [Control Element Assemblies] fully inserted into the reactor core. All 4 RCPs were stopped to allow for isolation of bleedoff to the RDT. Upon completion of Standard Post Trip Actions, the crew entered the Optimal Recovery Procedure for Loss of Forced Circulation. No emergency classification was required per the Emergency Plan. No automatic ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start and were not required. The offsite power grid is stable. LCO 3.6.3 was entered due to failure of the IA CIV. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event which contributed to the need for manual reactor trip." The reactor was manually tripped for equipment preservation. No safety or relief valves lifted other than noted above. After the trip, decay heat was being removed using the turbine bypass valves and steam generator level was being maintained with the auxiliary feedwater pumps. The licensee also entered LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loop Operability" because the RCPs were stopped. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |