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Event Notification Report for December 2, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/01/2009 - 12/02/2009

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45459 45529 45530 45531 45533 45534

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45459
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
J.THORP (e-mail) (NRR)
O.TABATABAI (e-mail) (NRO)

Event Text

INTERIM REPORT ON THERMOSTATIC VALVE FAILURE ON PALO VERDE EDG

"This interim report is being issued because Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) is not able to complete an evaluation of an identified deviation within the 60 day requirement of 10CFR21.21. The evaluation is expected to be completed no later than November 30, 2009.

"ESI began an evaluation of a thermostatic valve element failure on August 24, 2009. Palo Verde Nuclear Plant notified ESI of the failure as a result of a failure analysis they were performing on a thermostatic valve that had been removed from the lube oil system of their 2A-EDG. The element was in service since April 2008 and Palo Verde verified operation of the element prior to installation.

"The Palo Verde failure analysis determined that one of two elements within the valve was defective. The element failure was attributed to wax leakage past the diaphragm seal on one of two power pills within the element. Evidence of mechanical binding of the piston is believed to have caused the wax leakage. If the piston was jammed, the expanding wax could have over pressurized the diaphragm seal leading to wax leakage. The failure analysis noted the following to support piston binding:

- The piston was initially difficult to remove from its guide tube.
- A gouge was observed on the piston surface.
- The rubber plug within the power pill exhibited brass machining chip debris.

"ESI has been coordinating with Palo Verde and the manufacturer (AMOT) to complete our evaluation and to determine if this is a generic issue or if it is an isolated incident.

"To date, no other similar failures with AMOT thermostatic valves have been reported to ESI."

Palo Verde has Cooper Bessemer KSV-20T diesel engines that use one 6" thermostatic valve in the engine jacket water system and one in the engine lube oil system to regulate system temperatures during engine operation. The thermostatic valve is an AMOT model 6HAS. The AMOT thermostatic valve element (P/N 9760X) is the defective part. ESI did not provide any information on other nuclear power plants that have EDGs that utilize this model thermostatic valve.

* * * UPDATE RECEIVED VIA EMAIL FROM PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO TO DONG PARK AT 1642 EST ON 12/01/09 * * *

"This report is a follow-up to an interim report (10CFR21-0098-INT) issued by Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) on 10/23/09 which identified a deviation with an Amot thermostatic valve element. The interim report was issued because ESI was not able to complete the evaluation within the 60 day requirement of 10CFR21. The evaluation was completed on 11/30/09 and the deviation was determined be a reportable defect as by defined by 10CFR21.

"The Exelon analysis also reports that similar brass machining debris was observed on the plugs from the other three power pills to varying degrees. None of the stems of these pills displayed evidence of gouging or binding.

"To date, no other similar failures with Amot thermostatic valves have been reported to ESI.

"ESI has contacted the valve manufacturer (Amot) to discuss these findings. A copy of the Palo Verde failure analysis and eleven (11) element assemblies from ESI inventory were sent to Amot for evaluation. The following elements were sent to Amot for evaluation:

"Qty. 8: PIN 9760 X-170' (CES PIN 2-05V-419-107)
"Qty. 3: PIN 9760 X-160' (CES PIN 2-05V-419-109)

"Both part number elements are the same except for the temperature setting ('-170' indicates 170?F nominal and '-160' indicates 160?F nominal).

"Upon completion of their evaluation, Amot has reported the following:

"Fine shavings/powder of brass was observed in some of the element pills.

"None of the pill stems had any evidence of gouging.

"The pills used in the 9760X elements are made by converting another part number pill. This conversion consists of removing the stem from the pill and performing some machining. Amot believes the brass debris may have entered the pill as a result of this conversion process.

"Amot has not made any changes to this conversion process in recent history and has not had reports of similar problems with these elements.

"Machining debris, while undesirable, was evident in other pills which did not exhibit any operability issues; therefore this is not believed to be the cause of the pill failure.

"The primary cause of the failure is believed to be the gouge found in the pill stem. The gouge could have occurred during the conversion process as the stem is removed and handled at that time.

"As a precaution, Amot has made changes to their conversion process for this pill. The drilling fixture was modified to eliminate the possibility of chips entering the pill during the machining operation. This change was made effective 10/22/09.

"A listing of users with the thermostatic valves that contain the Amot 9760X element is provided in the table below.

"Site - Thermostatic Valve - System:
"Braidwood - 6HAS - Lube
"Byron - 6HAS - Lube
"Nine Mile Point - 6HAS- Lube
"Oconee - 4HAS & 6HAS - Water
"Palo Verde - 6HAS - Lube & Water
"South Texas Project - 6HAS - Lube & Water
"Susquehanna - 6HAS - Lube & Water
"Waterford - 5HAS & 6HAS - Lube & Water

"Corrective Action: The element failure at Palo Verde is considered to be an isolated incident related to a gouge in the pill stem. Thus, there is no recommended corrective action for users of the Amot 9760X element. The evaluation also indicated a weakness in Amot's manufacturing process for the element pill which introduced machining debris. While not believed to be the cause of the Palo Verde element failure, machining debris within the element pill is undesirable and increases the potential for failure in the future. Users with thermostatic valves containing Amot PIN 9760X elements should be aware of this issue so that they can monitor their systems for any indications of thermostat element problems.

Notified R1DO (Holody), R2DO (Guthrie), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Deese), NRR (Thorp) via e-mail, NRO (Tabatabai) via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45529
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL DUVALL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/01/2009
Notification Time: 08:57 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2009
Event Time: 09:18 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HEALTH PHYSICS CONTROL POINT AND CHEM LAB HVAC OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"On 12/1/2009 the emergency HVAC [heating, ventilation, and air conditioning] for the Hatch Nuclear Plant's Health Physics (HP) Control Point/Chemistry Lab area will be removed from service for preventative maintenance, planned corrective maintenance and glycol addition to the cooling coil. The Technical Response Manual (TRM) section 3.10.1 lists the HP Control Point/Chemistry Lab area emergency HVAC system as being required for functionality of the Operations Support Center [OSC]. This area is normally utilized by HP/Chem for analysis of radiological samples during normal as well as emergency conditions. These work activities are planned to be performed and completed within a 12 hour work shift. During the time these activities are being performed the HP emergency HVAC and filter train will not be available for operation for approximately eight (8) hours. As such the OSC will be rendered non-functional during the performance of this work activity. The OSC facility working area itself, however, does not lose EP functionality throughout this evolution.

"If an emergency were to occur, plans are to continue utilize the Health Physics Control Point/Chemistry Lab areas during the time required to restore the HVAC system, as long as environmental and radiological conditions allow. Habitability surveys will be performed in the areas while they are being utilized. If required respiratory protection equipment can be utilized as appropriate for emergency responders utilizing this area until such time as the emergency HVAC is returned to service.

"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 1 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45530
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MATUSZAK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 12/01/2009
Notification Time: 11:08 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2009
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 99 Power Operation

Event Text

IPCS SYSTEM OOS FOR SECURITY MODIFICATION

"Beginning December 1,2009, at approximately 1200, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be removed from service to support installation of a Cyber Security Modification. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the PCS platform and will be out of service when the PCS is removed from service. These systems will be unavailable to the Control Room and all other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately six hours. By 1800, it is planned to restore IPCS, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Control Room, Operational Support Center, and the Technical Support Center. The IPCS will remain unavailable to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) as well as alternate EOF. On December 2, at approximately 1600, IPCS will be restored to the EOF but will remain unavailable to the alternate facilities. On December 3, 2009, at approximately 1600, IPCS will be restored, including alternate facilities

"During this entire duration dose assessment capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the PCS is completely restored. For the first six hours of the PCS outage, the emergency assessment capability of all Fermi 2 ERFs will be degraded by the loss of IPCS and SPDS. During this period the ERDS function will also be lost. For the following 24 hrs., the EOF will have no IPCSs capability, which includes the SPDS function. Based on the aggregate effect of these losses, this notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR,50.72(b)(3)xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45531
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILLY JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/01/2009
Notification Time: 12:23 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2009
Event Time: 14:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Under Construction 0 Under Construction

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR

A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45533
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DONNA GUINN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 12/01/2009
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2009
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

CONTAMINATED PERSON REPORTS TO OFFSITE HOSPITAL

"On November 26, 2009, at 2330, it was determined that a machinist who was working on reactor coolant pump (RCP 3A) seal was contaminated on his left hand index finger. The contamination level was 1500 net counts per minute (CPM). Upon exit, the individual alarmed monitors and decontamination was attempted. Decontamination for the next two shifts included wrapping of the hand, waiting 2 hours, rechecking and repeating 2 hours later. However, decontamination was unsuccessful. The individual was conditionally released and allowed to leave the site with his hand wrapped.

"On December 1, 2009, at approximately 1500, the Fort Calhoun Station Health Physics and Radiological Protection Personnel met the machinist at the University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC) for further treatment."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45534
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/01/2009
Notification Time: 21:53 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2009
Event Time: 18:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 94 Power Operation 94 Power Operation
2 N Y 94 Power Operation 79 Power Operation

Event Text

ONSITE FLOODING CAUSED BY MAKE-UP SUPPLY LINE FAILURE

"The following transmission was made as a voluntary notification at 1800 EST: On 12/01/09 at 1410 [EST], due to a Unit 2 cooling tower make-up supply line failure, a valve vault was flooded and overflowed at several thousands of gallons per minute flow. The local fire company was contacted to provide equipment assistance in pumping out the vault. The river water overflowing the vault entered nearby storm drains and a nearby building housing non-safety related equipment. There are no injuries or an emergency of any kind. The water entering the storm sewer does not constitute a reportable spill. Unit 2 reactor power was reduced to 80% to minimize cooling tower impact. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency was notified at 1800 EST. Various other local and state agencies have been advised of the event.

"Subsequently, notifications were made to the following agencies:
"Salem Township Supervisor Chairman
"State Senator Baker
"State Rep. Boback
"Columbia County Commissioner Soberick
"Federal Affairs to notify US Rep. Kanjorski's staff.

"Although the impact of this make-up supply line failure to the environment is insignificant (Radiological levels are less than lower limit of detection), its occurrence coupled with subsequent notifications to aforementioned agencies is likely to cause heightened public or government concern. Thus, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station is making a four hour ENS notification pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). A press release is not planned at this time."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012