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Event Notification Report for November 30, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
11/27/2009 - 11/30/2009

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45519 45522 45524 45525 45526 45527 45528

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45519
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: BECTON DICKINSON INFUSION THERAPY SYSTEM INC.
Region: 4
City: BROKEN BOW State: NE
County:
License #: 04-01-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRYAN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 11/24/2009
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 11/23/2009
Event Time: 18:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
JIM LUEHMAN (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF SOURCE UP INDICATOR SWITCH

The following report was received via E-mail:

"At or around 6:45 PM on November 23, 2009 the irradiator at Becton Dickinson in Broken Bow, NE experienced a box jam. The master timer timed out and sent the source into the pool as normal. The source movement bell continued to ring beyond the normal time. The operator on duty entered the control room and noted that the fault indicator lights for source switch, source pass time out were activated. Both source up and source down indicator lights were on. The operator went to the source cylinder room on the roof and verified that physically the cylinder had traveled to the full down position. The source cable was determined to be tight as normal. The area was also surveyed for any radiation above background. None was noted.

"The operator then called the RSO and informed him of the situation. The RSO came to the plant. Since the source up indicator was activated, the area monitor was disabled. The cell door was manually opened and the air to the source cylinder disabled. Two operators along with the RSO slowly entered the cell with two survey meters. No radiation above background was detected.

"It was determined that the source up switch plunger had become stuck in the closed position. This plunger was removed, cleaned and lubricated. No other machine issues were noted and normal operation ensued.

"Reporting Requirement: 30.509(b)(2) - events involving failure or disability to function when equipment is required to be available and operable and no redundant equipment is available and operable, includes source disconnection and failure to retract source."

Nebraska Item Number: NE090017

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45522
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROGER MONTGOMERY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/27/2009
Notification Time: 05:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2009
Event Time: 23:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/27/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
4 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

TWO SHUTDOWN BANK RODS WERE DROPPED FROM FULLY WITHDRAWN POSITION

"With Unit 4 borated to a cold shutdown condition following the Unit 4 Cycle 25 refueling outage, post-modification acceptance testing was being performed on the Rod Position Indication System prior to reactor startup. While performing this test, two shutdown bank rods showed indication of being fully inserted from a fully withdrawn position. Off-normal procedures were entered and the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was subsequently manually actuated. All remaining rods were fully inserted in accordance with plant procedures. Investigations are in progress to determine and repair the cause of the dropped rods."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 45524
Rep Org: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: ANCHORAGE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 11/27/2009
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 11/27/2009
Event Time: 08:00 [YST]
Last Update Date: 11/27/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
JIM LUEHMAN (FSME)

Event Text

FAILURE TO FULLY RETRACT THE SOURCE OF A RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

Technicians were performing radiography when the source in an Industrial Nuclear Corporation (INC) IR-100 radiography camera was unable to be fully retracted. This was caused by a frozen lock on the device which occurred due to freezing weather conditions. A certified technician serviced the lock. The lock was returned to a fully functional condition, and the source was returned to the safe and secure position. No personnel over exposure occurred. The licensee could not provide the serial number of the camera at the time of the report due to the remote location where the radiography was taking place.

Similar events: EN #45384, 45469, 45496

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45525
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRUCE FARNZEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 11/28/2009
Notification Time: 03:15 [ET]
Event Date: 11/27/2009
Event Time: 22:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

TURBINE VALVE TRIPS DID NOT MEET TECH SPECS

"At 2205 on Nov 27, 2009, at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) it was determined that Technical Specification RPS functions 8 and 9, 'Turbine Stop Valve - Closure' and 'Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low' are susceptible to single point vulnerability due to a nonconformance to a design standard (IEEE- 279 1968). Based on this single point vulnerability, these RPS functions could potentially have prevented the fulfillment of their respective safety function and therefore this event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function-mitigate the consequences of an accident.' The station has performed an operability determination, and the safety function remains operable. Actions to restore compliance to referenced design standard are in progress."

The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45526
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN JARRELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/29/2009
Notification Time: 05:08 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2009
Event Time: 23:44 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

CONTAINMENT MINIMUM PATHWAY LEAK RATE WAS EXCEEDED

"10CFR50 Appendix J Local Leak Rate Testing determined the total 'as-found' containment minimum pathway leak rate exceeded the maximum allowable containment leak rate per the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This was primarily due to three penetrations that could not be pressurized to full test pressure. The maximum allowable leakage was assigned to both valves in each penetration since the valves can not be tested individually.

"This condition is reportable as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The condition was discovered with the plant in Mode 5. Corrective actions have already been completed and all penetrations, as well as total containment leakage, is well within limits established by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 45527
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 11/29/2009
Notification Time: 13:01 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2009
Event Time: 18:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
EARL EASTON (NMSS)

Event Text

SAFETY EQUIPMENT DISABLED DUE TO A GROUND IN THE AREA CONTROL ROOM ALARM

"At 1850 CST, on 11/28/09 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the C-333 Unit 6 Cell 5 UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System was inoperable due to loss of power to the Area Control Room (ACR) alarm for this system. The purpose of the PGLD System is to detect a UF6 release and alert operators in the ACR by sounding an alarm. At the time this was discovered, G-333 Unit 6 Cell 5 was operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the Unit 6 Cell 5 PGLD system inoperable, none of the required heads were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.B.1 was entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour.

"Troubleshooting was initiated, a ground was discovered on the alarm circuit, the ground was isolated, and the system was tested and declared operable at 2305 [CST]. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45528
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GEOFFREY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 11/29/2009
Notification Time: 13:31 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2009
Event Time: 10:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 0 Startup 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

TRIP FROM INTERMEDIATE RANGE DUE TO ROD GROUP DEMAND COUNTER DISCREPANCY

"During startup physics testing, the reactor operator identified a discrepancy between Group 1 & Group 2 Step Demand Counters for control bank 'B'. Research identified the issue to be associated with failure of a card in the rod control power cabinet. Failure of the card impacts group step counters for control bank 'B', control bank 'D' and shutdown bank 'B.'

"Inoperability of more than one group step counter per bank placed Unit 2 in a 6-hour clock to hot shutdown as of 0808 hrs 29 November 2009. Consequently, at 1045 hrs, the decision was made to trip Unit 2 reactor. The decision was based on time required to make repairs, complete post maintenance testing requirements, and maintaining proper control of reactivity.

"All systems functioned as required on the trip and initiation of any auxiliary or emergency systems was not required. Current heat removal is via normal plant alignment following refueling outage activities: steam generator blowdown, main feedwater, and steam generator PORV."

All control rods fully inserted on the manual trip.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012