| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/09/2009 - 09/10/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 44938 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY AHRENS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 03/26/2009
Notification Time: 19:43 [ET]
Event Date: 03/26/2009
Event Time: 12:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | Event Text NON-FUNCTIONAL STEAM EXCLUSION BARRIER
This event was additionally reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident.'
"On 03/26/2009 at 1226 CDT, an engineering analysis determined that a steam exclusion door would not provide adequate steam exclusion protection. A metal plate, that had been installed over the door's glass window, would fail under the steam overpressure postulated during a high energy line break. The metal plate was replaced with one of a stronger design. Permanent repairs were completed on the door at 1549 on 03/26/2009. While the original plate was installed, the barrier was non-functional. In accordance with TRM 3.0.9, Section A.1 all equipment supported by that steam exclusion barrier was immediately declared inoperable. This zone includes both trains of ECCS and support equipment (i.e., SI, RHR, ICS, CCW, etc.). TS 3.0.c was entered and exited during the time the door issue was identified and repaired.
"All 3 trains of Auxiliary Feedwater were declared inoperable due to AFW low suction pressure trip channels were declared inoperable per TS 3.4.b.5. Power was reduced to less than 1673 MWt per TS 3.4.b.3. All mode changes were suspended per TS 3.4.b.2.
"Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function,' and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'"
Containment Fan Coil Unit A was not operational during this event.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * RETRACTION FROM JACK GADZALA TO PETE SNYDER ON 9/9/09 AT 1718 * * *
"On March 26, 2009 EN # 44938 provided notification that both trains of ESF equipment (e.g. SI, RHR, ICS, CCW, etc.) were inoperable based on an engineering analysis, which determined that a steam exclusion door in the auxiliary building would not provide adequate steam exclusion protection.
"Subsequent physical pressure testing of equivalent doors and engineering evaluation of the test results determined that the door remained capable of fulfilling its steam exclusion function. A series of pressure tests demonstrated that the door (including a metal plate that had been installed over the door's glass window) would withstand the steam overpressure postulated during a high energy line break.
"Therefore, the door remained functional and the supported ESF equipment in the auxiliary building remain operable. Consequently, this condition did not meet the reportability criteria in 10 CFR 50.72.
"As a result, the notification made on 3/26/09 is hereby retracted.
"This condition was also reported in Licensee Event Report (LER) 2009-005-00 on May 21, 2009." The licensee is planning on retracting this LER. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45333 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RYAN MEREMA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/08/2009
Notification Time: 23:56 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2009
Event Time: 20:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 55 | Power Operation | Event Text REACTOR SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO AN UNISOLABLE LEAK IN A CORE SPRAY MINIMUM FLOW LINE
"On September 8, 2009, during performance of quarterly Core Spray (CS) system flow rate testing, a pinhole leak was identified in the 1B Core Spray Minimum Flow Line. The pinhole leak is located just downstream of the 1B CS minimum flow valve (1-1402-38B) and cannot be isolated from primary containment.
"At 1935, hours it was determined that structural integrity of the piping could not be assured. Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, Required Action B.1, was entered and a plant shutdown was initiated at 2010 hours.
"In addition, the 1B Core Spray system was declared inoperable. All other ECCS systems remain operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"This event is being reported under 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of a shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications."
The licensee estimates reactor shutdown will be achieved at 0130 CDT. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45334 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID MADSEN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 09/09/2009
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2009
Event Time: 09:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
PART 21 COORDINATOR (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation | Event Text DEFECT FOUND IN BUSSMANN FUSES
"On September 8, 2009, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) completed a reportability determination which concluded that a Bussmann fuse with a batch code of R18 contained an underlying fabrication vulnerability consisting of a missing fuse link. NPPD has concluded this condition is reportable per 10 CFR Part 21.
"This fuse is part of a batch of fuses purchased as Commercial Grade items and dedicated by NPPD for use at the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). The fuses are shipped directly from an authorized Bussmann facility to CNS. The fuse purchasing description is as follows: FUSE; 10 AMP; 250VAC; ONE-TIME; 50KA I.R. ; GENERAL PURPOSE; Manufacturer Part Number NON-10. The missing fuse link was discovered via destructive testing at CNS. The destructive test was prompted when the fuse failed a field continuity test prior to installation. The fuse had passed CNS dedication, which included a continuity test of 100% of the batch by the manufacturer. Although, none of the other fuses in this batch exhibited missing links via continuity testing, the fuse with the missing link is considered to be a continuation of quality problems previously reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) per Emergency Notification Number 44634, as followed up by a written report from NPPD to the NRC dated December 2, 2008. That report identified that Several Bussmann fuses, Manufacturer Part Number NON-10, batch code J47, contained poor solder joints internal to the fuse assembly.
"Bussmann NON-10 fuses are authorized by NPPD for use in both safety related and non safety related applications. The applicable dedication package identifies one of the safety functions as 'fuses are required to conduct the design basis load current without interruption.' If the fuses were installed without the condition being detected and failed upon valid demand of the associated circuit, the mission of the associated safety related equipment may not have been accomplished. Since the condition was found prior to installation, the safety function of the installed fuses remains unaffected and the supported equipment remains unaffected. Other locations where the batch R18 fuses are installed have been determined to be operable through actual circuit operation or measurements across the fuses. Therefore, this condition is NOT reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73.
"Vendor testing and current dedication practices should have precluded the possibility of placing a fuse with a similar condition into unrestricted spares. However, these barriers failed. This provided a potential for a Substantial Safety Hazard. This regulation does not credit pre-installation or post-maintenance testing for the detection of a defect. The dedication does not require CNS to perform a continuity check as credit is given to the vendor, per NUPIC survey, for performing the continuity check at the manufacturer's facility.
"Since the fuses were stocked in unrestricted spares for essential applications, 10 CFR 21 applies, and the condition is reportable under 10 CFR 21.21. The responsible Corporate Officer has been notified of this condition per 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) on September 8, 2009 at approximately 0930 CDT. Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(ii) written notification is due to the NRC within 30 days of this notification."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45335 | Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/09/2009
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
PART 21 COORDINATOR (NRR)
| Event Text PART 21 INVOLVING WOODWARD GOVERNORS USING UNAPPROVED SUPPLIER INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
The following information was provided via fax:
"COMPONENT: Woodward 2301A and DRU with unapproved supplier IC P/N: 9903-303, 9903-337, 9903-444 & 9903-470
"DISCUSSION: Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 8/14/09 to evaluate the use of an integrated circuit (IC) used in some 2301A and DRU controls. The suspect IC was obtained by Woodward from an unapproved supplier. The evaluation was concluded on 09/08/09 and was determined to be a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21.
"On 8/14/09, Woodward confirmed that they had shipped ESI a total of thirty-four (34) 2301A and DRU controls with nuclear part numbers that contained an IC (Woodward P/N 1688-767) from a suspect lot. The lot was dated 12/12/08 and was received by Woodward from an unapproved supplier. Eight (8) of the 34 controls were subsequently shipped by ESI to nuclear customers (2 domestic plants and 3 foreign plants) before the issue was identified. To date, no operability issues have been reported or observed with 2301A and DRU controls containing the suspect IC.
"In the DRU, the IC is used in the raise-lower circuit and in the ramp time circuit (the ramp time circuit controls the ramp rate of the DRU). The DRU is primarily used as the speed reference input signal to the 2301A and provides remote speed adjustment for the 2301A (similar to the function of a motor operated potentiometer - MOP). In some applications, the DRU has also been used as a replacement for the voltage regulator MOP; in this case, the DRU provides the voltage adjustment signal to the voltage regulator. Failure of this IC could impact speed (frequency) control (and in some cases voltage control) of the EDG.
"In the 2301A, the IC is used in the start fuel limit circuit and in the speed signal input (magnetic pickup) circuit. The 2301A is the electronic governor used on many EDG's. It provides speed and/or load control of the diesel engine by communicating with the governor/actuator mounted on the diesel engine. Failure of this IC could impact speed (frequency) control of the EDG.
"AFFECTED USERS: Thirty-four (34) controls were shipped to ESI containing IC's from the suspect lot. Twenty-six (26) of the suspect controls were in ESI inventory and have been returned to Woodward to have the suspect IC replaced. ESI shipped eight (8) controls with suspect IC's to nuclear customers as safety related items as identified in the tables below.
"LISTING OF WOODWARD CONTROLS SHIPPED WITH SUSPECT IC's - (DOMESTIC PLANTS)
McGuire - P/N # 9903-337, Customer PO # 00114776
Palo Verde - P/N # 9903-470 and # 9903-444, Customer PO # 500529186
"LISTING OF WOODWARD CONTROLS SHIPPED WITH SUSPECT IC's - (FOREIGN PLANTS)
Korea-KHNP - P/N # 9903-470, Customer PO # K080553241
Almaraz - P/N # 9903-470 and # 9903-337, Customer PO # 2009/015 - ER09AT06805MA
KRSKO - P/N # 9903-303, Customer PO # NEK-10271/309
"CORRECTIVE ACTION: The controls listed in the tables above should be returned to Engine Systems Inc. to have the suspect IC replaced as soon as possible. Contact ESI's Customer Service department with the part number and serial number of the control to be returned. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45336 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID BORGER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 09/09/2009
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2009
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY SIRENS OUT OF SERVICE
"On Wednesday, Sept. 9 at 9:30 am EDT, all 76 emergency sirens that serve the communities within a 10-mile radius of the PPL Susquehanna nuclear power plant failed during their bi-weekly silent test.
"The failed siren test was initiated by Columbia County at 9:30 am; Luzerne County was then asked to complete the test from its controller, but it experienced a similar failure.
"The vendor that services the system was called in and is working to fix the problem, which is believed to be a fault in the system radio repeaters.
"A backup emergency notification plan is in place with local emergency agencies.
"A voluntary notification will be made to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICH KLINEFELTER TO VINCE KLCO AT 1847 ON 09/09/2009 * * *
All emergency sirens were restored to service and tested successfully as of 1742 on 09/09/2009.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO(Powell). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45337 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN RODE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/09/2009
Notification Time: 17:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2009
Event Time: 15:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SOIL SAMPLE RESULTS IN EXCESS OF STATE REQUIREMENTS
"At 1523 CDT, on September 9, 2009, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) was notified via electronic mail that laboratory analyses of soil samples collected from the catch basins surrounding the Unit 1 and 2 Main Power Transformers, 1X01, and 2X01, revealed polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) levels in excess of Wisconsin Administrative Code requirements. Remediation will be performed in accordance with Wisconsin Administrative Code requirements."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |