United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2009 > July 15

Event Notification Report for July 15, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/14/2009 - 07/15/2009

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44975 45192 45195 45203 45204 45205

To top of page
Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 44975
Rep Org: HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES INC.
Licensee: HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES INC.
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 42-01068-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ELIZABETH SOLTZ
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/07/2009
Notification Time: 14:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE DURING THE SECOND QUARTER OF 2008

Landauer, a dosimeter processing vendor, notified Halliburton Energy Services of a possible overexposure in their quarterly dosimetry report on 8/20/2008. Around that same time Halliburton had just terminated the previous RSO and was in the process of hiring a new RSO. The current RSO became aware of this possible overexposure when she received an annual exposure report from Landauer.

One well logging engineer, who had been performing work for Halliburton at the Prudhoe Bay, Alaska site, reportedly received an exposure of 9141 millirem from 4/1/2008 to 6/30/2008. The report from Landauer contains a note to the effect that the dosimeter had been read twice with the second reading in agreement with the first; however, there was an irregularity. The RSO is investigating the occurrence.

* * * UPDATE AT 1807 ON 7/14/2009 FROM ELIZABETH FOLTZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following information was received via e-mail:

"Halliburton conducted an investigation to determine the validity and potential cause of the 9141 millirem exposure. To assist with the investigation, Halliburton engaged the services of a recognized expert in the field of radiation dosimetry. The investigation was comprehensive and included employee interviews and a review of their work involving sources of radiation, review and analysis of exposure monitoring data for all personnel working in Alaska, review of job records involving radioactive sources, and actual recreations of multiple exposure scenarios. Landauer technical experts were also engaged during the investigation process. Upon conclusion of the investigation, it was determined that the employee involved did not receive a 9141 millirem dose or any dose in excess of that allowed by the regulations. Halliburton has requested a modification of the employee's dose record by Landauer. On May 7, 2009, Halliburton submitted a written notification of this event to the NRC Region IV Deputy Director, including a detailed report of the investigation and findings."

Notified the R4DO (Gaddy) and FSME (Reis).

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 45192
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: STILLWATER State: OK
County:
License #: OK-00237-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 07/10/2009
Notification Time: 10:46 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2009
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION

The following information was received from the State of Oklahoma via email:

"An incident involving veterinary use of 3.7 milliCuries of Iodine 131 occurred at Oklahoma State University (OSU) on the afternoon of July 8. OSU holds a broad scope license OK-00237-03 and is located in Stillwater, OK. This was the licensee's first such treatment of a cat since an incident late last Fall where a veterinarian who was not an authorized user did a similar injection and stuck himself with the needle after the injection. An inspector from Oklahoma DEQ was present for the treatment, though not in the actual injection room because of space concerns. The University RSO directly observed the procedure and reports that the technician administering the dose appeared to follow the procedure precisely. She did not report anything unusual about the injection, though she observed that the cat (whose body was enclosed in a bag) struggled somewhat. The problem was discovered when a survey of the technician was done, and contamination was discovered on protective clothing covering the hand and the outer surface of the opposite forearm.

"Licensee measurements indicate that the cat reads 0.25 mrem/hr at 30 cm from the body, while measurements in the area where the cat was injected read over 60mrem/hr without the cat present. The licensee believes that the cat did not receive the majority of the dose and that the majority of the Iodine ended up on the injection shelf and the floor of the room. Thyroid screening of the technician, the RSO, and a control person with NaI probe does not indicate any internal absorption. The technician does not have any removable contamination on her skin, and meter readings of her skin are at background. A whole body scan at a hospital is being scheduled for her. She was given 0.13 cc of SSKI mixed with 2 ounces of water shortly after the incident.

"The area where the incident occurred has been closed off. The cat is being maintained in a cage in the room. The syringe assembly, its carrying case, and all protective garments worn by the technician have been preserved. The licensee is investigating, getting the advice of a team of experts.

"The licensee has not reached a conclusion of the cause of the problem, theories include mechanical failure in the preloaded syringe assembly or that the struggling cat may have caused the needle to stick out through the subcutaneous injection site causing the dose to be ejected outside the cat."

To top of page
Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 45195
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL GREENO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/12/2009
Notification Time: 00:08 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2009
Event Time: 20:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
MICHAEL TSCHILTZ (NMSS)

Event Text

UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION EVENT REQUIRING ADDITIONAL RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (RESPIRATORS) FOR MORE THAN 24 HOURS

"An unplanned contamination event occurred on 10 July 2009. This is a reportable event in accordance with 10CFR40.60 sub paragraph (1) based on an unplanned event that resulted in additional radiological controls being required for more than 24 hours. The 24 hour period ended at 2000 CDT on 11 July 2009 (the reported event). The additional control imposed was the wearing of air purifying respirators on the fourth floor of the Feed Materials Building. The location of the event was the Feed Materials Building fourth floor. The Feed Materials Building converts milled uranium oxide material to uranium hexafluoride by using a dry process. Air samples from the fourth floor were analyzed and the airborne radioactivity averaged approximately 6.11E-11 microcuries/ml. The airborne contaminant was natural uranium ore concentrate and the physical form is a light microscopic dust. The processes in the area of elevated levels of airborne radioactivity have been secured and potential leakage paths are being investigated.

"The licensee will notify NRC Region II."

HOO Note: See similar Event Numbers 44857, 44871, 45058, and 45163.

* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL GREENO TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1628 EDT ON 7/14/09 * * *

The isotope responsible for the increased controls was natural uranium in the chemical form of uranium tetraflouride (UF4); green salt. The amount of unplanned contamination that was released in the form of green salt was estimated to exceed 5 times the ALI [Annual Limit on Intake] (3 grams). The airborne activity averaged approximately 6.11E-11 microCuries/ml. (5.0E-11 microCuries/ml is 30% of 1 DAC [Derived Air Concentration]).

The licensee states that bioassay sampling of any potentially exposed individuals will be performed within the routine sampling frequency, but prior to 7/30/09.

The licensee has notified NRC Region II. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue) and NMSS EO (Kotzalas).

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 45203
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/14/2009
Notification Time: 01:46 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2009
Event Time: 22:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF ENS PHONE CIRCUITS AND SOME COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

"At 2200 CDT on 7/13/09 it was discovered the Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone lines in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms and the Technical Support Center were not functioning. Additionally, the Health Physics Network is not functioning. This discovery occurred during extent of condition troubleshooting when it was determined that local cellular phone and land-line phone service was unavailable in some local areas. A successful land-line phone call to the NRC Operations Center was completed following this discovery, All State and local authorities required to be contacted in the event of an Emergency Class declaration were contacted via land-lines and made aware of the situation.

"Also at this time, the Dedicated Emergency Fax/Voice System (DEF/VS) is unable to fax to the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) Little Rock Operations Center. Land-line voice communications to Little Rock have been verified. The Russellville ADH office is able to receive fax notifications from ANO and can ensure that all state and local agencies can be notified. The Russellville ADH office will remain manned until the situation is resolved.

"At approximately 2345 CDT, it was determined that the NRC Operations Center was unable to directly contact either Unit 1 or Unit 2 control room.

"The cause of the loss of communications is suspected to be a major fiber-optic line being cut In Morrilton, Arkansas. No estimate of time for repairs Is available at this time."

The licensee has established that communication capability exists via either radio or phone with local emergency response and law enforcement organizations. The licensee can still contact the NRC via commercial circuits but cannot receive calls from the NRC. A dedicated cell phone line has been established by the licensee to facilitate communication from the NRC if necessary.

State and local authorities have been informed of the problem. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified and has responded to the site.

* * * UPDATE BY HUFFMAN AT 0500 EDT ON 7/14/09 * * *

The ENS lines and commercial phone service have been restored to ANO and verified operable. R4DO (Gaddy) notified.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 45204
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MORRIS SANDERS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 07/14/2009
Notification Time: 09:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2009
Event Time: 03:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAK

At 0303 EDT on July 13, 2009, while in Hot Standby Mode 3, operators at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 identified a leak in the vicinity of the "A" reactor coolant pump (RCP). The containment sump leakage trend indicated a leak rate of 0.03 gallons per minute. At 0540 EDT, chemical analysis confirmed the leakage to be from the reactor coolant system. Follow up inspections are in progress to determine the source of the pressure boundary leak. Operators have cooled the plant to Cold Shutdown Mode 5 in accordance with plant Technical Specification 3.4.6.2, Reactor Coolant Operational Leakage.

The plant entered Cold Shutdown Mode 5 at 1601 EDT on July 13, 2009.

The licensee stated that this report is late due to an administrative oversight.

Licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 45205
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: MIKE McBREARTY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/14/2009
Notification Time: 22:18 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2009
Event Time: 11:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TEMPORARY LOSS OF POWER TO TEN EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS

"On Monday July 13, 2009, at approximately 1100 PDT, Southern California Edison discovered a loss of the ability to activate 10 Community Alert Sirens (CAS) located on the Camp Pendleton Marine Corp Base. Prior to the discovery, the most recent test demonstrating operability of the sirens was performed on July 10, 2009, at approximately 1152 PDT. On July 13, 2009, at approximately 1130 PDT, SCE re-established the ability to activate the sirens. SCE is currently conducting an investigation to determine the cause of the problem, to try to ascertain the time that the loss of ability to activate the sirens occurred, and to identify the cause of the delay in reporting this event.

SCE assumes the sirens were inoperable for greater than 48 hours, and therefore, is reporting this event as a loss of emergency offsite capability, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at about 99 percent and 100 percent power, respectively."

A CAS power panel was found with a tripped breaker. An investigation into the cause of the breaker trip is ongoing.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012