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Event Notification Report for June 26, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/25/2009 - 06/26/2009

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45025 45150 45162 45163

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 45025
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: THOMAS MORSE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 04/28/2009
Notification Time: 00:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2009
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/25/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) PUMP TRIPPED WHILE IN OPERATION FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING

"On April 27, 2009, at approximately 1730 hours, with the plant in Mode 5 during refueling outage (RFO) 12, RHR 'A' pump tripped while operating in shutdown cooling. RHR 'A' was the primary decay heat removal shutdown cooling system. RHR 'B' was the backup decay heat removal shutdown cooling system. Preliminary investigation shows that jumper installation activities associated with plant testing resulted in a blown fuse and closure of the RHR shutdown cooling outboard common suction isolation valve (1E12F008). Closure of the 1E12F008 valve tripped the RHR 'A' pump and prevented the RHR 'B' pump from being used to initiate shutdown cooling from the control room. Operators were preparing to manually open 1E12F008 in parallel with activities to restore control from the control room.

"The plant entered Technical Specification 3.9.9, 'RHR - Low Water Level', Conditions A and C due to 1E12F008 isolating causing the loss of shutdown cooling. Action A.1 calls for verification of an alternate method of decay heat removal available for each inoperable RHR shutdown cooling subsystem in 1 hour and once per 24 hours thereafter. This was completed with the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system's two pumps and two heat exchangers cooled by NCC [Nuclear Closed Cooling System] (available due to the ability to reflood the upper pools with a hotwell pump through normal cavity reflood path) being one alternate system. A second alternate system was the utilization of the low pressure core spray to flood the vessel, returning to the suppression pool through safety relief valves, and a loop of RHR in suppression pool cooling. Actions for Condition C, to verify reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method and to monitor reactor coolant temperature were not met due to no reactor coolant flow past a valid temperature monitoring point. Approximate reactor coolant temperature was being trended using the reactor water cleanup system.

"The blown fuse was identified and replaced at approximately 1816 hours. The RHR 'B' pump was started at approximately 1834 hours. From the time that the RHR 'A' pump tripped (approximately 1730), until the RHR 'B' pump was started, the reactor temperature increased from 94 degrees F to 97 degrees F. Pre-determined time to boil had been calculated to be 9 hours. At approximately 1835 hours, TS 3.9.9 Condition C was exited due to the RHR 'B' shutdown cooling loop being placed in operation.

"This event is being reported as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of a safely function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM C. ELBERFELD TO P. SNYDER AT 1727 ON 6/25/09 * * *

"The purpose of this call is to retract Event Number 45025. On April 28, 2009, at 0055 hours, notification was made to the NRC Operations Center by the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) reporting a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to remove residual heat [10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)]. Jumper installation activities associated with plant testing resulted in a blown fuse and closure of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling outboard common suction isolation valve. Closure of the valve resulted in the RHR A pump tripping, as designed. The blown fuse was replaced and the valve reopened. The RHR B subsystem was then started as the primary decay heat removal shutdown cooling system. Additionally, it was initially questioned whether Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.9.9 Required Actions were met to verify reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method and to monitor reactor coolant temperature.

"Based on further evaluation, it was determined that there was not a reasonable expectation of the loss of safety function of a system needed to remove residual heat (i.e., the RHR System). The redundant RHR B subsystem was manually aligned and operated in a timely manner to continue to meet the system requirements to fulfill the safety function. Since the condition reported in Event Number 45025 would not have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to remove residual heat, the condition is not reportable, and this notification is retracted.

Additionally, it was determined that verification of reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup System) was performed and that monitoring of reactor coolant temperature was appropriate. Therefore, based on not meeting any 10 CFR 50.73 reporting criteria, no Licensee Event Report is required. The evaluations (i.e., Reportability Reviews) for this condition are documented in Condition Report 09-58110 and Condition Report 09-58123."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45150
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: LONGVIEW FIBRE
Region: 4
City: LONGVIEW State: WA
County:
License #: R0205
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRANDIN KETTER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/23/2009
Notification Time: 11:06 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2009
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GAUGE

"On 15 Jun 2009 a fixed gauge fell off a digester blow line, about 4 feet onto a grating platform. Licensee staff working in the area noticed the gauge and alerted their supervisor and radiation safety officer. After ensuring the shutter was closed and the source [CS-137; .4092 Ci] was still present, the device (containing its source) was moved to a secure location. Licensee performed wipe surveys to check for leaking / contamination. Meter surveys confirmed the presence of the source, and also the absence of elevated dose rates. There is concern that the welds failed that attached the device to the mounting on the pipe. The manufacturer [Ohmart Vega] has been notified and will assist in arranging return of device (containing its source) and further assessment of cause of failure. The manufacturer uses same model [SR-1A] and serial [#6339] for both source and device."

The Washington State incident number is WA-09-034.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45162
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC HORVATH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 06/25/2009
Notification Time: 11:44 [ET]
Event Date: 06/25/2009
Event Time: 00:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/25/2009
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
MARK SATORIUS (R3 D)
FREDERICK BROWN (NRR)
JIM WIGGINS (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

DISCOVERY OF AN AFTER-THE-FACT ALERT DUE TO CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF CCPD

"A transitory ALERT [condition was determined to have existed] based on Emergency Action Level 7.D.2 - 'Onsite Explosion Affecting Plant Operation'. At time 0049 on 06/25/09 a catastrophic failure-explosion of the Constant Current Potential Device (CCPD) on 'J' Bus near Air Circuit Breaker (ACB) 34563 resulted in a loss of switchyard 345 KV Bus 'J'. This event de-energized Startup Transformer 01 which is a tie from offsite sources to the Unit 13.8 KV Busses. The unit entered [Technical Specification] LCO 3.8.1, Condition A [due to the loss of one offsite power source]. The Unit remains stable and in operation at 100% RTP [reactor thermal power]. A problem solving decision making team is working on [the] troubleshooting/repair/restoration activities. This event did not impact any plant safety systems or result in any release of radioactive material."

Failure of the CCPD caused automatic opening of the breakers on both sides of the 'J' bus which was configured as part of a switchyard ring bus at the time of the event. This resulted in the loss of one of the offsite power ties. However, startup Transformer 02 is still energized from offsite power and remains available for plant operations. Other than the de-energized startup transformer, onsite electrical configurations are normal including availability of emergency diesel generators. The licensee is in a 72 hour LCO per Tech Spec 3.8.1, Condition A, to restore the lost offsite power source. The licensee is inspecting the switchyard for collateral damage to other equipment from the failure of the CCPD. The licensee believes the CCPD failure is likely a result of equipment failure and not the result of any equipment tampering.

The licensee stated that initially, the severity of the CCPD failure was not recognized because of the night time conditions and minimal lighting in the area. After daylight examination of the location of the event, it was determined that the failure of the CCPD should have been classified as an explosion affecting plant operation under EAL 7.D.2. Consequently, the licensee made the after-the-fact declaration.

Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying State and local authorities.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 45163
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL GREENO
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 06/25/2009
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2009
Event Time: 10:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/25/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)

Event Text

ACCESS RESTRICTION DUE TO UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION

"An unplanned airborne contamination event occurred beginning June 24, 2009 at 1045 at the Honeywell Metropolis, IL facilities' pond mud calciner area. Access was restricted to the area by requiring respiratory protection to be worn.

"Average airborne concentrations during the following 24 hour period were 7.19 E -11 microcuries per cubic centimeter which exceeds the administrative limit of 5 E -12 microcuries per cubic centimeter. Natural uranium dust was the isotope involved.

"There was no known effect to employees. This event is being entered into the facilities corrective action program."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012