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Event Notification Report for June 16, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/15/2009 - 06/16/2009

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45111 45120 45121 45122 45123 45124 45128 45132 45133

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45111
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRUCE HUGO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 06/02/2009
Notification Time: 00:54 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2009
Event Time: 16:50 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

LOSS OF TSC AIR CONDITIONING UNIT COMPRESSOR

"On 5/20/09, the Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning unit compressor failed to restart following refueling outage electrical bus maintenance. On 5/31/09, the compressor was discovered to be shorted to ground. The short renders the air conditioning unit nonfunctional and at 1650 on 6/1/09 the nonfunctional air conditioner was determined to adversely affect TSC habitability based on meteorological conditions. TSC filtration capabilities are not affected by this problem. The nonfunctional air conditioner leaves the TSC in a degraded state; however, the TSC is currently habitable and available for service. Should the TSC need to be activated, habitability of the TSC will be monitored per existing plant procedures. Relocation of the TSC to an alternate location would be performed in accordance with station procedures as necessary to ensure continued TSC functionality. The control room and all other emergency response facilities are unaffected by the TSC chiller outage. Work instructions to repair the chiller are in review and work is expected to commence on June 2nd and proceed with high priority. A follow-up notification will be made when the TSC chiller has been restored. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC resident has been notified."

* * * UPDATE AT 1503 EDT ON 6/15/09 FROM RULLMAN TO HUFFMAN * * *

"Repairs to the TSC air conditioning unit have been completed and it has been placed in service. There is no longer any challenge to TSC habitability."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. R4DO (Cain) notified.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45120
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: PROCTOR & GAMBLE
Region: 1
City: Greensboro State: NC
County: Guilford
License #: 041-0464-0G
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HENRY BARNES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/10/2009
Notification Time: 09:54 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - LOST SOURCE

The following information was received via facsimile:

"The device is a product fill level gauge that was on a line that was being disassembled and cleared out. [Proctor & Gamble] P&G had told the contractor to leave the part of the line with the gauge until Industrial Dynamics (their consultant for radioactive materials) had a chance to remove the device from the package line. However, the device was not removed and the line was sent off for disposal.

"The device was physically removed from the site on or about May 28, 2009. The Licensee discovered the [device to be missing] on June 9, 2009. The disposed-of material was sent to DH Griffin [a scrap yard] in Greensboro, NC. DH Griffin has been contacted and they are in the process of sorting and searching for the device. They say there is a good chance that the device is still at the scrap yard as the material received from P&G should be in one of two piles still at the yard.

"[The State of North Carolina] asked P&G if they needed any assistance and [P&G] said no, at this time."

The device is an Industrial Dynamics FT-50 Filtec device used to measure the fill level of liquid products. The source is an Am-241, 100 mCi source. Gauge S/N: 110585, Source S/N: 3770. The source was leak tested in Sept. 2006 and it was not leaking at that time.

The North Carolina Incident number is NC-09-25.

* * * UPDATE FROM HENRY BARNES TO DONALD NORWOOD ON 06/10/2009 AT 1307 EDT * * *

"D.H. Griffin contacted P&G [at] 10:15 am. They informed P&G that they had located the Filtec unit on site. [An employee of P&G] drove to the D.H. Griffin site [and] verified that it was their Filtec unit. The unit is now isolated on a pallet and secured in a warehouse at D.H. Griffin. P&G is in contact with their Industrial Dynamics regional resource to arrange to have the source removed. They will keep [the State] informed as to the progress on the removal of the unit."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45121
Rep Org: KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: KLEINFELDER CENTRAL INC
Region: 4
City: ROELAND PARK State: KS
County: JOHNSON
License #: 22-B632-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 06/10/2009
Notification Time: 11:31 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2009
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
ANDREA KOCK (FSME)
DENNIS ALLSTON (ILTA)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the State of Kansas via facsimile:

"Case number: KS090005.

"Kansas Division of Emergency Management reported that the duty officer received a call at 5:29 on 6/9/09 from licensee that a moisture density gauge had been stolen from a job site in Roeland Park, KS, Johnson County, on 6/6/09. The Roeland Park police were notified at 5:12 pm on 6/9/09. [The responding officer] stated he observed the vehicle and chains used to secure the gauge. The chains were rusty and did not appear to have been tampered with (no scrape marks or areas where the rust had been disturbed). The licensee employee stated the gauge transport case was secured by the chains through the handles. KDHE [Kansas Department of Health and Environment] was notified 0905 6/10/09."

The gauge was a Humboldt Scientific model number 5001, with sealed sources of 50 mCi Am-241:BE and 11 mCi Cs-137.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 45122
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL A. REANDEAU
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 06/10/2009
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2009
Event Time: 09:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 98 Power Operation 96 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION - UNKNOWN CABLE WITH COMBUSTIBLE COATING FOUND IN DIVISION I / DIVISION II CABLE TRAY

"At 0920 on June 10, 2009, technicians [performing] a Halon detection functional surveillance found a No. 10 AWG Tefzel coated conductor that ran in the Division 1, Division 2, and non-divisional cable trough in the Main Control Room subfloor panels. The conductor is terminated at a ring lug to a bus bar on one end, and the termination point on the other end is unknown. The Tefzel coating is combustible.

"This is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as 'any condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'

"Clinton is required to have divisional separation in the event of a fire, and if the cable caught fire both Division 1 and Division 2 could be impacted.

"The station is working on determining the design function of the conductor and what the conductor is connected to."

The licensee will notify the on-site state IEMA Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1655 EDT ON 6/15/09 FROM REANDEAU TO HUFFMAN * * *

The licensee is retracting this event based on the following:

"Further inspection of the duct run in the subfloor section reveals that the #10 AWG Tefzel coated conductor is actually 2 separate conductors, not just one. Each is a ground for the flex conduits in the divisional ducts (as described in USAR section 8.3.1.4.5.5), installed to ensure that hot shorts in the wiring inside the flex conduit will melt the upstream fuses. In addition, between the division 1 and division 2 duct sections, there is a metal barrier in the duct, providing the separation barrier between redundant Class 1E equipment (Division 1 and Division 2 cables) as described in IEEE 384.

"Also, further review shows that Tefzel is flame retardant and non-propagating, passes the IEEE 383 and UL vertical tray flame test, and is rated 'non-burning' under ASTM D635.

"There is no divisional separation issue and no condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."

The licensee has notified the on-site state IEMA Resident Inspector and NRC Resident Inspector.

R3DO (Lipa) notified.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45123
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: DOW CHEMICAL
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L00451
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DANNY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 06/11/2009
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/11/2009
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
ANDREA KOCK (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following was received via E-mail:

"As we [the Texas Department of Health] understand it, a gauge, Ronan Eng. Co., Model SA-1 with 3Ci of Cs-137, has a broken handle and the shutter will not close. The serial number (S/N) is M7844 and I see that the source model could be 3M or QSA (AEA) so that will [be] determined later. It said that the external exposure rate is a nominal 1.5mR/hr and the gauge is 40' high on a vessel which is in process so no vessel entry is anticipated. They hope to keep operating until their next scheduled outage on July 15."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45124
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIM TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/11/2009
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 06/11/2009
Event Time: 15:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 12 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

UNIT 2 INITIATED A TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO A RISE IN UNIDENTIFIED DRYWELL LEAKAGE

"At noon on 06/11/2009 Browns Ferry Unit 2 experienced a rise in drywell leakage during reactor startup. The 4 hour unidentified leak rate from 0800 to 1200 on 6/10/2009 was 0 GPM, while the 4 hour unidentified leak rate from 0800 to 1200 on 6/11/2009 was 3.88 GPM. This increase in leak rate exceeded the allowable limit of a 2 GPM increase in unidentified leakage in a 24 hour period per Technical Specification 3.4.4. At 1555 [CDT] on 06/11/2009, Unit 2 inserted a manual reactor SCRAM to comply with Technical Specification 3.4.4 Condition C to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 4 within 36 hours.

"All systems responded as required except that when reset of the SCRAM was attempted after all control rods had inserted, a portion of the 'B' RPS channel (B2/B3) failed to reset. The 'A' RPS channel was then actuated by a spike on the Intermediate Range Monitors while they were being driven into the core resulting in a full RPS SCRAM actuation.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Unit 2 is currently removing decay heat using normal feedwater with bypass steam to the main condenser. The electrical system is in a normal shutdown configuration. The licensee has not identified the source of the unidentified leakage and anticipates taking Unit 2 to Cold Shutdown (Mode 4).

* * * UPDATE AT 1730 EDT ON 6/15/09 FROM HUNTER TO SANDIN * * *

"Plant personnel entered the drywell after the reactor was shutdown. The resulting investigation revealed two sources of increased drywell leakage. One source of leakage was from 2-CKV-10-511 and 2-CKV-10-526, SRV Tailpipe Vacuum Breakers, which were apparently damaged by leakage past the pilot valve for 2-PCV-001-0023, Main Steam Safety Relief Valve. The combination of damaged vacuum breakers and a leaking pilot valve resulted in steam leakage into the drywell atmosphere. The other source of leakage was noted through the packing for 2-DRV-10-505, RPV Drain to RWCU. The vacuum breakers, pilot valve, and drain valve have been repaired.

"The 'B' RPS contactors were repaired and the scram reset.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

R2DO (McCoy) notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45128
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE HENRY
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER
Notification Date: 06/13/2009
Notification Time: 09:19 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2009
Event Time: 09:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE

"Planned maintenance activities are being performed today (June 13, 2009) on the Vogtle Nuclear Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC) power sources. This work activity is planned to be performed and completed expeditiously within approximately 3 days (78 hours). This maintenance activity is to perform a transformer replacement, perform preventative maintenance on several circuit breakers, perform preventative maintenance on the TSC HVAC unit, repair a leak on the Back-Up D/G [diesel generator] which provides a back-up power supply to the TSC HVAC, and other minor maintenance activities.

"If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the Technical Support Center during this work activity, contingency plans are in place to restore the TSC to fully functional status, with the time to restoration dependent on the stage of the work activity at the time the emergency occurs. Plans are to utilize the Shift Manager's Office in the Control Room as the Backup TSC for any declared emergency during the time the work activity is being performed. Procedure 91201-C, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center, provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC. At the beginning of the TSC outage, the ENN [Emergency Notification Network] and ERDS [Emergency Response Data System] will not be available until temporary power is being provided. This outage for the communications equipment will last from 2-4 hours, at which time they will be available.

"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The licensee provided notification of this issue prior to initiation of the maintenance per the licensee's 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation for the activity. The licensee intends to update this report when the temporary modification is completed such that the ERDS system is returned to service.

* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HENRY TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0735 EDT ON 6/15/09 * * *

The licensee has returned the ERDS system to service using temporary power. Preventive maintenance still continues on the TSC. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (McCoy).

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 45132
Rep Org: ACUREN INSPECTIONS
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTIONS
Region: 3
City: LINDEN State: IN
County:
License #: 42-27593-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK RINKE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 06/15/2009
Notification Time: 08:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2009
Event Time: 09:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

STUCK SOURCE IN RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

Two radiographers were examining welds on a tank when the magnetic stand that was attached to the side of the tank fell. The Amersham radiography camera (model 660B) was secured to the tank by a shackle and swung freely. This mishap damaged the guide tube extension and crimped the guide tube at the source connect. When the radiographers realized the source (65.2 Ci Ir-192) was stuck they followed O&E (Radiographic Operating & Emergency) procedures and notified the FRSO (Facility Radiation Safety Officer). At that same time the radiographers reassessed the area and established appropriate boundaries.

The tank being examined was in an area away from the general public, therefore the public was not exposed. The FRSO, in retrieving the stuck source, was not over exposed.

Both individuals on the job-site, as well as the FRSO are carded radiographers. FRSO is also trained in source retrieval.

Corrective actions planned by the licensee to prevent recurrence of this incident is to use two lifts instead of one, which should prevent the stand from falling to its farthest point.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45133
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK ARNOSKY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/16/2009
Notification Time: 05:51 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2009
Event Time: 00:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO COMPUTER PROBLEMS

"[The licensee experienced] a loss of the ability to send ERDS data to the NRC for greater than 60 minutes due to a computer problem. The HPN and ENS communications systems were not affected and remained available through a commercial communication line. SPDS also remained in service and remained available during this period. The ERDS system was restored to service after 109 minutes."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012