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Event Notification Report for June 11, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/10/2009 - 06/11/2009

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45117 45119 45122

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45117
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: IROQUOIS PAVING CORP.
Region: 3
City: WATSEKA State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01909-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 06/08/2009
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2009
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

ILLINOIS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"On Friday June 5, the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer, called the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] to report a traffic accident involving their portable moisture density gauge that afternoon around 15:30. Apparently, a drunk driver entered the north bound construction zone on IL Rt. 49 at a speed in excess of 70 miles per hour and struck the gauge. The gauge was drug [approximately] 350 to 500 feet from the site of the impact. The car backed up to dislodge the gauge from under the vehicle and sped off. The license plate and identity of the vehicle was noted by a member of the road crew. The driver later crashed his vehicle and was apprehended by local law enforcement.

"The gauge source rod was in a shallow test position at the time of impact which separated the handle with indexing rod and source rod from the base of the gauge. The licensee attempted to recover all the pieces but some fragments of the source rod appeared to be missing. Radiation measurements taken at the scene by the RSO using a hand held instrument suggested both the Cs-137 and Am-241 sources were present. Digital pictures forwarded from the site to the Agency seemed to corroborate that finding however, after the gauge was returned to the storage location approximately one hour later, readings from the source rod definitely showed the source was no longer attached to the bottom of the rod.

"The Agency immediately dispatched an individual to investigate the matter.

"[The investigator, using] direct measurements and observation confirmed that although the Am-241:Be source was intact and in the shielded base of the destroyed gauge, the Cs-137 was no longer present with the other remaining pieces of the gauge and that the source rod tip had been cleanly severed from the source rod. Arrangements were made with the RSO and QA/QC Manager for the licensee to acquire additional safety equipment and begin a search of the section of pavement where the accident occurred. The nighttime scanning of the 1 mile section of roadway from the point of impact with a rate meter and scintillation probe produced elevated readings along the roadside off of the shoulder of the new asphalt. The readings were used to pinpoint the area where the source was located. Additional lighting eventually lead to the discovery of the source capsule within a grassy area of the shoulder some 5 feet from the road bed. The source was subsequently collected by the Agency investigator and placed into a shielded transport container. Gross monitoring of wipe tests collected at the scene showed no signs of contamination from the source or any equipment used to handle the source. The source was subsequently secured and isolated at the licensee's storage facility pending transfer to the manufacturer. Interviews with staff and assessment of radiation readings from the source indicated that no individual received a notable exposure from the actual event nor did any one handle a piece of the gauge that would result in an extremity exposure. Pocket dosimeter readings from those involved in the recovery showed no measured exposures.

"This item remains open pending transfer of the source and submission of the required report from the licensee."

The gauge contained a 8 mCi Cs-137 source and a 40 mCi Am/Be-241 source.

Illinois Event No. IL0900046

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45119
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MIKE MCDANIEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 06/10/2009
Notification Time: 01:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/2009
Event Time: 18:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

DOOR FOR SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY LEFT OPEN

"This notification is being made pursuant to NRC regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"At 1852 [CDT] on June 9, 2009, River Bend Station personnel discovered that a normally closed auxiliary building door was open. This door serves as part of the secondary containment boundary. At discovery, immediate action was taken to close the door. This action restored the secondary containment to the design configuration. Investigation determined that the door was last accessed at 1242 on June 9 and was most probably left open at that time. Further action is being taken to investigate the cause of the event.

"Secondary containment leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis, and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structures will be treated by the Standby Gas Treatment System prior to discharge to the environment. With the subject door being open, the function of secondary containment would be impacted. A second door is located in the same exterior passage way as the secondary containment door found open. This door was closed during the period of time the secondary containment door was open. This second door serves a security function. However, it potentially could serve to perform the secondary containment function. An evaluation is being performed to determine the actual impact of the condition on the secondary containment function. However, based on the identified condition, this report is being made as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45122
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL A. REANDEAU
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 06/10/2009
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2009
Event Time: 09:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 98 Power Operation 96 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION - UNKNOWN CABLE WITH COMBUSTIBLE COATING FOUND IN DIVISION I / DIVISION II CABLE TRAY

"At 0920 on June 10, 2009, technicians [performing] a Halon detection functional surveillance found a No. 10 AWG Tefzel coated conductor that ran in the Division 1, Division 2, and non-divisional cable trough in the Main Control Room subfloor panels. The conductor is terminated at a ring lug to a bus bar on one end, and the termination point on the other end is unknown. The Tefzel coating is combustible.

"This is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as 'any condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'

"Clinton is required to have divisional separation in the event of a fire, and if the cable caught fire both Division 1 and Division 2 could be impacted.

"The station is working on determining the design function of the conductor and what the conductor is connected to."

The licensee will notify the on-site state IEMA Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012