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Event Notification Report for May 14, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/13/2009 - 05/14/2009

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45001 45050 45054 45060 45064 45065

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45001
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GEORGE E. STOROLIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/20/2009
Notification Time: 05:09 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2009
Event Time: 01:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

UNEXPECTED START OF THE STEAM DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP DURING PLANT COOLDOWN

"On 4/20/09 at 0153 hours, while in Mode 3 performing a plant cooldown for a refueling outage, a control room operator noted that the 'B' train steam supply (TV-1MS-105B) to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, FW-P-2, was open. This caused the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump to start and inject auxiliary feedwater into the steam generators. This was an unexpected condition. The start of the FW-P-2 auxiliary turbine driven feedwater pump is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"At 0209, TV-1MS-105B was closed. The steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump was declared inoperable and Technical Specification action statements were entered. Technical Specification 3.7.5 Condition B requires the pump to be restored to operable status within 72 hours or be in Mode 4 within the following 18 hours.

"Mode 4 was entered on 4/20/09 at 0347 hours. The steam drive auxiliary feedwater pump is not required to be operable in Mode 4. Technical Specification 3.7.5 Condition B was exited on 4/20/09 at 0347.

"Investigation is in progress to determine the cause of TV-1MS-105B opening.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * UPDATE ON 5/13/09 AT 1021 EDT TO RETRACT ORIGINAL EVENT AND REPORT AS INVALID ACTUATION FROM MATTY TO HUFFMAN * * *

"This notification retracts 10 CFR 50.72 Event Notification No. 45001 since the actuation that was reported has subsequently been determined to be invalid.

"On April 20, 2009, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 (BVPS-1) was in Mode 3 and being shutdown in preparation for a refueling outage. At 0153 hours, one steam supply isolation valve (TV-1 MS-105B) to the steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Pump (FW-P-2) unexpectedly opened at BVPS-1, causing this pump to commence feeding all three steam generators. FW-P-2 functioned as designed with steam being supplied to the pump's steam-driven turbine. This actuation was reported in NRC Event Notification No. 45001.

"This start of the steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was not valid. There was no adverse Steam Generator water levels, no Safety Injection signal, and no Reactor Coolant Pump undervoltage condition which could have caused an Auxiliary Feedwater Pump start. No maintenance or tests were ongoing with the Auxiliary Feedwater System at the time. After observing that there was no demand for this Auxiliary Feedwater System pump to be operating, the control room crew closed the steam supply isolation valve from the control room at 0209 hours, terminating operation of this auxiliary feedwater pump.

"A follow-up problem solving team investigation did not identify any deficiencies within the solid state protection system. The most likely cause involved a degraded control room benchboard switch for TV-1 MS-105B. The physical degradation of the control switch would have allowed for the unplanned opening of the steam supply to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. This benchboard switch has been replaced and satisfactorily tested.

"This event is being retracted since the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump actuation was not valid and therefore not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as previously reported.

"This event is, however, reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it involved an actuation of a PWR Auxiliary Feedwater system train as listed per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(6). However, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification, instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report, since the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System pump was not generated by a valid actuation."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Holody) notified.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45050
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: UCLA
Region: 4
City: LOS ANGELES State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/08/2009
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2009
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- MISSING SEALED SOURCES

"UCLA was unable to locate 2 sealed sources which were listed in their inventory database. The first source was 50 micro Ci Co 60 as of 5/1/2000. Current activity is 15.28 micro Ci which exceeds the 1 microCi 24 hour reporting requirement. The second source was listed in their database as 1.83 micro Ci of Cm 244 as of 10/12/1988.

"UCLA believes the original activity for the Cm 244 source to be 1.83 nano Ci, and was listed incorrectly in their database. They contacted the Manufacturer, Isotope Products Laboratory, who informed them that they did not manufacture micro Curie quantities, but only nano Curie quantities of Cm 244. The current activity of the Cm 244 source (decayed to date of notification) is either 832 nano Curies or 0.832 nano Curies. The former exceeds the 1 nano Ci 24 hour reportable quantity requirements.

"UCLA believes the Cm 244 Source was installed in an instrument, but they were unable to locate the instrument at the time of notification. UCLA is continuing to search for the missing sources."

The UCLA RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) believes the sources are still on the campus.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45054
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PRIVATE CITIZEN
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 05/11/2009
Notification Time: 15:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2009
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIUM SOURCE FOUND

The State of Colorado sent this report in by fax.

"On 5/7/09, the Department received a request for assistance from a private citizen regarding the disposition of a load of scrap metal that he sent to a scrap metal recycling facility. The load was rejected after it tripped the gate radiation monitor.

"On 5/8/09, representatives from the Department went to the owner's site to investigate. After sifting through the pile of scrap, a radium source was found. The source, which was approximately 2 inches [in] diameter and 0.25 thick, had a glass face and appeared to be some type of light source. The back of the source was stamped with the following, 'USRC, UNDARK, 22MTTR58, Poison Inside.' The source was reading approximately 35 millirem per hour on contact and 0.3 millirem per hour at one foot. No removable contamination was detected by wipe test. The owner, who was cleaning out an old building on the property, did not know where the source came from.

"The source is currently being stored inside a locked, empty building on the property pending disposition. No other details are available at this time."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45060
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/13/2009
Notification Time: 02:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/12/2009
Event Time: 21:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 50 Power Operation 50 Power Operation

Event Text

INSTRUMENT VALVE MALFUNCTION POTENTIALLY AFFECTING THE ISOLATION CAPABILITY OF ONE OF THE MAIN STEAM LINES

"The equalizing valve for one of the four Main Steam Line (MSL) Flow - High differential pressure switches on the 'B' MSL was leaking through. The leak effectively reduced the differential pressure across all four MSL Flow - High valves on the 'B' MSL. This reduction in differential pressure thus potentially would not allow the switches to isolate the 'B' MSL at the required setpoint. This switch was for group 1 isolation. This loss of safety function was restored by isolating the faulty valve block for DPIS-2-117A. All other switches are now reading normally. The repairs for the faulty valve are in progress."

The licensee will notify NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45064
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PATRICK M. LEAHY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/13/2009
Notification Time: 18:14 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2009
Event Time: 15:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TRACK HOE SLID INTO INTAKE FOREBAY

"At approximately 1505 a Track Hoe clearing brush and foliage on the SQN Site berms slid into the SQN Intake Forebay. This is outside the Protected Area and does not affect Safety Related or other plant equipment. A small oil sheen was noted at the Track Hoe requiring notification of Federal and State Agencies in accordance with the Site Spill Prevention, Control and Countermeasure Plan. The containment of the oil sheen is in progress. An extraction plan is being developed by on-site personnel."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45065
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: NICHOLAS RULLMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 05/13/2009
Notification Time: 20:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2009
Event Time: 11:37 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT

A contractor supervisor had a confirmed urine sample substitution. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012