Event Notification Report for May 05, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/04/2009 - 05/05/2009
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45043
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ED TREMBLAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ED TREMBLAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/05/2009
Notification Time: 05:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2009
Event Time: 03:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2009
Notification Time: 05:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2009
Event Time: 03:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 2 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby |
3C MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE PROBLEMS
"While preparing to perform main turbine testing prior to returning Unit 3 to service, a possible weld defect was identified by plant personnel during a main steam system walk down. This defect appears to be on a small bore section of pipe upstream of a steam trap on a socket weld. This resulted in a small steam leak on the upstream side of the 'C' main steam isolation valve. The repair must be completed with the steam line depressurized and, as such, the plant is in the process of reducing temperature to less than 200 degrees F. Based on previous interpretations of TS 3.4.10 and the applicability to ASME Class 2 piping, TS 3.0.3 has been entered based on current plant conditions.
"At 0348 on 5/5/09, while bringing the Unit 3 to Mode 3 to comply with TSAS [Technical Specification Action Statement] 3.0.3, the 3C MSIV failed to close when demanded. The 3C MSIV was declared inoperable and Unit 3 entered TSAS 3.7.1.5 due to the inability to fulfill its safety function. The unit is required to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 within the following 6 hours.
"At 0437, the 3C MSIV was closed. This is in compliance with TSAS 3.7.1.5. An investigation is in progress as to the cause of the failure of the 3C MSIV to close when demanded.
"Plant shutdown continues to comply with TSAS 3.0.3."
All other safety systems are operable and there is no impact on Unit 4.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"While preparing to perform main turbine testing prior to returning Unit 3 to service, a possible weld defect was identified by plant personnel during a main steam system walk down. This defect appears to be on a small bore section of pipe upstream of a steam trap on a socket weld. This resulted in a small steam leak on the upstream side of the 'C' main steam isolation valve. The repair must be completed with the steam line depressurized and, as such, the plant is in the process of reducing temperature to less than 200 degrees F. Based on previous interpretations of TS 3.4.10 and the applicability to ASME Class 2 piping, TS 3.0.3 has been entered based on current plant conditions.
"At 0348 on 5/5/09, while bringing the Unit 3 to Mode 3 to comply with TSAS [Technical Specification Action Statement] 3.0.3, the 3C MSIV failed to close when demanded. The 3C MSIV was declared inoperable and Unit 3 entered TSAS 3.7.1.5 due to the inability to fulfill its safety function. The unit is required to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 within the following 6 hours.
"At 0437, the 3C MSIV was closed. This is in compliance with TSAS 3.7.1.5. An investigation is in progress as to the cause of the failure of the 3C MSIV to close when demanded.
"Plant shutdown continues to comply with TSAS 3.0.3."
All other safety systems are operable and there is no impact on Unit 4.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45044
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MIKE LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MIKE LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/06/2009
Notification Time: 06:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2009
Event Time: 23:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/2009
Notification Time: 06:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2009
Event Time: 23:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
VALID AUTO-START AND LOADING OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR TO SAFETY BUS DUE TO UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION
"A valid Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) actuation for emergency A/C power for the 15AA bus occurred at 2327 on 5/5/09 due to degraded voltage on ESF Transformer 12. ESF Transformer 12 was supplying power to the 15M bus due to Service Transformer 21 being out of service for maintenance. A fault occurred on the site power loop at switch 389-2901S causing breaker J3872 and breaker 5X01 to open de-energizing the site power loop and degrading the offsite power circuit 115kv voltage to the point that Division 1 Load Shedding and Sequencing (LSS) sensed a degraded voltage condition and performed a Load Shedding and Sequencing on the 15AA bus and started Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator to power the 15AA bus. Division 1 Diesel Generator is now supplying power to the 15M bus. Operators implemented appropriate off normal event procedures to mitigate the transient. All systems responded as designed.
"The exact cause of the fault to switch 2109S is not known at this time."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"A valid Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) actuation for emergency A/C power for the 15AA bus occurred at 2327 on 5/5/09 due to degraded voltage on ESF Transformer 12. ESF Transformer 12 was supplying power to the 15M bus due to Service Transformer 21 being out of service for maintenance. A fault occurred on the site power loop at switch 389-2901S causing breaker J3872 and breaker 5X01 to open de-energizing the site power loop and degrading the offsite power circuit 115kv voltage to the point that Division 1 Load Shedding and Sequencing (LSS) sensed a degraded voltage condition and performed a Load Shedding and Sequencing on the 15AA bus and started Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator to power the 15AA bus. Division 1 Diesel Generator is now supplying power to the 15M bus. Operators implemented appropriate off normal event procedures to mitigate the transient. All systems responded as designed.
"The exact cause of the fault to switch 2109S is not known at this time."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.