Event Notification Report for April 20, 2009

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION ON VALID STEAM GENERATOR HI-HI SIGNAL DURING SHUTDOWN

"On April 20,2009 at 0115 during Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 shutdown and cooldown in support of the 19th refueling outage, Unit 1 experienced an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation P-14 due to Steam Generator (SG) HI-HI water level in the 'B' Steam Generator. This ESF actuation initiated automatic actions resulting in full feedwater isolation, trip of the only operating 'B' main feed and the start of two Auxiliary Feedwater System pumps. The unplanned automatic initiation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system [was] due to the Main Feedwater pump trip. The P-14 automatic ESF features properly closed the main and bypass feedwater regulating valves and [caused the] closure of the Feedwater Containment Isolation valves. A turbine trip signal was generated but the turbine was not on-line. The automatic start of the MDAFW pumps from this valid signal is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"The cause of the steam generator high level transient is the failure of the FCV-1FW-489, 'B' steam generator feed water bypass level control to automatically maintain level. Attempts to control the level manually were not successful. Additional investigation is in progress.

"P-14 ESF actuation reset actions are being performed. Unit one cooldown continues using the MDAFW pumps and controls. AFW continues to be injected into the steam generators.

"The licensee notified the NRC resident Inspector."

UNEXPECTED START OF THE STEAM DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP DURING PLANT COOLDOWN

"On 4/20/09 at 0153 hours, while in Mode 3 performing a plant cooldown for a refueling outage, a control room operator noted that the 'B' train steam supply (TV-1MS-105B) to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, FW-P-2, was open. This caused the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump to start and inject auxiliary feedwater into the steam generators. This was an unexpected condition. The start of the FW-P-2 auxiliary turbine driven feedwater pump is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"At 0209, TV-1MS-105B was closed. The steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump was declared inoperable and Technical Specification action statements were entered. Technical Specification 3.7.5 Condition B requires the pump to be restored to operable status within 72 hours or be in Mode 4 within the following 18 hours.

"Mode 4 was entered on 4/20/09 at 0347 hours. The steam drive auxiliary feedwater pump is not required to be operable in Mode 4. Technical Specification 3.7.5 Condition B was exited on 4/20/09 at 0347.

"Investigation is in progress to determine the cause of TV-1MS-105B opening.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * UPDATE ON 5/13/09 AT 1021 EDT TO RETRACT ORIGINAL EVENT AND REPORT AS INVALID ACTUATION FROM MATTY TO HUFFMAN * * *

"This notification retracts 10 CFR 50.72 Event Notification No. 45001 since the actuation that was reported has subsequently been determined to be invalid.

"On April 20, 2009, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 (BVPS-1) was in Mode 3 and being shutdown in preparation for a refueling outage. At 0153 hours, one steam supply isolation valve (TV-1 MS-105B) to the steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Pump (FW-P-2) unexpectedly opened at BVPS-1, causing this pump to commence feeding all three steam generators. FW-P-2 functioned as designed with steam being supplied to the pump's steam-driven turbine. This actuation was reported in NRC Event Notification No. 45001.

"This start of the steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was not valid. There was no adverse Steam Generator water levels, no Safety Injection signal, and no Reactor Coolant Pump undervoltage condition which could have caused an Auxiliary Feedwater Pump start. No maintenance or tests were ongoing with the Auxiliary Feedwater System at the time. After observing that there was no demand for this Auxiliary Feedwater System pump to be operating, the control room crew closed the steam supply isolation valve from the control room at 0209 hours, terminating operation of this auxiliary feedwater pump.

"A follow-up problem solving team investigation did not identify any deficiencies within the solid state protection system. The most likely cause involved a degraded control room benchboard switch for TV-1 MS-105B. The physical degradation of the control switch would have allowed for the unplanned opening of the steam supply to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. This benchboard switch has been replaced and satisfactorily tested.

"This event is being retracted since the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump actuation was not valid and therefore not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as previously reported.

"This event is, however, reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it involved an actuation of a PWR Auxiliary Feedwater system train as listed per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(6). However, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification, instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report, since the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System pump was not generated by a valid actuation."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Holody) notified.

INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF ONE AUTOMATIC NOTIFICATION SYSTEM SIREN

"At approximately 1242 on April 20, 2009, three New Jersey Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Alert Notification System sirens went into AC power failure. This caused an automatic swap of the power supply from an AC source to a back up DC battery source. When this auto swap occurred, the Salem County 9-1-1 Center received an alarm which the dispatcher acknowledged. Sirens 127 and 114 were successfully acknowledged but when the dispatcher went to acknowledge Siren 128 he inadvertently selected 'alert with report' at 12:50:34 which when selected, initiated the siren. An ANS Services technician immediately received notification of the siren system actuation and called the Salem County 9-1-1 Center to provide direction to cancel the actuation. The siren actuation was cancelled at 12:52:21. Salem County officials notified the Lower Alloways Creek (LAC) Public Safety director and the New Jersey State Police (NJSP). The NJSP was notifying the NJ Regional Operation Intelligence Center (ROIC), LAC Police, and making a courtesy call to the LAC elementary school which is located in the vicinity of the siren. This event is being reported to NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

INJURED PERSON TRANSPORTED OFF SITE WITH CLOTHING CONTAMINATION

"At 1208 on 4/20/2009, the control room was notified of an injured person inside the Unit 3 Containment. It was immediately reported that this person fell about 4 feet off of the Reactor Head (while the Reactor Head was on the head stand) and potentially had head/back trauma. At 1210, Miami Metro Dade Fire and Rescue (911) was called. At 1218, Medical and Safety personnel arrived in containment and began preparation to transport the individual outside of containment. At 1225, Metro Dade Fire and Rescue arrived on site. At 1240, the individual was transported outside of containment via the equipment hatch. At 1253, FPL Radiation Protection reported to the control room that due to the individual's injuries and the difficulty in completing a full frisk, the individual would be transported offsite as a potentially contaminated-injured person. At 1255, security contacted the control room and stated that Metro Dade Fire and Rescue received the individual and began transport offsite to Baptist Hospital, Miami, Florida. At 1408,an FPL Radiation Protection representative that traveled to Baptist Hospital reported that the individual's clothing (protected clothing and modesty garments) was contaminated at 200 corrected cps > background. No skin contamination was found. An FPL Radiation Protection representative at Baptist Hospital took physical control of all material brought to the hospital from the site and are transporting all material back to site."

The ambulance, other equipment, people, and structures with whom the contaminated individual and his clothing made contact between the containment control point and the hospital were surveyed, showed no contamination, and released. The individual was an FPL employee, and was staging equipment at a work site.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.