| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/12/2009 - 03/13/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 44866 | Rep Org: EDAX, INC
Licensee: EDAX, INC
Region: 1
City: MAHWAH State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-17369-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB WESTERDALE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 02/20/2009
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2009
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
ANGELA McINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB via email ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST CALIBRATION SEALED SOURCE OF FE-55
A 2 milliCurie sealed source of Iron-55, used for calibration, was misplaced and believed to be lost. The source (Mfg # C1-375) was stored in a pig in a locked cabinet in a secure lab. Inventory is taken daily, and the last time it was seen was 2/17/09. Licensee believes that a lab technician was working with the source and it accidently rolled off the desk into a trash container. Licensee has searched every possible area where it may have gone. The sealed source was in a plastic tube, and therefore the exposure to personnel is just above background.
* * * UPDATE AT 1627 ON 3/12/2009 FROM BOB WESTERDALE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The strength of the Fe-55 source was calculated to be 660 microCuries on 3/10/2009.
Notified the R1DO (Dimitriatis), FSME (Mauer) and ILTAB (Whitney via e-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44899 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ELLIS PFEFFER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 03/12/2009
Notification Time: 11:21 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2009
Event Time: 10:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant is making a telephone Report in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) Invalid Actuation of the Standby Gas Treatment and Secondary Containment Isolation Systems due to high resistance resulting from inadequate contact wipe of a relay. This report is being made in lieu of a written Licensee Event Report.
"SPECIFIC TRAINS AND SYSTEMS THAT WERE ACTUATED
"The 'A' Standby Gas Treatment system actuated and Secondary Containment isolated.
"DESCRIPTION OF WHETHER EACH TRAIN ACTUATION WAS COMPLETE OR PARTIAL
"On January 20, 2009, during performance of Step 29 of Procedure 0003, Drywell High Pressure Scram and Groups 2, 3, & Secondary Containment Isolation Test and Calibration, the Standby Gas System automatically initiated and Secondary Containment isolated due to high contact resistance on a Drywell High Pressure HFA relay. This resulted in increased steam chase temperatures, entry into Action Statement TS 3.3.6.2.A for Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation, entry into Action Statement TS 3.6.4.1.A for Secondary Containment, entry into Action Statement TS 3.6.4.3.A for Standby Gas Treatment, and 10CFR50.73 reportability.
"DESCRIPTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE SYSTEM STARTED AND FUNCTIONED SUCCESSFULLY
"All systems started and functioned successfully.
"The cause of the initiation of SBGT and isolation of Secondary Containment during performance of Step 29 of Procedure 0003 was the presence of high resistance at relay 16A-K60A, contacts 5-6. The cause of high resistance at relay 16A-K60A, contacts 5-6, was inadequate contact wipe. The cause of the inadequate contact wipe was inadequate contact wipe adjustment after replacement of HFA coils with the new Century series coil.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event report." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44901 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED BENDIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 03/12/2009
Notification Time: 12:31 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2009
Event Time: 04:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PROCESS COMPUTER AND ERDS UNAVAILABLE FOR GREATER THAN 60 MINUTES
"Byron Unit 1 Process Computer was unavailable for use from 0420 to 0814 EDT on 3/12/09. This resulted in a loss of Unit 1's ability to send Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) to the NRC for greater than 60 minutes. The Unit 1 Process Computer and ERDS was restored at 0814 on 3/12/09. Byron's reportabllity procedure defines a loss of ERDS for greater than 60 minutes as being a major loss of emergency preparedness capability."
NRC Resident Inspector was notified by licensee. Notified R3DO (Julio Lara) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44903 | Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL TURNER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/12/2009
Notification Time: 21:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2009
Event Time: 16:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION FOR LOW INTAKE WATER LEVEL DUE TO AN ICE JAM
"On March 12, 2009 at 1249 CDT, Fort Calhoun Station entered AOP-01, 'Acts of Nature' Section IV, 'Low River Water Level' due to lowering river level resulting from an ice jam upstream from the station. At that time, Missouri River level had lowered to 983 feet and posed a potential challenge to continued operation of the circulating water pumps. AOP-01 requires offsite notification of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to determine current river conditions, expected river levels for Fort Calhoun Station, and planned actions to alleviate the lowering levels.
"Current river level at 1900 CDT was 982' 6" with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers predicting the minimum river level to be 981' 6" feet. At this time, there has been no degradation in the circulating water pump or plant performance and compensatory measures are in place to monitor river level hourly. Barring degradation in circulator performance, additional actions will not be required if river level stays above the predicted minimum levels."
The minimum level for operating the circulating water pumps is 978'. A break in the ice jam is not expected to adversely affect the plant.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44904 | Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRAD KIRKMON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/12/2009
Notification Time: 23:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2009
Event Time: 16:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE
"This non-emergency 8-hour report is pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3). On 03/12/09 at 1620, Operations performed [Standard Operating Procedure] S.O. 23.7.B-2 to swap the CST and Torus suctions in conjunction with scheduled I&C testing. While opening the HPCI Torus Inboard Suction valve MO-2-23-58, its travel stopped at approximately the 50% full open position. The HPCI system was declared inoperable per Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.5.1. The HPCI system remains available and the HPCI Torus Outboard Suction valve MO-2-23-57, was closed and de-energized for PCIV isolation as required by T.S. 3.6.1.3.
"Both MO-2-23-058 and the Unit 2 HPCl system are inoperable. The valve has been quarantined in accordance with station procedures and required Technical Specification actions have been taken. Reactor operation is unaffected and Unit 2 remains at 100% power. The inoperability of the HPCI system places the plant in a 14 day shutdown Tech Spec action statement. Further investigation of the cause of the valve failure is currently in progress."
RCIC has been verified operable.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44905 | Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TOM MORSE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 03/13/2009
Notification Time: 00:42 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2009
Event Time: 00:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text PARTIAL LOSS OF PLANT COMPUTER FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE TAKING ERDS OOS
"The Perry Nuclear Power Plant has taken a portion of the Plant Computer out of service for scheduled maintenance. This has resulted in a portion of ERDS being out of service. From 0025 hours EDT on March 13, 2009 for approximately 36 hours, personnel will be performing maintenance activities which result in a partial loss of the Plant Computer. During this planned maintenance, portions of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the automatic mode calculation of the Computer Aided Dose Assessment Program (CADAP) will be unavailable.
"In the event of an emergency, plant parameter data will be orally transmitted to the facilities through the Status Board Ring Down circuit with back-up by the Private Branch Exchange, Off Premise Exchange, and various redundant intra-facility circuits throughout the emergency facilities. The dose assessment function will be maintained during the out of service time period by manual input of data into CADAP and, if required, by manual calculation. The ability to open and maintain an 'open line' using the Emergency Notification System will not be affected and will be the primary means of transferring plant data to the NRC as a contingency until the ERDS can be returned to service during the period of unavailability.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as a condition that results In a major loss of offsite communication capability. A follow-up notification will be made when the maintenance activities are completed and the equipment is restored."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |