| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/02/2009 - 03/03/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 44748 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: C. DUNSMORE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 01/01/2009
Notification Time: 21:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/01/2009
Event Time: 14:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TWO EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO COMPONENT FAILURE
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: During return to service testing for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) #3, it was noted that the fuel rack limiting cylinder was not returning to its non-limiting position. The fuel rack limiting cylinder is designed to limit the stroke distance of the fuel rack assembly during the initial EDG start sequence. Once the EDG is at rated speed, ~10 seconds, the fuel rack limiting cylinder should return to its non-limiting position. Failure of this component to operate as expected may have prevented EDG #3 from fulfilling its safety function during the postulated Loss of Off Site Power and/or Loss of Coolant Accident conditions. As a result, EDG #3 remains inoperable.
"During performance of subsequent surveillance testing on the remaining EDG's (#1, #2, and #4), in accordance with Technical Specifications, a similar condition as described above existed on EDG #4. EDG's #1 and #2 did not exhibit the same behavior and therefore, these EDG's remained operable during this sequence of events. Consequently, EDG #4 was declared inoperable at 1430 on 1/01/09. Failure of this component to operate as expected may have prevented EDG #4 from fulfilling its safety function during the postulated Loss of Off Site Power and/or Loss of Coolant Accident conditions. The concurrent failure of this component on EDG #3 and EDG #4 may have prevented on-site emergency power to Emergency busses 3 & 4 and thus the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: Plant operation is being maintained within the limiting conditions of the license expected. However, transient analyses relating to accident mitigation could have been impacted due to the inability to ensure emergency on-site power supply to Emergency busses 3 & 4. Off-site power and the grid have been stable during the time period both EDG's were inoperable.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The fuel rack limiting cylinder for EDG #4 was repaired and EDG #4 was restored to Operable on January 1, 2009 at 1755 EST. Actions required per technical specifications for 2 EDG's were exited within the required time frame. Repair efforts are in progress for EDG #3."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY LEE GRZECK TO JASON KOZAL AT 1530 ON 3/2/09 * * *
"On January 1, 2009, at 2106 hours, the Control Room Shift Manager made a notification (i .e. Event Number 44748) to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (v) (D) (i.e., any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident). The notification was made due to two Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) being declared inoperable. During return to service testing for BSEP's EDG 3, it was noted that the fuel rack limit cylinder was not returning to its non-limiting position in a timeframe consistent with prior observations. The fuel rack limit cylinder is designed to limit the stroke of the fuel rack during the initial EDG start sequence, preventing too much fuel from being provided to the engine cylinders on initial start. Once the EDG is at half-rated speed (i.e., in approximately 5 to 8 seconds), the fuel rack limit cylinder should be released to return to its non-limiting position. Failure of this component to operate as expected may have prevented the EDG from fulfilling its safety function during the postulated Loss of Off-site Power (LOOP) and/or Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) conditions. As a result, EDG 3 was conservatively declared inoperable due to the potential for the unexpected response of the fuel rack limit cylinder to impact Design Basis Accident (DBA) transient loading criteria.
"During performance of subsequent surveillance testing on the remaining EDG's, (i.e.,1,2, and 4), in accordance with Technical Specifications, a similar condition was identified on EDG 4. EDGs 1 and 2 did not exhibit the same behavior and therefore, these EDGs remained operable during this sequence of events. Consequently, EDG 4 was also conservatively declared inoperable at 1430 on January 1, 2009. The concurrent failure of this component on EDG 3 and EDG 4 may have prevented the onsite emergency power from fulfilling its intended safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Basis for Retraction
"Further investigation has demonstrated that both EDG 3 and EDG 4 were fully operable. The EDG 3 evaluation concluded that the fuel rack limit would remain in effect for approximately seven (7) seconds after the diesel output breaker closed during a LOOP loading event or a design basis LOOP/LOCA loading event. After that, the fuel limit cylinder would not have limited the governor response in any way. The generator capacity during the first seven seconds of load acceptance at the fuel rack limited position would be sufficient to ensure proper acceleration of the 480-volt design basis loads and the Nuclear Service Water pump. These are the only loads expected to start during the first seven seconds of the EDG loading. The generator frequency response during the acceleration of these loads would be well within the EDG design limits. The Residual Heat Removal and Core Spray pumps are sequenced onto the EDG at 10 seconds and 15 seconds, respectively, following the closure of its output breaker and are not affected by the fuel limiter impairment. The EDG 4 evaluation is bounded by the above analysis.
"Therefore, the fuel rack limiter impairment would not have prevented either EDG 3 or EDG 4 from fulfilling their intended safety function. On this basis, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3) (v) (D).
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 312876.
"The NRC resident was notified of this retraction."
R2DO (Musser) has been notified. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44876 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: NDE, INCORPORATED
Region: 1
City: TAMPA State: FL
County:
License #: 3404-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH | Notification Date: 02/25/2009
Notification Time: 11:18 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2009
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
ANGELA McINTOSH (FSME)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)
| Event Text POSSIBLE OVER EXPOSURE DURING RADIOGRAPHY
"Employee's TLD recorded an overexposure of 6.381 rem whole body deep dose; shallow was 6.061 rem. Date [exposure occurred] was between 10 Jan 2009 to 9 Feb 2009. [The] affected employee claims he left his shirt with TLD in area where radiography was being performed. Pocket dosimeter reading was no more than 20 mr. Other employees who worked with him during [the] same time period 10 Jan 2009 to 9 Feb 2009 have no excessive exposures. RSO calculates dose should be approximately 205 mr during month as per records. RSO believes [this is] not an occupational overexposure. Employee's TLD report received today 25 Feb 2009."
Isotope(s): Ir-192 from two (2) separate radiography cameras with activities of 24 Ci and 77 Ci.
State radiation personnel plan to investigate the event.
Florida incident number FL09-020. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44885 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM HACKLER
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 03/02/2009
Notification Time: 12:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2009
Event Time: 09:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2)
ANTHONY McMURTRAY (IRD)
JOHN THORPE (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text ONSITE FATALITY
"A contract employee associated with the Unit 2 refueling outage died this morning from an apparent heart attack. The death was not the result of any industrial safety issue and did not occur in a contaminated area. The individual was treated by the onsite first responders who administered CPR and AED (automatic external defibrillator). He was transported via ambulance to Dosher Memorial hospital where he was pronounced dead at 0915."
"OSHA is being notified of the event under the requirements of 29 CFR 1904."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44886 | Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SHICK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/02/2009
Notification Time: 13:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2009
Event Time: 11:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text WEATHER RELATED LOSS OF AUTOMATIC NOTIFICATION SYSTEM SIRENS
"Sixteen of seventy three ANS [Automatic Notification System] sirens are inoperable for failure to pass the weekly growl test. The following sirens that are OOS are located in Calvert County (9 of 50 sirens), St. Mary's County (5 of 17 sirens) and Dorchester County (2 of 6 sirens)."
The failures were most likely due to the weather conditions. The licensee has notified the local governments.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |