Event Notification Report for February 18, 2009

MISSING NICKEL-63 LICENSED RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

"On February 18, 2009, during a scheduled radioactive material inventory activity, a personnel explosive detection device containing 15 mCi of Nickel-63 was discovered missing. A search of the facility has not located the licensed material at this time.

"This is being reported under 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(ii), Loss of licensed material greater than 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C to 20.1001 - 20.2401 {20.2201(a)}."

The personnel explosive detection model information is: Smiths Detection; Ionscan Sentinel II; Instrument Serial Number - 213028; Sealed Source Serial Number (from the manufacturer) - MY 636.

The Licensee suspects that this material was disposed as trash.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * UPDATE FROM FRED POLLAK TO JOHN KNOKE AT 0949 EDT ON 03/25/09 * *

Licensee is adding a sentence to the first paragraph "The location of the source remains indeterminate at this time." The licensee is deleting the sentence in the fourth paragraph "The licensee suspects that this material was disposed as trash."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Steven Vias). Notified NRR EO (Ross-Lee) and FSME EO (McIntosh) via email.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

LOST CALIBRATION SEALED SOURCE OF FE-55

A 2 milliCurie sealed source of Iron-55, used for calibration, was misplaced and believed to be lost. The source (Mfg # C1-375) was stored in a pig in a locked cabinet in a secure lab. Inventory is taken daily, and the last time it was seen was 2/17/09. Licensee believes that a lab technician was working with the source and it accidently rolled off the desk into a trash container. Licensee has searched every possible area where it may have gone. The sealed source was in a plastic tube, and therefore the exposure to personnel is just above background.

* * * UPDATE AT 1627 ON 3/12/2009 FROM BOB WESTERDALE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The strength of the Fe-55 source was calculated to be 660 microCuries on 3/10/2009.

Notified the R1DO (Dimitriatis), FSME (Mauer) and ILTAB (Whitney via e-mail).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

TURBINE TRIP DUE TO POWER LOAD UNBALANCE SIGNAL ON MAIN GENERATOR RESULTING IN REACTOR SCRAM

"At 0351 on 2/18/09, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to actuation of the Reactor Protection System from a turbine trip due to a power load unbalance signal on the main generator. The cause of the power load unbalance signal was due to a generator neutral over voltage condition of which the cause is unknown and the investigation is continuing. All systems responded as expected to the turbine trip. One Safety Relief Valve (SRV) opened due to the reactor pressure transient, and then reactor pressure was automatically controlled by the Main Turbine Bypass valves. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) reactor water level initiation set points were reached, all expected containment isolation and initiation signals were received, and reactor water level is being automatically controlled by the feedwater system.

"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

All control rods fully inserted. The plant electrical system is in normal shut down alignment. No Diesel Generators started as a result of this event. There was no ECCS injection to the reactor vessel.



* * * * UPDATE FROM RICKY GIVENS TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1828 0N 02/21/09 * * * *

"Review of available data indicates that no Main Steam safety/relief valves (MSRVs) opened in response to the Unit 1 reactor scram on 02/18/2009. There were no indications of an open MSRV on any discharge tailpipe thermocouple or acoustic monitor. Initial indications of the discharge tailpipe thermocouples for MSRV (1-PCV-1-30) did indicate a slight increase in temperature (approximately 36 degrees F) as reactor pressure decreased, which resulted in the initial assumption of an SRV opening. However, this behavior is a classical indication of slight main seat leakage and system engineering believes this seat leakage is what the post scram data indicates. Utilizing multiple reactor pressure instrumentation responses, the peak reactor pressure was determined to be approximately 1130 psig which is 15 psi below MSRV 1-PCV-1-30 setpoint. Additionally, the rise in tailpipe temperature did not coincide with the peak pressure but was after pressure had lowered. Based upon a thorough review of this data and a better understanding of the timing of the temperature rise, it is now believed that the MSRVs performed as designed during the reactor pressure transient event. The initial determination that concluded an MSRV opened will be further investigated within the corrective action program; reference PER 164114."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2 DO (Charlie Payne)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the State of Alabama via fax:

"At 1:45 PM CST the Alabama Office of Radiation Control received a call from Qore, Inc. in Birmingham, Alabama (Alabama license No. 708). They reported that a CPN Model MC1DR (S/N MD30406940) had been stolen from the back of one of their trucks. The licensee indicated that the device case had been secured with 2 separate locked chains, but that they had been cut. The device had been stolen sometime during the morning or early afternoon while the truck was parked at an employees residence in Center Point, Alabama. The licensee is filing a report with local law enforcement. They are also sending an information flyer to area pawn shops, and will issue a message to the media regarding the device, and offer a reward for information leading to the recovery of the device.

"This information is accurate as of 3:20 PM CST. Further information, including methods to prevent a recurrence, is forthcoming from the licensee."

Alabama Incident # 09-08

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.