Alert

Due to a lapse in appropriations, the NRC has ceased normal operations. However, excepted and exempted activities necessary to maintain critical health and safety functions—as well as essential progress on designated critical activities, including those specified in Executive Order 14300—will continue, consistent with the OMB-Approved NRC Lapse Plan.

Event Notification Report for February 2, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/30/2009 - 02/02/2009

** EVENT NUMBERS **

Fuel Cycle Facility	Event Number: 44819
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 Region: 2 City: PADUCAH State: KY County: McCRACKEN License #: GDP-1 Agreement: Y Docket: 0707001 NRC Notified By: BILLY WALLACE HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN	Notification Date: 01/30/2009 Notification Time: 19:33 [ET] Event Date: 01/30/2009 Event Time: 12:17 [CST] Last Update Date: 01/30/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE	Person (Organization): GERALD MCCOY (R2) SHEENA WHALEY (NMSS)

Event Text

24 HOUR REPORT OF PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM INOPERABILITY

"At 1217 CST, on 01-30-09 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that C-310 (product withdrawal facility) had lost power due to an electrical fault. As a result of the power loss, the C-310 High Voltage Process Gas Leak Detection (PGLD) System was rendered inoperable. This PGLD System contains detectors that cover the C-310 UF6 condensers, accumulators, and piping heated housing. At the time of this loss of power, these areas were operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.3.4.4 requires that all of detector heads in this system be operable during operations above atmospheric pressure. Power was restored to this PGLD System at 1240 hours, which is within the one hour required by TSR LCO 2.3.4.4.A.1 to enter a continuous smoke watch. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function. Once the source of the fault was identified, power was restored to the C-310 the High Voltage PGLD System and the system was tested.

"Power was restored at 1240 hours and the system was tested at 1258 hours. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

Fuel Cycle Facility	Event Number: 44820
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 Region: 2 City: PADUCAH State: KY County: McCRACKEN License #: GDP-1 Agreement: Y Docket: 0707001 NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE	Notification Date: 01/31/2009 Notification Time: 13:22 [ET] Event Date: 01/31/2009 Event Time: 01:50 [CST] Last Update Date: 01/31/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE	Person (Organization): GERALD MCCOY (R2) SHEENA WHALEY (NMSS)

Event Text

LOSS OF POWER TO CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM HORN

"At 0150 CST, on 01-31-09 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) trouble alarm had actuated for the C-409 (Stabilization Building). The PSS dispatched personnel to investigate and discovered that a circuit breaker had tripped causing a loss of power to the CAAS horn uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Further investigation revealed that the output of the UPS was off. This caused loss of CAAS audibility for C-409 and TSR LCO 2.6.4.1b was immediately entered. There were no fissile material operations in progress and all personnel in the affected area had a radio in constant communication with the Central Communications Facility satisfying the required actions of TSR 2.6.4.1 b. The circuit breaker that tripped was closed, the UPS was turned back on, and TSR 2.6.4.1b was exited at 0317 hours.

"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-09-0203; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2009-02

Power Reactor	Event Number: 44821
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD Region: 3 State: IA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: JEFF MIELL HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN	Notification Date: 02/01/2009 Notification Time: 21:28 [ET] Event Date: 02/01/2009 Event Time: 18:00 [CST] Last Update Date: 02/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): PATTY PELKE (R3)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	M/R	Y	53	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF CONDENSER COOLING

"[The licensee manually inserted a reactor scram] due to imminent loss of heat sink (condenser). Circulating water to the condenser suffered an unisolable break resulting in loss of suction source to pumps with cavitation. [The] plant was stabilized per emergency operating procedures. Containment isolations signals operated per design with Groups 2, 3, and 4 received.

"Plant response [was] complicated with [an] unexpected loss of one 161 KV bus in the switchyard. This was caused by a breaker failure lockout of the bus caused by signal from the output breaker. This output breaker did open. Cause of the breaker failure being investigated.

"[The] power loss [of the 161 KV bus] had minor plant effect. One power supply to essential service offsite transformer 1X3 [was] lost due to the bus lockout. [The] transformer and offsite circuit remained available. [The] plant did sustain a temporary loss of spent fuel pool cooling system. Cooling has been restored with no level or temperature complications.

"Essential power [remained] available with both onsite SBDG's (Standby Diesel Generators) and offsite circuits (current source). All ECCS available. All safety related equipment operat[ed] as designed, except Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) turbine which had difficulty in automatic control. Manual control [of RCIC] was effective. This is not unexpected during the conditions it was operating (low flow)."

The licensee was shutting down to enter a refueling outage as the time of the event. Circulating water to one cooling tower had been isolated when a riser on the second cooling tower ruptured and resulted in loss of supply to the circwater pumps. All systems functioned as required except for the lockout of the 161KV bus and RCIC automatic control. Rods fully inserted. The plant is in a normal electrical configuration except for the loss of the 161 KV bus which does not supply any safety related busses. No safety relief valves lifted during the transient. Cooling is currently via HPCI and RCIC to the torus with torus cooling via essential service water.

The plant is currently stable at 600 psi and being cooled-down to cold shutdown. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 44822
Facility: OYSTER CREEK Region: 1 State: NJ Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-2 NRC Notified By: ANDREW ZUCHOWSKI HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN	Notification Date: 02/01/2009 Notification Time: 23:05 [ET] Event Date: 02/01/2009 Event Time: 21:56 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/01/2009
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL	Person (Organization): WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1) THOMAS BLOUNT (NRR) SAM COLLNS (R1RA) JIM WIGGINS (NRR) ANTHONY McMURTRAY (IRD) TOM BANNER (DHS) DAVE BARDEN (FEMA) RON BELLAMY (R1) BETSY KEELING (OCA)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	A/R	Y	100	Power Operation	0	Hot Shutdown

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT AND REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO MAIN TRANSFORMER FIRE

At 2156 EST, a fire occurred on Main Transformer M1A. The loss of the main transformer resulted in a reactor scram from full power without complications. The transformer deluge system activated. The fire brigade responded and offsite assistance from the fire department was obtained to help extinguish the fire. The fire department has since departed the site. An Unusual Event was declared at 2211 EST based on the transformer fire lasting longer than 15 minutes. The fire was extinguished at 2227 EST. A fire reflash watch was established. There was no damage to any other equipment besides the main transformer.

During the reactor scram transient, the isolation condenser actuated as expected and was subsequently secured. Four electro-magnetic relief valves actuated and reseated normally. The plant is currently in hot standby with reactor pressure at 927 psi and water level at 150 inches with all conditions stable and a normal electrical configuration.

The licensee is assessing the criteria for exiting the UE at this time. The licensee has notified State and local government agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM ZUCHOWSKI TO HUFFMAN AT 0001 ON 2/02/09 * *

The licensee terminated the UE at 2337 EST due to stable plant conditions with all entry criteria for the UE exited and no concern of reflash. The licensee did note that there is an oil sheen on the water around the transformer and indication of a small amount of oil dripping from the transformer. The licensee is taking efforts to contain the spill with spill kits and barriers.

The NRC Resident has been notified. Notified R1DO (Schmidt), R1 (Bellamy), NRR EO (Blount), and IRD (McMurtray). Informed DHS (Banner) and FEMA (Barden).

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