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Event Notification Report for December 15, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/12/2008 - 12/15/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44593 44700 44706 44714 44715 44716 44717 44718 44719

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 44593
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MERT PROBASCO
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 10/22/2008
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2008
Event Time: 12:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

RCIC DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO AGING CONCERN OF SEVERAL FLOW CONTROLLER COMPONENTS

"On October 22, 2008, at 1217 hours, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power and steady state conditions, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) conservatively declared the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) inoperable in response to a concern regarding the reliability of aged capacitors that are installed in the RCIC flow controller.

"As background, the RCIC flow controller was calibrated and successfully tested on October 7th, 2008 as part of normal surveillance activities, however several of the capacitors installed in the controller were noted to be between 21 to 30 years of age. Industry recommended replacement interval for the capacitors is typically between 7 to 10 years of age. PNPS engineering review in conjunction with Entergy fleet consultation concluded today (10/22) that there was no definitive technical bases to provide a reasonable expectation that the RCIC flow controller function can be assured throughout it's mission time due to the capacitor aging concern. Therefore, RCIC was declared inoperable and a 14 day limiting condition for operability action statement was entered in accordance with TS 3.5.D.1. A replacement controller is being prepared for installation, with post maintenance testing projected to be completed by 2100 hours this evening. Ultimately the suspect controller will be the subject of further evaluation and this notification will be updated as appropriate.

"This notification has no impact on the health and safety of the public.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector is onsite and has been notified.

"This is an 8 hour notification made in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."


* * * RETRACTION AT 1435 EST ON 12/12/2008 FROM JOHN WHALEY TO DONALD NORWOOD * * *

"Basis for Retraction: Event Notification 44593 was conservatively made to ensure that the eight-hour non-emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were satisfied pending the evaluation of RCIC System operability.

"On 10/22/08, RCIC flow controller FIC-1340-1 was declared inoperable due to engineering uncertainty for controller operability. The controller's electrolytic capacitors appeared to be aged beyond the expected useful life, and the resultant degrading power supply voltage indicated that the controller may not operate for the required FSAR mission time of eight hours.

"The controller was replaced on 10/23/08 with a refurbished controller and subsequent post-maintenance RCIC system flow testing demonstrated RCIC system operability.

"The controller that was removed from service was evaluated. Controller bench testing was performed on 11/6 and 11/7, 2008. This testing demonstrated that the controller could provide a full demand output signal for a minimum of 15 continuous hours. During this testing, it was also determined that the power supply output voltage was not degrading.

"Based on this post-service controller testing, and the successful in-service RCIC flow controller calibration and system performance test conducted on 10/07/08, the controller was operable when installed. The RCIC system was capable of performing its intended safety functions and would have started and supplied design basis flow to the reactor vessel under design basis conditions. Thus there would have [been] no impact on nuclear safety. Therefore, this event was not reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"Event Number 44593, made on 10/22/2008, is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Bellamy).

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44700
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
                   NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
                   LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: CHARLES STREET
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/06/2008
Notification Time: 13:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2008
Event Time: 04:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
DANIEL DORMAN (NMSS)
FUELS OUO via e-mail ()

Event Text

UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION

"During a transfer of uranyl nitrate, solution entered a column overflow. Less than one (1) liter of solution leaked from a fitting on the overflow line and contaminated process equipment primarily in an area inaccessible to personnel. The event is being reported because decontamination could not be completed within 24-hours.

"The area was isolated and personnel access was restricted. Cleanup activities were initiated and decontamination was performed in areas accessible to personnel. Decontamination of remaining areas [are] ongoing."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44706
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIMIN CORPORTATION
Region: 1
City: SPRUCE PINE State: NC
County:
License #: 061-0695-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CLIFF HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 12/09/2008
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2008
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - FIRE IN MANUFACTURING FACILITY CONTAINING FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGES

"N.C. Radiation Protection Section has confirmed the N.C. Division of Emergency Management and local law enforcement were included in initial notifications and remain engaged in the ongoing event evaluation.

"N.C. Radiation Protection Section was notified on 30 November 08 by an unrecorded source from UNIMIN Corporation that there was a major fire in one of their mineral processing facilities in Spruce Pine, NC. Initial reports from the licensee indicate four industrial nuclear gauges containing Cs-137 sealed sources (3 gauges contain 2 mCi each and the fourth contains 50 mCi) were present in the facility at the time of the fire. The damage to the facility exceeds $200,000 and the facility will be out of operation for over one week, so this incident is a reportable event under NC Code 15A NCAC 11.1646(a)(3) & (4).

"Command of the site was taken by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (for fire investigation). Preliminary radiation surveys of the exterior of the facility indicated radiation levels equivalent to background. An inspector from N.C. Radiation Protection was dispatched to the scene on 4 December 08, but was not allowed access to the interior of the facility or to any records maintained by the RSO of UNIMIN Corporation. The inspector was allowed to examine and survey the exterior of the affected facility; he found the structural damage to be significant and that radiation levels about the perimeter of the affected facility were background. The UNIMIN RSO has been able to visually identify three of the four gauges from a vantage point exterior to the facility. Security at this facility is adequate.

"The investigation will be continued on 12/9 or 12/10 by the inspector from the N.C. Radiation Protection Section."

North Carolina Report # NC-08-51.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44714
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: A. LEE YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/12/2008
Notification Time: 01:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/11/2008
Event Time: 23:01 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A FEEDWATER TRANSIENT

"The 'C' condensate pump tripped due to an electrical problem which caused a feedwater transient. The unit [automatically] tripped on high steam generator level at approximately 2301 CST. The unit is in mode 3 and stable. The reactor trip procedures are in progress at this time."

All control rods fully inserted into the core during the reactor trip. Offsite power is available and powering safety loads. The steam generator atmospheric steam dumps lifted momentarily during the transient and reseated. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser with makeup provided by auxiliary feedwater to the steam generator. The standby diesel generators and safety systems are available.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44715
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 12/12/2008
Notification Time: 08:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2008
Event Time: 13:18 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM FROM RELAY SENSING CIRCUIT

"This event is being reported via a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. In this case, the telephone report is not considered an LER. This report is being made under 10CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A).

"During Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) logic testing on October 24, 2008, an invalid actuation of the following heat removal systems occurred: 'B' train of the Decay Heat River Water System (DR), 'B' train of the Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water System (DCCW), and the 'B' train of the Nuclear Services River Water System (NR). There was no injection into the Reactor Coolant System. The invalid actuation occurred when the channel under test was taken to its tripped position. Since ESAS utilizes a 2 out of 3 logic for actuation, another actuation signal was present on one of the two channels not being tested, satisfying the actuation logic for the affected systems. The invalid actuation of these heat removal systems during testing on October 24, 2008 was due to oxidation on a silver-plated contact in one of the other two channels that was not being tested. This contact oxidation caused a higher input resistance to the timer relay, which resulted in an inadvertent actuation of the relay and its associated systems. The contact oxidation was caused as a result of using silver plated contacts in a low voltage application (approximately 12 VDC). During this invalid actuation, the heat removal systems were fully actuated. These heat removal systems functioned successfully and the operation of these systems did not have any adverse impact on plant operation.

"All of the silver-plated contacts in the affected circuits will be replaced with gold-plated contacts. The contacts are scheduled to be replaced by December 18, 2008.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44716
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHUCK OLSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/12/2008
Notification Time: 11:48 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2008
Event Time: 08:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 32 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

UNIT 1 WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FROM 32% POWER DUE TO AN ABNORMAL ROD PATTERN

"Following startup from refueling outage 1R21, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 was holding stable at 32% reactor power in order to perform Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) calibration. Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) control was in automatic with the controlling group (Group 7) at approximately 75% withdrawn. Control room operators received an asymmetric rod alarm and noted abnormal rod pattern on Group 7 with reactor power lowering. At this point, operations manually scrammed the reactor. Post trip response was normal and the plant is stable in Mode 3. Reactor Coolant System pressure is approximately 2155 psig and temperature is approximately 550 degree F. Post Transient Review is in progress."

Unit 1 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup. No primary or secondary reliefs lifted during the transient. Auxiliary feedwater was placed in service to supply the Steam Generators for decay heat removal via the Main Condenser.

The licensee informed both the State and NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44717
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GREG KIMMINAU
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/12/2008
Notification Time: 14:36 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2008
Event Time: 10:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

INADVERTENT VALID REACTOR TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION SIGNALS DUE TO MAINTENANCE

"Valid Reactor Trip and Manual Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater While in MODE 3"

"At 1042 on 12/12/2008, while in Mode 3, a valid reactor trip signal was generated during I&C maintenance activities on intermediate range nuclear instrument SENI0036. This resulted in a feedwater isolation signal. Reactor Operators manually started both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps to maintain steam generator levels. These pumps were started prior to receiving an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation. Plant is stable in Mode 3. Normal feedwater supply has been restored. The cause of the reactor trip is understood.

"All systems functioned normally in response to plant conditions.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44718
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KARST
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/13/2008
Notification Time: 17:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/13/2008
Event Time: 14:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/13/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

STEAM EXCLUSION BOUNDARY DOOR LATCH FAILURE

"At 1420 on 12/13/08 a plant electrician identified that a steam exclusion door would not close when he was transiting through the door. This door would not have closed and maintained the Steam Exclusion Boundary and could have led to steam through out the Auxiliary Building which could have resulted in both Trains of ESF Equipment failing to perform their required functions, i.e., SI, RHR, CC etc. A Unit Supervisor who was in the Auxiliary Building at the time immediately went up to the door and found the latch was broke and the broken piece was removed which then enabled the door to close and latch. At 1425 on 12/13/08 the Steam Exclusion Boundary was restored to functional and both Trains of ESF Equipment restored to operable."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44719
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRED BIANCO
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/14/2008
Notification Time: 20:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2008
Event Time: 17:14 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 98 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO ELECTRICAL FAULT ON AN OPERATING CONDENSATE PUMP

"Callaway Plant was at 98% power with two condensate pumps in service. At 1714 on 12-14-08, the reactor was manually tripped due to a motor ground fault on the 'B' condensate pump. The 'C' condensate pump was not available for service [See EN #44714]. This left only one condensate pump available so the reactor was manually tripped. The plant is in mode 3 and stable. Reactor trip procedures have been implemented and exited and normal operating procedures are in progress at this time. All safety systems actuated as designed. All control rods inserted during the trip. Offsite power is available and powering safety loads. There is no primary to secondary leakage. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser with makeup provided by Auxiliary Feedwater to the steam generators. The standby diesel generators and safety systems are available. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

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