Event Notification Report for November 06, 2008

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF A DISCHARGE TO THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER

"On November 6, 2008 at 11:15, Operations was notified that results of an October 20, 2008 oil and grease weekly sample from a plant sump discharge to the Mississippi River exceeded the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) daily maximum allowable value of 15ppm. The October monthly average oil and grease NPDES of 10ppm was also exceeded. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency is being notified."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

DEFECT FOUND IN BUSSMAN FUSES

"On November 6, 2008, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) completed a reportability determination which concluded that a batch of Bussmann fuses with a date code of J47 contained an underlying fabrication vulnerability that could result in a premature failure of the fuse. NPPD has concluded this condition is reportable per 10 CFR Part 21, since the underlying vulnerability could create a substantial safety hazard. The fuses are Commercial Grade items dedicated by NPPD for use at the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). The fuses are shipped directly from an authorized Bussmann facility to CNS. The fuse purchasing description is as follows: FUSE ; 10 AMP ; 250VAC ; ONE-TIME ; 50KA I.R. ; GENERAL PUPOSE ; Manufacturer Part Number NON-10. These fuses, with batch code of J47, have been determined by independent analysis to contain a poor solder joint internal to the fuse.

"These fuses are authorized by NPPD for use in both safety related and non safety related applications. The applicable dedication package identifies one of the safety functions as 'Fuses are required to conduct the design basis load current without interruption.' If the fuses were installed without the condition being detected and failed upon valid demand of associated circuit, the mission of the associated safety related equipment may not have been accomplished. However, since the fuses were found, the safety function of the installed fuses is maintained and the associated equipment remains operable based on specific instructions for maintaining the fuses in place until replacement. Therefore, this condition is NOT reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73. However, installation could have occurred and remained undetected, thus introducing a common mode failure in certain applications, thus fulfilling the definition of a Substantial Safety Hazard as defined by 10 CFR Part 21. Based on independent analysis of fuse mode of failure, the defect may not be necessarily detected upon installation. Since the fuses were stocked in unrestricted spares for essential applications, 10 CFR Part 21 applies, and the condition is reportable under 10 CFR 21.21. The Responsible Corporate Officer has been notified of this condition per 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(i) on November 6, 2008 at 08:56 AM, CST. Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(ii) written notification is due to the NRC within 30 days of this notification."

Forty fuses were in the defective lot of which 15 are still installed in plant systems: Circ Water, RCIC, Emergency Diesel Generator 2, air removal and 4160 VAC diesel start breaker circuitry.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN REQUIRED DUE TO FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST

"Nine Mile Point (NMP) Unit 1 initiated a Technical Specification (TS) shutdown at 2027.

"During a normal Instrumentation Surveillance Test, a relay for Emergency Condenser (ECCS) Initiation failed to meet its acceptance criteria (at 1245). This placed the plant in an action statement that required placing a channel trip in for the affected relay channel in 24 hours.

"To perform the relay replacement NMP Unit 1 entered 1 hour TS shutdown Limiting Condition of Operation at 1928. At 2027 Shutdown of the plant was initiated by lowering reactor recirculation flow and thus reactor power. At 2031, relay replacement was completed, [at] 2038 plant returned to full power operations.

"The plant remained in 24 hour action statement until post maintenance testing was completed at 2124."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

LOST X-RAY ANALYZER CONTAINING CADMIUM-109 AND IRON-55

"On November 6, 2008, at 1510, IDPH received a call from Keokuk Steel Castings, Registration No.: 3325-1-56-XRF that a TN Technology X-ray Fluorescent Analyzer, model 9266, serial number B837, containing 5 mCi of Cadmium-109 and 45 mCi of Iron-55, was missing.

"The licensee was returning the device to Thermo Scientific for disposal. On 2/26/08, the licensee shipped the device via UPS.

"On 6/3/08, the licensee was contacted by Thermo Scientific that the device never arrived.

"The licensee contacted UPS and on 7/7/08, a Tracer Investigation was opened. UPS never located the package (tracking no. 1Z5421030340748497).

"IDPH contacted a UPS Supervisor who stated that the last known location of the package was Des Moines, Iowa, and the UPS investigation was closed on 7/16/08. He was asked to reopen the file and to look one more time for the package. He called back and stated that the device could not be located in Des Moines. IDPH and UPS consider the case closed."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.