Event Notification Report for October 16, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/15/2008 - 10/16/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
4466144575445764456844570445714457244573
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44661
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: R. G. LOOSE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: R. G. LOOSE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 11/17/2008
Notification Time: 10:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 09:07 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2008
Notification Time: 10:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 09:07 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1)
MARIE MILLER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF STEAM DRIVEN AUX FEED PUMP
"On October 16, 2008 during a routine clearance restoration activity, two solenoid-operated steam supply isolation valves on one of the three steam lines to the steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2FWE-P22) unexpectedly opened at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No.2, admitting steam to and causing this pump to commence rotating. The control room operator monitoring the plant quickly recognized the unwarranted system response and attempted to terminate steam flow to the auxiliary feedwater pump by re-closing the two unexpectedly open steam supply isolation valves from the control room. At the same time, the local operator performing the restoration activity of opening a separate manual upstream steam isolation valve also recognized the unwarranted system response (by hearing too much steam flow through the manual valve) and also terminated steam flow to the pump by re-closing the upstream manual isolation valve. The total time that this pump rotated was less than approximately 30 seconds and the plant computer indicated that no auxiliary feedwater was actually pumped into any of the steam generators. Neither of the other two Auxiliary Feedwater System motor-driven pumps were actuated at BVPS Unit No.2.
"The design for these two solenoid-operated isolation valves are susceptible to briefly popping open if steam is initially introduced too rapidly. These valves fail open with no power and are pilot-operated solenoid-actuated to close. An initial large steam rush can briefly overcome the solenoid force holding the valve shut. This is what occurred on October 16, 2008. Therefore, this brief rotation of the steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was not initiated by a valid actuation signal.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it involved a train-level actuation of the PWR auxiliary feedwater system as listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(6). This actuation was not part of a pre-planned sequence and did not occur with system properly removed from service.
"However, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report since the actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System train was not generated by a valid actuation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On October 16, 2008 during a routine clearance restoration activity, two solenoid-operated steam supply isolation valves on one of the three steam lines to the steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2FWE-P22) unexpectedly opened at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No.2, admitting steam to and causing this pump to commence rotating. The control room operator monitoring the plant quickly recognized the unwarranted system response and attempted to terminate steam flow to the auxiliary feedwater pump by re-closing the two unexpectedly open steam supply isolation valves from the control room. At the same time, the local operator performing the restoration activity of opening a separate manual upstream steam isolation valve also recognized the unwarranted system response (by hearing too much steam flow through the manual valve) and also terminated steam flow to the pump by re-closing the upstream manual isolation valve. The total time that this pump rotated was less than approximately 30 seconds and the plant computer indicated that no auxiliary feedwater was actually pumped into any of the steam generators. Neither of the other two Auxiliary Feedwater System motor-driven pumps were actuated at BVPS Unit No.2.
"The design for these two solenoid-operated isolation valves are susceptible to briefly popping open if steam is initially introduced too rapidly. These valves fail open with no power and are pilot-operated solenoid-actuated to close. An initial large steam rush can briefly overcome the solenoid force holding the valve shut. This is what occurred on October 16, 2008. Therefore, this brief rotation of the steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was not initiated by a valid actuation signal.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it involved a train-level actuation of the PWR auxiliary feedwater system as listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(6). This actuation was not part of a pre-planned sequence and did not occur with system properly removed from service.
"However, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report since the actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System train was not generated by a valid actuation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44575
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: WAL-MART
Region: 1
City: QUINCY State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: WAL-MART
Region: 1
City: QUINCY State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/17/2008
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2009
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
CHRIS EINBERG (FSME)
TODD JACKSON (R1)
CHRIS EINBERG (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF SIX TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
"On 10/16/08 the Agency received 2 telephone calls from Rich Dailey, RSO of Wal-Mart. During the first call Rich Dailey reported the loss of 2 tritium exit signs, S/N 249447 & 249454, from the Wal-Mart store in Quincy [MA]. During the second call Rich Dailey reported the loss of 4 tritium exit signs from the Wal-Mart store in Halifax [MA]. Rich Dailey stated that Wal-Mart is conducting a replacement of all tritium signs. In the Spring of 2008 these exit signs were inventoried. In October 2008, prior to replacement, the signs could not be located. All of the exit signs were manufactured by `SRB Lite' and contain 20 curies of H-3. Rich Dailey will send a written report to the Agency at a later date."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/28/08 AT 0957 EDT FROM DAILEY TO KLCO * * *
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On October 22, 2008 Wal-Mart Stores reported four missing tritium exit signs at 300 Colony Place, Plymouth, MA. The signs were discovered missing on October 21, 2008. The serial numbers and manufacturer were unknown."
Notified FSME(Burgess), R1DO(Cobey) and ILTAB via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/16/08 AT 1130 EST FROM SUMARES TO HUFFMAN * * *
The following information was received from the State via facsimile:
The State of Massachusetts was notified by a Wal-Mart corporate representative located in Bentonville, AR, indicating that Wal-Mart was unable to account for 887 tritium exit signs (which are general licensed materials) that were used at one time in Wal-Mart stores throughout the state. The Wal-Mart representative informed the state office that Wal-Mart had exhausted searching for the tritium exit signs and considered them to be lost and/or missing. The state was provided a listing from corporate Wal-Mart of the store locations along with information on the tritium exit sign manufacturers, model and serial numbers, and curie content where known.
Notified FSME (McIntosh), R1DO (Burritt), and ILTAB
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
"On 10/16/08 the Agency received 2 telephone calls from Rich Dailey, RSO of Wal-Mart. During the first call Rich Dailey reported the loss of 2 tritium exit signs, S/N 249447 & 249454, from the Wal-Mart store in Quincy [MA]. During the second call Rich Dailey reported the loss of 4 tritium exit signs from the Wal-Mart store in Halifax [MA]. Rich Dailey stated that Wal-Mart is conducting a replacement of all tritium signs. In the Spring of 2008 these exit signs were inventoried. In October 2008, prior to replacement, the signs could not be located. All of the exit signs were manufactured by `SRB Lite' and contain 20 curies of H-3. Rich Dailey will send a written report to the Agency at a later date."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/28/08 AT 0957 EDT FROM DAILEY TO KLCO * * *
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On October 22, 2008 Wal-Mart Stores reported four missing tritium exit signs at 300 Colony Place, Plymouth, MA. The signs were discovered missing on October 21, 2008. The serial numbers and manufacturer were unknown."
Notified FSME(Burgess), R1DO(Cobey) and ILTAB via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/16/08 AT 1130 EST FROM SUMARES TO HUFFMAN * * *
The following information was received from the State via facsimile:
The State of Massachusetts was notified by a Wal-Mart corporate representative located in Bentonville, AR, indicating that Wal-Mart was unable to account for 887 tritium exit signs (which are general licensed materials) that were used at one time in Wal-Mart stores throughout the state. The Wal-Mart representative informed the state office that Wal-Mart had exhausted searching for the tritium exit signs and considered them to be lost and/or missing. The state was provided a listing from corporate Wal-Mart of the store locations along with information on the tritium exit sign manufacturers, model and serial numbers, and curie content where known.
Notified FSME (McIntosh), R1DO (Burritt), and ILTAB
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44576
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: WAL-MART
Region: 1
City: SWAINSBORO State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEITH ST. CYR
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: WAL-MART
Region: 1
City: SWAINSBORO State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEITH ST. CYR
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/17/2008
Notification Time: 13:39 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/04/2008
Notification Time: 13:39 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/04/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
GREGORY AHERN (ILTA)
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
GREGORY AHERN (ILTA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
A Wal-Mart store at 14 S. Main Street in Swainsboro GA notified the State of Georgia that a tritium exit sign that had been held in storage was missing. The store had previously removed its tritium signs and was storing them for eventual return to the manufacturer. During an inventory of the signs, one was discovered to be missing. The sign is generally licensed by the State. The sign was manufactured by Isolite with 11.5 curies of tritium. The State of Georgia did not have the serial number of the sign.
* * * UPDATE FROM ERIC JAMESON TO JOE O'HARA AT 1353 ON 10/21/08 * * *
A Wal-Mart store at 6065 Jonesboro Road in Morrow, GA notified the State of Georgia that two tritium exit signs were missing. The signs were manufactured by SRB with 20 Curies each S/N 279368 and S/N 282787. Additionally, a Wal-Mart store at 3886 Highway 17 in Toccoa, GA. had one tritium exit sign missing. The sign was manufactured by Isolite with 11.5 curies of tritium. The State of Georgia did not have the serial number of the sign. The signs are generally licensed by the State.
Notified R1DO(Cahill), FSME(Burgess), and ILTAB via E-mail
* * * UPDATE FROM ERIC JAMESON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1533 ON 10/27/08 * * *
A Wal-Mart store at 2427 Gresham Road, Atlanta, GA reported on 10/22/08 one missing tritium exit sign. The sign was manufactured by Isolite, S/N unknown, Activity unknown.
A Wal-Mart store at 3040 Norman Drive, Valdosta, GA reported on 10/24/08 one missing tritium exit sign. The sign was manufactured by Isolite, S/N 269809, Activity 11.5 curies.
A Wal-Mart store at 1569 North Expressway, Griffin, GA reported on 10/24/08 one missing tritium exit sign. The sign was manufactured by SRB, S/N 278658, Activity 20 curies.
A Wal-Mart store at 1099 Indian Drive, Eastman, GA reported on 10/24/08 two missing tritium exit signs. The first sign was manufactured by Isolite, S/N 297971, Activity 11.5 curies. The second sign was manufactured by Isolite, S/N 297990, Activity 12.5 curies.
Notified R1DO (Cahill), FSME (Mauer), and ILTAB (Ahern) via E-Mail.
* * * UPDATE FROM ERIC JAMESON TO JASON KOZAL AT 1557 ON 11/04/08 * * *
Two more signs reported missing:
A store located at 4221 Atlanta Highway, Loganville, GA Manufacturer - SRB, Serial Number - 310084, Activity - 20 Ci.
A store located at 4798 Jimmy Lee Smith Parkway, Hiram, GA Manufacturer - SRB, Serial Number - 273972, Activity - 20 Ci.
Notified R1DO (Caruso), FSME EO (Burgess) and ILTAB via e-mail.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
A Wal-Mart store at 14 S. Main Street in Swainsboro GA notified the State of Georgia that a tritium exit sign that had been held in storage was missing. The store had previously removed its tritium signs and was storing them for eventual return to the manufacturer. During an inventory of the signs, one was discovered to be missing. The sign is generally licensed by the State. The sign was manufactured by Isolite with 11.5 curies of tritium. The State of Georgia did not have the serial number of the sign.
* * * UPDATE FROM ERIC JAMESON TO JOE O'HARA AT 1353 ON 10/21/08 * * *
A Wal-Mart store at 6065 Jonesboro Road in Morrow, GA notified the State of Georgia that two tritium exit signs were missing. The signs were manufactured by SRB with 20 Curies each S/N 279368 and S/N 282787. Additionally, a Wal-Mart store at 3886 Highway 17 in Toccoa, GA. had one tritium exit sign missing. The sign was manufactured by Isolite with 11.5 curies of tritium. The State of Georgia did not have the serial number of the sign. The signs are generally licensed by the State.
Notified R1DO(Cahill), FSME(Burgess), and ILTAB via E-mail
* * * UPDATE FROM ERIC JAMESON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1533 ON 10/27/08 * * *
A Wal-Mart store at 2427 Gresham Road, Atlanta, GA reported on 10/22/08 one missing tritium exit sign. The sign was manufactured by Isolite, S/N unknown, Activity unknown.
A Wal-Mart store at 3040 Norman Drive, Valdosta, GA reported on 10/24/08 one missing tritium exit sign. The sign was manufactured by Isolite, S/N 269809, Activity 11.5 curies.
A Wal-Mart store at 1569 North Expressway, Griffin, GA reported on 10/24/08 one missing tritium exit sign. The sign was manufactured by SRB, S/N 278658, Activity 20 curies.
A Wal-Mart store at 1099 Indian Drive, Eastman, GA reported on 10/24/08 two missing tritium exit signs. The first sign was manufactured by Isolite, S/N 297971, Activity 11.5 curies. The second sign was manufactured by Isolite, S/N 297990, Activity 12.5 curies.
Notified R1DO (Cahill), FSME (Mauer), and ILTAB (Ahern) via E-Mail.
* * * UPDATE FROM ERIC JAMESON TO JASON KOZAL AT 1557 ON 11/04/08 * * *
Two more signs reported missing:
A store located at 4221 Atlanta Highway, Loganville, GA Manufacturer - SRB, Serial Number - 310084, Activity - 20 Ci.
A store located at 4798 Jimmy Lee Smith Parkway, Hiram, GA Manufacturer - SRB, Serial Number - 273972, Activity - 20 Ci.
Notified R1DO (Caruso), FSME EO (Burgess) and ILTAB via e-mail.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44568
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH POPE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH POPE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/16/2008
Notification Time: 03:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 01:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2008
Notification Time: 03:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 01:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2)
STEVEN VIAS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
NON-FUNCTIONAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER
"During normal surveillance testing of the U1 Control Room radiation monitors, the Technical Support Center Emergency Filtration Unit did not automatically start as required upon initiation of a High CR Radiation Signal. Additionally, the filtration unit could not be manually started from the TSC HVAC Control panel.
"This report is being made per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1, action B.2. With the Technical Support Center Emergency Filtration Unit inoperable, the functionality of the Technical Support Center has been lost. The alternate TSC facility is available and actions are being taken to return the TSC to Functional status with a high priority.
"The NRC resident Inspector has been notified."
"During normal surveillance testing of the U1 Control Room radiation monitors, the Technical Support Center Emergency Filtration Unit did not automatically start as required upon initiation of a High CR Radiation Signal. Additionally, the filtration unit could not be manually started from the TSC HVAC Control panel.
"This report is being made per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1, action B.2. With the Technical Support Center Emergency Filtration Unit inoperable, the functionality of the Technical Support Center has been lost. The alternate TSC facility is available and actions are being taken to return the TSC to Functional status with a high priority.
"The NRC resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44570
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KRESS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KRESS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/16/2008
Notification Time: 11:58 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2008
Notification Time: 11:58 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PARTIAL UNAVAILABILITY OF TSC VENTILATION AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"At 1100 on Thursday, October 16, 2008, a portion of the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system air conditioning was removed from service for maintenance on the Non-Essential Service Water System (NESW). The NESW system supports 3 of the 4 air conditioning units for the Technical Support Center. The filtration system will remain available, and an air conditioning unit which is not supported by NESW will remain in service.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary based upon results of procedurally required monitoring of TSC radiological conditions.
"The TSC ventilation system maintenance is scheduled to complete at 1800 on Thursday, October 16, 2008.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/17/08 AT 0526 FROM BEN HUFFMAN TO PETE SNYDER * * *
"The TSC ventilation system air conditioning was returned to functional status at 0525 on Friday, October 17, 2008. This follow up notification is being made to provide closure from the initial notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Phillips).
"At 1100 on Thursday, October 16, 2008, a portion of the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system air conditioning was removed from service for maintenance on the Non-Essential Service Water System (NESW). The NESW system supports 3 of the 4 air conditioning units for the Technical Support Center. The filtration system will remain available, and an air conditioning unit which is not supported by NESW will remain in service.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary based upon results of procedurally required monitoring of TSC radiological conditions.
"The TSC ventilation system maintenance is scheduled to complete at 1800 on Thursday, October 16, 2008.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/17/08 AT 0526 FROM BEN HUFFMAN TO PETE SNYDER * * *
"The TSC ventilation system air conditioning was returned to functional status at 0525 on Friday, October 17, 2008. This follow up notification is being made to provide closure from the initial notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Phillips).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44571
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TROY SPILLMAN
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TROY SPILLMAN
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER
Notification Date: 10/16/2008
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2008
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2)
STEVEN VIAS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY (ERDS)
"At 1030 [EDT] on 10/16/08, Emergency Planning personnel discovered that both ERDS [Emergency Response Data System] links (modems) were not functioning. The cause of the failure is unknown at this time and is being investigated by onsite technicians. The Emergency Notification System (ENS) was verified to be functioning properly. Loss of either ERDS link is considered a major loss of emergency communication capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1030 [EDT] on 10/16/08, Emergency Planning personnel discovered that both ERDS [Emergency Response Data System] links (modems) were not functioning. The cause of the failure is unknown at this time and is being investigated by onsite technicians. The Emergency Notification System (ENS) was verified to be functioning properly. Loss of either ERDS link is considered a major loss of emergency communication capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44572
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM BUNKELMAN
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM BUNKELMAN
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER
Notification Date: 10/16/2008
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 13:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2008
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 13:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO CERTAIN FIRE CONDITIONS
"While performing an extent of condition review resulting from the unanalyzed condition related to certain fire conditions identified in Event Notification #44482, another situation was identified in which, under certain fire conditions, the ability to meet the performance criteria of the approved fire protection program may be challenged.
"Specifically, it was postulated under certain fire conditions affecting the relay room, the ability to maintain pressurizer level within the indicated range may be challenged due to spurious opening of pressurizer vent and reactor head vent valves.
"Compensatory actions to address the fire in the area of concern are in place. (1-hour Fire Watch).
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"NRC Resident has been notified."
"While performing an extent of condition review resulting from the unanalyzed condition related to certain fire conditions identified in Event Notification #44482, another situation was identified in which, under certain fire conditions, the ability to meet the performance criteria of the approved fire protection program may be challenged.
"Specifically, it was postulated under certain fire conditions affecting the relay room, the ability to maintain pressurizer level within the indicated range may be challenged due to spurious opening of pressurizer vent and reactor head vent valves.
"Compensatory actions to address the fire in the area of concern are in place. (1-hour Fire Watch).
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"NRC Resident has been notified."
Transportation Event
Event Number: 44573
Rep Org: FROEHLING & ROBERTSON, INC.
Licensee: FROEHLING & ROBERTSON, INC.
Region: 1
City: CHESAPEAKE State: VA
County:
License #: 45-088-9002
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BRIODY
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER
Licensee: FROEHLING & ROBERTSON, INC.
Region: 1
City: CHESAPEAKE State: VA
County:
License #: 45-088-9002
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BRIODY
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER
Notification Date: 10/17/2008
Notification Time: 08:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2008
Notification Time: 08:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2008
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
CHRISTOPHER REGAN (NMSS)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
TODD JACKSON (R1)
CHRISTOPHER REGAN (NMSS)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN VIRGINIA
The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) reported that on 10/16/2008, at approximately 1500 EDT, a licensee truck transporting a Troxler 3400 Series moisture density gauge, flipped over in the Monitor-Merrimac Bridge Tunnel, near Newport News, VA. This series of Troxler gauge typically contains 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am/Be.
The RSO indicated that it was reported that the handle on the case, in which the gauge was secured, was damaged in the accident. The RSO did not have any indications of elevated or abnormal radiation or contamination levels from the gauge after the accident. The driver of the truck was injured in the accident (broken arm).
At the time of this report, the gauge was in the possession of the licensee, and the licensee is conducting follow-up surveys.
Notified Virginia Radioactive Materials Program, DOT (NRC), DOE, and DHS.
* * * UPDATED AT 1155 EDT ON 10/17/2008 FROM W. BRIODY TO P. SNYDER * * *
The licensee RSO reported that follow-up surveys and visual inspection of the gauge found no abnormal radiation levels, and no apparent damage to the gauge itself. The licensee will send the gauge to the manufacturer (Troxler) for further evaluation and/or repair.
Notified R1DO (T. Jackson), FSME EO (Einberg), NMSS EO (Regan), IRD Mgr (J. Grant).
The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) reported that on 10/16/2008, at approximately 1500 EDT, a licensee truck transporting a Troxler 3400 Series moisture density gauge, flipped over in the Monitor-Merrimac Bridge Tunnel, near Newport News, VA. This series of Troxler gauge typically contains 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am/Be.
The RSO indicated that it was reported that the handle on the case, in which the gauge was secured, was damaged in the accident. The RSO did not have any indications of elevated or abnormal radiation or contamination levels from the gauge after the accident. The driver of the truck was injured in the accident (broken arm).
At the time of this report, the gauge was in the possession of the licensee, and the licensee is conducting follow-up surveys.
Notified Virginia Radioactive Materials Program, DOT (NRC), DOE, and DHS.
* * * UPDATED AT 1155 EDT ON 10/17/2008 FROM W. BRIODY TO P. SNYDER * * *
The licensee RSO reported that follow-up surveys and visual inspection of the gauge found no abnormal radiation levels, and no apparent damage to the gauge itself. The licensee will send the gauge to the manufacturer (Troxler) for further evaluation and/or repair.
Notified R1DO (T. Jackson), FSME EO (Einberg), NMSS EO (Regan), IRD Mgr (J. Grant).