Event Notification Report for October 03, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/02/2008 - 10/03/2008
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44539
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: LAWRENCE DERTING
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: LAWRENCE DERTING
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/03/2008
Notification Time: 19:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2008
Event Time: 18:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2008
Notification Time: 19:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2008
Event Time: 18:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(2) - EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > LIMITS
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(2) - EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
ANNA BRADFORD (FSME)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
ANNA BRADFORD (FSME)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TRUCK SHIPMENT EXTERNAL RADIATION LEVELS EXCEED LIMITS
"Received Shipment from Pilgrim Station of temporary lead shielding that exceeds 10 CFR 20 requirements for a non-exclusive use limited quantity shipment of 0.5 mR on contact.
"Receipt inspection readings of the last container in the shipment measured between 1.3 mR and 1.85 mR (taken via 3 readings, using 3 separate meters and 2 different technicians).
"Per 10CFR20 subpart 1906 paragraph D, which states:
(d) The licensee shall immediately notify the final delivery carrier and the NRC Operations Center (301-816-5100), by telephone, when --
(1) Removable radioactive surface contamination exceeds the limits of section 71.87(i) of this chapter; or (2) External radiation levels exceed the limits of section 71.47 of this chapter."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/17/2008 AT 1309 EDT FROM D. MAY TO R. ALEXANDER * * *
"NRC Notification 44539 was conservatively made due to conservative procedural guidance.
"10 CFR 20.1906(d)(2) requires immediate notification of the final delivery carrier and the NRC Operations Center when external radioactive levels exceed the limits of section 71.47 of this chapter.
The reporting threshold contained in 10 CFR 71.47 is 200 mR [per hour] at any point on the external surface of the package. Since actual measured levels were between 1.3 mR [per hour] and 1.85 mR [per hour] this event is not reportable.
"ENS Event Number 44539, made on 10/03/08, is being retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee of this retraction.
Notified R1DO (Jackson) & NMSS EO (Regan).
"Received Shipment from Pilgrim Station of temporary lead shielding that exceeds 10 CFR 20 requirements for a non-exclusive use limited quantity shipment of 0.5 mR on contact.
"Receipt inspection readings of the last container in the shipment measured between 1.3 mR and 1.85 mR (taken via 3 readings, using 3 separate meters and 2 different technicians).
"Per 10CFR20 subpart 1906 paragraph D, which states:
(d) The licensee shall immediately notify the final delivery carrier and the NRC Operations Center (301-816-5100), by telephone, when --
(1) Removable radioactive surface contamination exceeds the limits of section 71.87(i) of this chapter; or (2) External radiation levels exceed the limits of section 71.47 of this chapter."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/17/2008 AT 1309 EDT FROM D. MAY TO R. ALEXANDER * * *
"NRC Notification 44539 was conservatively made due to conservative procedural guidance.
"10 CFR 20.1906(d)(2) requires immediate notification of the final delivery carrier and the NRC Operations Center when external radioactive levels exceed the limits of section 71.47 of this chapter.
The reporting threshold contained in 10 CFR 71.47 is 200 mR [per hour] at any point on the external surface of the package. Since actual measured levels were between 1.3 mR [per hour] and 1.85 mR [per hour] this event is not reportable.
"ENS Event Number 44539, made on 10/03/08, is being retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee of this retraction.
Notified R1DO (Jackson) & NMSS EO (Regan).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44536
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: QSA GLOBAL
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: QSA GLOBAL
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/03/2008
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2008
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2)
STEVE ORTH (R3)
RUSS BYWATER (R4)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2)
STEVE ORTH (R3)
RUSS BYWATER (R4)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DEFECTIVE COMPONENT THAT COULD POTENTIALLY CAUSE A SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD
The following information was received from the State of Massachusetts via email:
"Prompted by a reported event, Event Number 44434, QSA Global conducted an investigation of a Model 660B camera. QSA Global concluded that the root cause of the event was a defective component on the pigtail of the camera, and has determined that more cameras contain these defective components which could contribute to future events. "
"This defect could give the user the false impression that the source is connected to the drive cable when there is only a partial connection. The operations manual does require that the user check the connection prior to use and when this is done, there is no problem. However if the user does not do a check of the connection, it may not be secure and may cause the source to disconnect in the guide tube.
"The defective component was reported to the State of Massachusetts under Massachusetts code 105 CMR 120.142(B)(2)(a). The defective component is a female source connector, QSA part number 55042-1. This defect was only found in lot 0731300805. QSA sold six Co-60 sources [Model 424-14] and 659 Ir-192 [Model 424-9] sources that utilized connectors from this lot. One Co-60 source will be returned to QSA for evaluation due to a source retrieval event.
"[QSA Global] Corrective Actions: Customers who had received the other five Co-60 source wires from the suspected lot were contacted and arrangements were made to make a field inspection of these sources by QSA Global staff for the potential defect. Any defective source wires would be recommended to the customer for return and replacement by QSA Global.
"Customers who had received one of the 659 Ir-192 source wires that contained the suspected lot were notified and advised of this potential condition. These customers were provided with [a] notification which re-enforces the need to ensure a solid connection between the drive cable and the source prior to making any source exposures. The customer notification letter includes inspections the customer should make to determine if their source may contain this defect and advises the customer to contact QSA Global if a source is suspected of being defective to arrange for source replacement.
"It was decided that the supplier of the defective lot would be removed from the approved supplier list pending further evaluation of their production processes. This will prevent their use as a supplier for components (including Class A components) until their evaluation and re-approval at a later date."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/17/08 AT 1036 EDT FROM J. SUMARES TO R. ALEXANDER * * *
"On 10/13/08, QSA Global notified the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] of a second Part 21 defect for the Model 550 connector that created a source disconnect in WA [Washington], reference event notification #44552. The defect was discovered on a second component of the 550 connector, the inner sleeve. The circular recess for the ball of the male connector was undersized per specifications and prevented the ball to fully seat into the female connector and making it easier for the source wire to disconnect.
"QSA Global submitted a preliminary report for the inner sleeve stating:
"1. All inventory of connectors using this defective lot of sleeves were 100% re-tested and defective parts were removed from inventory.
"2. As of 10/15/08, affected customers are being notified of potential problems and will be advised to conduct inspections of male to female connections of the Model 550 connector to ensure a full engagement. Any suspect connections may be returned to QSA for evaluation and replacement.
"3. All remaining lots of components (sleeves, other components) from this supplier are quarantined for re-inspection or scrap.
"4. This supplier has been suspended from use.
"Further evaluation and investigations of the inner sleeves are on-going."
Notified FSME (Einberg & Jankovich), R1DO (Jackson), R2DO (Vias), R3DO (Phillips), & R4DO (Hay)
The following information was received from the State of Massachusetts via email:
"Prompted by a reported event, Event Number 44434, QSA Global conducted an investigation of a Model 660B camera. QSA Global concluded that the root cause of the event was a defective component on the pigtail of the camera, and has determined that more cameras contain these defective components which could contribute to future events. "
"This defect could give the user the false impression that the source is connected to the drive cable when there is only a partial connection. The operations manual does require that the user check the connection prior to use and when this is done, there is no problem. However if the user does not do a check of the connection, it may not be secure and may cause the source to disconnect in the guide tube.
"The defective component was reported to the State of Massachusetts under Massachusetts code 105 CMR 120.142(B)(2)(a). The defective component is a female source connector, QSA part number 55042-1. This defect was only found in lot 0731300805. QSA sold six Co-60 sources [Model 424-14] and 659 Ir-192 [Model 424-9] sources that utilized connectors from this lot. One Co-60 source will be returned to QSA for evaluation due to a source retrieval event.
"[QSA Global] Corrective Actions: Customers who had received the other five Co-60 source wires from the suspected lot were contacted and arrangements were made to make a field inspection of these sources by QSA Global staff for the potential defect. Any defective source wires would be recommended to the customer for return and replacement by QSA Global.
"Customers who had received one of the 659 Ir-192 source wires that contained the suspected lot were notified and advised of this potential condition. These customers were provided with [a] notification which re-enforces the need to ensure a solid connection between the drive cable and the source prior to making any source exposures. The customer notification letter includes inspections the customer should make to determine if their source may contain this defect and advises the customer to contact QSA Global if a source is suspected of being defective to arrange for source replacement.
"It was decided that the supplier of the defective lot would be removed from the approved supplier list pending further evaluation of their production processes. This will prevent their use as a supplier for components (including Class A components) until their evaluation and re-approval at a later date."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/17/08 AT 1036 EDT FROM J. SUMARES TO R. ALEXANDER * * *
"On 10/13/08, QSA Global notified the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] of a second Part 21 defect for the Model 550 connector that created a source disconnect in WA [Washington], reference event notification #44552. The defect was discovered on a second component of the 550 connector, the inner sleeve. The circular recess for the ball of the male connector was undersized per specifications and prevented the ball to fully seat into the female connector and making it easier for the source wire to disconnect.
"QSA Global submitted a preliminary report for the inner sleeve stating:
"1. All inventory of connectors using this defective lot of sleeves were 100% re-tested and defective parts were removed from inventory.
"2. As of 10/15/08, affected customers are being notified of potential problems and will be advised to conduct inspections of male to female connections of the Model 550 connector to ensure a full engagement. Any suspect connections may be returned to QSA for evaluation and replacement.
"3. All remaining lots of components (sleeves, other components) from this supplier are quarantined for re-inspection or scrap.
"4. This supplier has been suspended from use.
"Further evaluation and investigations of the inner sleeves are on-going."
Notified FSME (Einberg & Jankovich), R1DO (Jackson), R2DO (Vias), R3DO (Phillips), & R4DO (Hay)