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Event Notification Report for September 19, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/18/2008 - 09/19/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44487 44493 44497 44502 44503

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44487
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 09/15/2008
Notification Time: 12:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2008
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO POWER OUTAGES CAUSED BY HIGH WINDS

"At approximately 0800 on 09/15/2008, it was determined that 55 of 119 Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Emergency Offsite Sirens were inoperable. The apparent cause is loss of power to the sirens due to numerous power outages in the surrounding area. High winds from the remnants of Hurricane Ike passed through the surrounding area overnight. The weather has since returned to normal conditions. BVPS has validated that backup route alerting capability is in place for Columbiana County, Ohio and Hancock County, West Virginia. Beaver County, Pennsylvania is in process of verifying backup route alerting capability for the affected areas. This event is being reported as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The NRC resident inspector has been notified. Updates on the status of siren restoration will be provided to the NRC resident inspector on an ongoing basis. Periodic updates to the NRC Headquarters' Operations Center will also be provided."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY BARRY SOMMER TO DAN LIVERMORE ON 09/16/2008 AT 1713 * * *

"As of 1450 hours on 09/16/2008, 23 of the 119 Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Emergency Offsite Sirens remain inoperable. There may be some variability of the number of inoperable sirens due to ongoing storm restoration activities. Backup route alerting capability remains in effect for the areas served by the inoperable sirens,

"Updates on the status of siren restoration will be provided to the NRC resident inspector on an ongoing basis. Periodic updates to the NRC Headquarters' Operations Center will also be provided."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JAMES LUTZ TO JOHN KNOKE ON 09/18/2008 AT 1512 * * *

"Update to EN# 44487. As of 1330 hours on 09/18/2008, 8 of the 119 Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Emergency Offsite Sirens remain inoperable. The remaining 8 inoperable sirens no longer represent a major loss of emergency preparedness capabilities. Backup route alerting capability remains in effect for the areas served by the inoperable sirens and the licensee will continue to monitor restoration status.

"Updates on the status of siren restoration will be provided to the NRC resident inspector on an ongoing basis."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local officials. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44493
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 3
City: DECATUR State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01136-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRARA
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 09/16/2008
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)

Event Text

RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE FAILED TO RETURN TO SAFE POSITION

"On September 12, [the] RSO for Team Industrial Svcs. called to advise that an irregularity had occurred during a routine radiography shot [deleted]. A radiography crew had been working at the Archer Daniels Midland facility in Decatur Illinois to perform a panoramic shot within a 5 inch thick steel vessel. Following the shot, the 100 Ci Co-60 source failed to return to the safe position within the camera. The crew called their local RSO, [deleted) and requested assistance. During [the local RSO's] travel to the site, the crew secured the Fabrication Shop where the vessel was located. [The local RSO's] first actions at the site were to confirm the area was secured and the appropriate barriers were in place such that exposures to any other individuals remained below regulatory limits for members of the public. (Prior to the work beginning, the area had been evacuated and remained that way during the duration of the event). The shot was described as a 'panoramic, horizontal shot at ground level that did not require support equipment.' The lead radiographer's pocket dosimeter at the time of the notification showed a total of 50 milliR for that day's activities. Preliminary evaluation by the crew suggested the source had become disconnected in that the expected number of 'cranks' on the drive cable exceeded the number necessary to return the source to the camera from the 14 foot length guide tube with extension and there was no evident increase in radiation exposure rate as had been expected from the camera. The manufacturer of the equipment/source, QSA Global, was contacted immediately and had been asked to be on 'standby by' in the event their assistance for a source recovery is necessary. Team Industrial Services is authorized to perform source retrievals and has adequate procedures/equipment for that activity for when they choose to attempt a recovery on their own.

"Later, [the corporate RSO] reported that [the local RSO] confirmed the source disconnect at the scene by separating the guide tube from the camera and cranking the drive cable back to the camera. Additional lead and steel shielding was brought into the area via a remote overhead crane in the Fabrication Shop to allow for more direct observation. Dose rate at the camera location was measured as 200 milliR/h unshielded. With a leaded barrier, the dose rate was brought down to 100 milliR/h at the camera. The dose rate was further reduced by extending the crank assembly an additional 15 feet away from the camera. Based on technical instruction from QSA Global's expert, source recovery was attempted by modifying the connector on a drive cable that was then attached to the crank and threaded back through the camera. Team [Industrial Services] imposed a conservative 200 milliR total dose limit for the recovery operation and 500 milliR/h dose rate limit for area occupancy during [the local RSO's] attempts.

"After 2 hours of attempts to recover were unsuccessful, the maximum exposure received at that point was 60 milliR. Over twenty attempts took place however, positive connection with the source 'pigtail' could not be confirmed. A reevaluation of the arrangement suggested that the extension guide tube should be removed and the overall guide tube length be made more straight by remotely partially withdrawing the main guide tube from the vessel. Following those changes and a break, another attempt was made which was successful. The source was secured within the camera and no immediate damage to the source was evident from a field wipe test which showed background levels of radiation. The maximum recorded exposure to recovery personnel was approximately 140 milliR as measured by DRD. All associated equipment was returned to Team Industrial's permanent storage facility in Roxana, IL that same night by 23:00. Plans are to return the source with camera, drive cable and guide tubes to the manufacturer for further analysis as to a potential cause of the event. The radiography crew reported that prior to the days events, routine checks showed the equipment was in properly operating condition. They further insist that a 'misconnect' where the drive cable was not properly connected to the source did not occur in this case. The licensee has been advised that a 30 day report to the Agency is required. This item will remain open pending receipt of that report and the analysis of the manufacturer as to the state of the returned equipment."

Illinois Report Number: IL080051

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44497
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: STERIS INC
Region: 4
City: ONTARIO State: CA
County:
License #: 66663-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 09/16/2008
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2008
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)

Event Text

HIGH CONDUCTIVITY IN A POOL IRRADIATOR

"At 8:14 am on September 16, 2008, the radiation safety officer (RSO) called to report the pool water conductivity was above 100 microsiemens per centimeter on September 6, 2008. On September 4, 2008 the licensee noted some product (honey) had leaked out of the container into the pool. They thought this small amount of contaminate would be cleared out of the pool once it circulated through the water purifying tanks, however, the conductivity continued to increase until September 6, 2008 until it reached 120 microsiemens per centimeter. The licensee did not realize this was a reportable event per 10 CFR 36.83(a)(10) until he spoke to his corporate RSO last night (9-15-08) he then reported the incident to us [State of California] this morning. The licensee has been continuing to work to reduce the conductivity by adding new water purifying tanks. As of today, the water is still too cloudy to see the sources in the pool and the conductivity is at 57 microsiemens per centimeter and is continuing to reduce each day. Corrective actions to be taken include refresher training for the RSO to review the regulatory requirements for reportable events and instruction to customers regarding the correct packaging of their product so they do not have a similar incident in the future. The RSO will be providing the Department with a written report within 30 day as required and will continue to mitigate the conductivity and clarity of the pool water until it has reduced to normal levels. The licensee will notify us when the conductivity and clarity is at normal levels."

California Report Number - 091608

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44502
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MURPHY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/18/2008
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2008
Event Time: 14:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO MIAMI-DADE COUNTY DUE TO SPILL

"While moving a battery a forklift punctured a battery cell and sulfuric acid leaked onto the asphalt. The spill was less than 10 gallons and was on a non-permeable surface. The spill was contained, neutralized and cleaned up.

"Under the Specific Conditions of PTN's Industrial Waste Annual Operating Permit with Miami-Dade County all spills are reportable within 4 hours. The spill occurred about 1415 on 9/18/08. The notification to Miami-Dade County Department of Environmental Resource Management (DERM) at 1700 EDT on 9/18/08."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44503
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE BORGER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/18/2008
Notification Time: 21:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2008
Event Time: 18:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO MISSING INSULATION

"At 1848 on 09/18/2008, the control room was notified by system engineering that insulation was missing from the bottom of the HPCI turbine that could result in nearby electronic components being subjected to higher than design temperatures. This could challenge the ability of the HPCI system to perform its design function for the prescribed mission times. The condition does not prevent the high pressure coolant injection system from automatically starting and injecting during an accident. The longer term ability of the system to continue to inject is challenged by the existing condition.

"The HPCI system was immediately declared inoperable while engineering continues to evaluate the condition to determine if an actual loss of design function has occurred.

"This is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012