| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/16/2008 - 09/17/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 44483 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES WEAST
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/11/2008
Notification Time: 22:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2008
Event Time: 21:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
MICHELE EVANS (NRR)
ANTHONY McMURTRAY (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO WORK-RELATED FATALITY
"On Tuesday, September 9, 2008 a maintenance contractor suffered an apparent heart attack at approximately 0900. On site Medical Emergency Response personnel responded until ambulatory transport to Oconee Medical Center and then Greenville Memorial Hospital. On Thursday, September 11, 2008 at 1755 he passed away at Greenville Memorial Hospital.
"At 2135 on September 11, 2008, Oconee Environmental Health and Safety notified OSHA due to the death of an Oconee contractor. This notification is being made in accordance with Duke Energy Corporation administrative procedures due to notification of a federal agency.
"Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44487 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE | Notification Date: 09/15/2008
Notification Time: 12:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2008
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO POWER OUTAGES CAUSED BY HIGH WINDS
"At approximately 0800 on 09/15/2008, it was determined that 55 of 119 Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Emergency Offsite Sirens were inoperable. The apparent cause is loss of power to the sirens due to numerous power outages in the surrounding area. High winds from the remnants of Hurricane Ike passed through the surrounding area overnight. The weather has since returned to normal conditions. BVPS has validated that backup route alerting capability is in place for Columbiana County, Ohio and Hancock County, West Virginia. Beaver County, Pennsylvania is in process of verifying backup route alerting capability for the affected areas. This event is being reported as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified. Updates on the status of siren restoration will be provided to the NRC resident inspector on an ongoing basis. Periodic updates to the NRC Headquarters' Operations Center will also be provided."
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY BARRY SOMMER TO DAN LIVERMORE ON 09/16/2008 AT 1713 * * *
"As of 1450 hours on 09/16/2008, 23 of the 119 Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Emergency Offsite Sirens remain inoperable. There may be some variability of the number of inoperable sirens due to ongoing storm restoration activities. Backup route alerting capability remains in effect for the areas served by the inoperable sirens,
"Updates on the status of siren restoration will be provided to the NRC resident inspector on an ongoing basis. Periodic updates to the NRC Headquarters' Operations Center will also be provided."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44490 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 09/15/2008
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2008
Event Time: 02:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS DUE TO HIGH WINDS
"On September 15, 2008 with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Shutdown for refueling, a severe windstorm moved through Oswego County and resulted in local area power outages. Seven (7) of thirty-seven (37) emergency notifications sirens are out of service. Tracking for station reporting criteria of 'four or more sirens out of service for 12 hours or more' was initiated at 02:44 with seven sirens out of service at that time. Five of the original seven out of service sirens remain out and two additional sirens have subsequently lost power.
"Sirens affected provide coverage to Oswego County. The sirens are utility owned and shared with the Nine Mile Point site.
"In the event the sirens are needed, the County has it's Hype-Reach (911 call back system) on standby.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) requires reporting within 8 hours when a significant portion of the emergency communication system has been lost. The site emergency procedures defines loss of 4 or more sirens for 12 hours or 19 or more sirens for 1 hour as a significant loss of emergency communications. Since the restoration activities did not result in restoring the siren system to less than 4 sirens out of service by 14:44 this reporting criteria is met.
"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the resident inspector has been briefed and the state PSC will also be notified."
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GENE DORMAN TO JASON KOZAL ON 09/16/08 AT 1309 * * *
The licensee reported that emergency notification system was restored to less than 4 sirens out of service on 9/15/08 at 2022. The availability of the emergency notification system is less than the reporting criteria. Three sirens remain out of service.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GENE DORMAN TO DAN LIVERMORE ON 9/16/08 AT 1625 * * *
The licensee reported that at 1150 on 09/16/2008, all emergency sirens were returned to service and are now operable.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44491 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BURNS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 09/15/2008
Notification Time: 16:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS DUE TO HIGH WINDS
"On September 15, 2008 a severe windstorm moved through Oswego County and resulted in local area power outages. Seven (7) of thirty-seven (37) emergency notifications sirens are out of service. Tracking for station reporting criteria of 'four or more sirens out of service for 12 hours or more' was initiated at 02:44 with seven sirens out of service at that time. Five of the original seven out of service sirens remain out and two additional sirens have subsequently lost power.
"Sirens affected provide coverage to Oswego County. The sirens are utility owned and shared with the James A. FitzPatrick site.
"In the event the sirens are needed, the County has it's Hype-Reach (911 call back system) on standby.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) requires reporting within 8 hours when a significant portion of the emergency communication system has been lost. The site emergency procedures defines loss of 4 or more sirens for 12 hours or 19 or more sirens for 1 hour as a significant loss of emergency communications. Since the restoration activities did not result in restoring the siren system to less than 4 sirens out of service by 14:44 this reporting criteria is met.
"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the resident inspector has been briefed.
"There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event."
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY SCOTT BURNS TO JASON KOZAL ON 9/16/08 AT 1226 * * *
The licensee reported that 5 sirens were returned to service. There is no completion time for return to service of the remaining 3 sirens.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY SCOTT BURNS TO DAN LIVERMORE ON 9/16/08 AT 1620 * * *
The licensee reported that at 1150 on 09/16/2008, all emergency sirens were returned to service and are now operable.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44492 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 09/16/2008
Notification Time: 13:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2008
Event Time: 07:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING CAPABILITY
"On September 16, 2008 at 0734 the James A, FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant was shutdown and operating in the refueling mode (Mode 5), when shutdown cooling was lost. Shutdown cooling was lost while hanging a tagout on the Reactor Protection System (RPS). When removing fuses as directed by the tagout, isolation logic for Shutdown Cooling suction salve 10MOV-18 was actuated. This Suction Valve isolates the common shutdown cooling suction line to all Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pumps. At the time of the isolation cavity flood-up was in progress and the time to boil was greater than 5.5 hours. The appropriate Technical Specification LCO Actions were entered and shutdown cooling was restored at 08:27.
"Power was restored to RPS and work in that system has been suspended pending the results our investigation into the cause of the event. Also additional controls have been established to review any electrical jumper/ protective tagging interactions prior to installation.
"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and a Licensee Event Report (LER) will be filed within 60 Days as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).
"The resident inspector has been briefed and the state Public Service Commission (PSC) will also be notified." |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44494 | Rep Org: NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC AD
Licensee: NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC AD
Region: 4
City: BOULDER State: CO
County:
License #: 0511997-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RHONDA CARPENTER
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE | Notification Date: 09/16/2008
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 08/28/2008
Event Time: 16:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
ILTAB ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text THREE UNACCOUNTED FOR NICKEL-63 SOURCES
"Two Hewlett Packard (HP) gas chromatographs with three HP Nickel-63 detectors at a source strength of 15 millicuries each were determined to be missing from their stored warehouse (Building #4) at NOAA ESRL laboratory in Boulder, CO by [the licensee] on 29 March 2007. A search was begun with the belief that the sources had been moved or used by someone in the NOAA facility because Building #4 was used as a temporary post office for about one year and [NOAA] boxes may have been moved to other locations on the site. The serial numbers of the missing sources were L1231 and L1941 in an HP model 5890 II GC with serial number 2518A05469, and M2087 in another HP model 5890 II GC with serial number 2518A05471. [NOAA] use[s] the ECDs in a worldwide network to measure atmospheric substances (freons) that destroy stratospheric ozone. The network includes stations at Pt. Barrow, Alaska; Niwot Ridge, Colorado; Mauna Loa, Hawaii; American Samoa, and South Pole, Antarctica. Source serial #s L1231 and L1941 were last wipe tested on 24 July 2001. The GC containing those sources was then retired from service at Niwot Ridge and placed in storage on 20 August 2001. Source serial# M2087 was last wipe tested on 7 February 2000. The GC containing those sources was retired from service from American Samoa and placed in storage. On 9 August 2002, all sources were moved to Building #4 for long term storage. They were not wipe tested further since they were inactive.
"Building #4 is locked 24 hours, seven days a week, and occasionally left opened during working hours without security monitors or staff members in the storage area. The Boulder DoC campus is guarded with access control, but not fenced in. The following activities were investigated to locate the three missing stored sources:
"(1). The Department of Commerce Laboratories in Boulder stores all excess property in Building #4 to make it ready for transport to the Denver Federal Center for posting of availability of excess property to all government agencies. If the excess property was not transferred to another government agency over a year period, then it will be sold to general public. The thought was that the shipper had taken the instruments with their sources by accident to the Denver Federal Center. We contacted the shipper and the Denver Federal Center, and both reported that they were never picked up prior to 2007. The procedure also requires that each piece of excessed property be sealed with plastic on a pallet with paper work attached, so this possibility was ruled out in 2007.
"(2). [The licensee] contacted all current employees in the group to make sure that the sources were not loaned out. Nothing was discovered.
"(3). [The licensee] contacted all past employees in the group to make sure that they had not borrowed the sources without our knowledge. Nothing was discovered.
(4). [The licensee] contacted HP, now Agilent Technologies, to see if anyone reported the instruments with the sealed sources as being serviced. Nothing was discovered.
"(5). [An employee] of ESRL/GMD contacted all observatory staff and inspected all spares parts at our observatories (except American Samoa) over the past year to see if they were there. This required a year for someone from our group to visit each site, including South Pole since it is only opened three months each year. Nothing was discovered.
"(6). [The licensee] contacted LabX, a web site where used laboratory equipment is sold, to see if the instruments with the missing sources were sold on LabX. Nothing was discovered.
"(7). Many members of the NOAA/ESRL/GMD searched the complete DoC site and all rental storage facilities in Boulder were completed on 15 August 2008. Nothing was discovered.
"[The licensee] concluded that these three sources were lost on 28 August 2008 after investigating all of the leads above. The probable outcome is that the sources and their instruments were moved out of NOAA property in Boulder. They are either misplaced or stolen. [The licensee] only contacted one used instrument web site, LabX, a[n] eBay type service, ---they only providing a listing service. In the used instrument market, these instruments are being sold for as high as $12K each. They are the most expensive items that [the NOAA] group currently stores. They are sealed low level beta sources. There is little or no risk to any individuals that worked with them and they do not create a problem for the public at large."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 44495 | Rep Org: WALMART STORES
Licensee: WALMART STORES
Region: 4
City: BENTONVILLE State: AR
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICH DAILEY
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 09/16/2008
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
ILTAB E-MAIL ()
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The licensee reported two tritium exit signs missing from stores in Crawfordsville, IN (SN 368230, manufacturer -Isolite, Activity - approximately 10 Ci) and South Hill, VA (SN 320031, manufacturer - unknown, activity - unknown). The missing signs were identified during a remove and replacement effort of the tritium exit signs company wide. Both signs were accounted for in an inventory of the signs in the spring of 2008. An investigation was performed by company personnel to determine the disposition of the signs. Upon completion of the investigation it was determined that the signs could not be located and their final disposition was unknown.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44496 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RAY BUZARD
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE | Notification Date: 09/16/2008
Notification Time: 19:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2008
Event Time: 14:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING TROUBLESHOOTING OF CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM MOTOR GENERATORS
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On September 16, 2008 at approximately 1400 hours Mountain Standard Time (MST) Palo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 3 experienced a manual reactor trip. At the time of the trip trouble shooting efforts were in progress to investigate abnormalities with the control element drive mechanism (CEDM) motor generators (MG). The MGs (2 - 100% each) normally operate in parallel to supply the necessary power to grip, move and hold the control element assemblies (CEA). During the trouble shooting activities the 'B' MG was removed from service. The 'A' MG initially provided power to the CEDMs but did not maintain the power.
"As a result of the pre-job briefing contingency actions, a manual reactor trip was ordered.
"All CEAs fully inserted into the core. No other emergency actuation signals were initiated and none were required. Off site power provided power to the class buses during and after the event. Decay heat removal is being provided by the steam bypass control system to the main condenser. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event.
"The unit is in Mode 3, Hot Standby, at normal temperature and pressure.
"The cause of the MG abnormality is under investigation."
Normal feedwater remained in service providing water to the steam generators.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |