United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2008 > September 11

Event Notification Report for September 11, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/10/2008 - 09/11/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44339 44354 44469 44472 44480

To top of page
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 44339
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 07/07/2008
Notification Time: 16:54 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2008
Event Time: 14:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FAILURE OF THE ALERT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM

Alert Notification sirens (60 of 67) failed to operate properly and therefore required licensee to report this per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). All Emergency Planning Zone counties have been notified and placed on backup route alerting, which means notification will be performed by local authorities. Investigation of this matter is ongoing.

Licensee has notified NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL RICHARDSON TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1435 EDT ON 07/08/08 * * *

A bad radio in the test shop created interference with the Alert Notification sirens, thus preventing them from operating properly. At 1425 EDT all Emergency Planning Zone counties were notified and the backup route alerting was cancelled. The sirens were tested satisfactorily multiple times.

Licensee has notified NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Guthrie)

* * *RETRACTION PROVIDED AT 1744 EDT ON 09/10/08 FROM ROGER DEHART TO JEFF ROTTON * * *

Telecom investigation revealed that all 67 ANS sirens were in fact available and ANS siren failure did not occur. The polling feature of the ANS sirens feedback signal experienced radio interference from a standby radio. This interference in the feedback system of the radio/siren system did not interfere with the activation of the sirens. The ANS sirens were fully functional and available during this time, therefore notification 44339 is being retracted.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Payne)

To top of page
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 44354
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN FRUTH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/17/2008
Notification Time: 19:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2008
Event Time: 11:41 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

DEGRADED CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION ENVELOPE

"At 1141 on Thursday, July 17, 2008, Braidwood Station determined that the Control Room Envelope (CRE) boundary had a degraded condition based on data obtained during performance of differential pressure testing performed in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.18, 'Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.' Degradation of the CRE boundary was identified that could have prevented the Control Room (VC) Ventilation Filtration System from performing its safety function due to the potential for a greater amount of unfiltered inleakage into the CRE than assumed in the licensing basis analysis for Design Basis Accident consequences. The differential pressure test results identified slightly negative pressures as compared to outside air in some areas of the CRE that do not include spaces that control room occupants inhabit during accident conditions.

"In accordance with the requirements of TS 3.7.10, 'VC Filtration System,' Condition B, mitigating actions have been implemented to lessen the effect on CRE occupants from the potential hazards of a radiological or chemical event or a challenge from smoke. Actions are in progress to resolve the CRE degraded condition.

"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an 8-hour report as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. A Licensee Event Report will be submitted under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).

"The licensee informed the NRC resident."

* * * UPDATE AT 1300 EDT ON 09/10/08 FROM RYAN FRUTH TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"On July 17, 2008, NRC Notification 44354 was conservatively made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) related to the failure of a control room envelope (CRE) differential pressure test. This was the first time this test methodology had been used at Braidwood Station. Specifically, based on the test results, the unfiltered CRE inleakage could not be confirmed as being bounded by the values assumed within the accident dose analyses and hence the Control Room Ventilation (VC) Filtration System could have been prevented from performing its specified safety function. Subsequent evaluation has determined that the VC Filtration System was capable of performing its specified safety function to maintain CRE habitability, since the identified condition would not have resulted in a greater amount of unfiltered inleakage into the CRE than assumed in the licensing bases analyses. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted.

"The causes for the test failure were attributable to an incorrect test methodology and minor CRE boundary imperfections that had existed since plant construction. These CRE minor imperfections were present during performance of the last CRE unfiltered air inleakage test performed in 2004, which produced acceptable results. Both of these causes were corrected and the test reperformed with acceptable results.

"Evaluation of this event notification is documented in the corrective action program.

"The NRC resident has been notified of this retraction."

Notified R3DO (Passehl).

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 44469
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: NONDESTRUCTIVE AND VISUAL INPECTION
Region: 4
City: HOUMA State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5601 L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 09/05/2008
Notification Time: 20:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - OVEREXPOSURE FROM STUCK RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE

The following information was provided by the State of Oklahoma via e-mail:

"On Tuesday, September 2, radiographers were doing pipeline weld testing near Ardmore, Oklahoma. They were operating in a three man team, the radiographer (who held a current Texas card) would move ahead of the group dropping off film at each weld. Assistant #1 moved behind him putting the film in place on each weld. Assistant #2 followed with the radiography camera balanced behind him on the seat of a 4-wheeled All Terrain Vehicle (ATV) and would position the camera and take the shots at each weld. The camera and guide tube where not disassembled between shots.

"At approximately 10 AM Tuesday, the camera fell off the ATV while being transported, and the guide tube bent where it attaches to the camera. One of the assistants was able to straighten the guide tube, and they were able to crank the source in and out, though with increased resistance. They continued working with this guide tube, though they report they had another guide tube available at the site.

"At approximately Noon Tuesday, assistant #2 decided the terrain near the next weld was too rugged to drive the ATV over, so he dismounted and disassembled the radiography setup to carry it to the weld. When he unscrewed the guide tube, he saw the cable inside, and realized the source was not secured inside the camera. The crew was able to retract the source into the camera. Assistant #2's pocket dosimeter was reading off scale. When his alarming rate meter was tested, it did not work.

The utilization log for the morning states that the alarming rate meter did work when checked out in the morning. State investigators could not get the alarming rate meter to work, and they believe the batteries are dead, though they did not test to confirm that. Assistant #2 had a survey meter, but was not checking it at the time of the incident. Note that state investigators found that the crew had two calibrated survey meters, but one of them was damaged and not operational. The crew states that the meter was working at the time of the incident, but had been damaged on Friday morning as the other two crew members continued to work.

"Assistant #2 ceased work, and his badge was sent for emergency processing. The badge provider reports a whole body dose of 16 rem. A representative of the company contacted the state of Oklahoma shortly after receiving the report. The company did not contact Oklahoma before receiving the report. The company states that Louisiana has been informed of the incident.

"Assistant #2 states that he rode the ATV with the camera on the seat of the ATV behind him. Distance from the camera to his body was about one foot, and it is believed that this is similar to the distance from the source to his body. He estimates that he spent 2-3 minutes riding this way between the prior shot and the time he noticed that the source was not properly retracted. The crew states that film from prior shots has been developed and shows no anomalies or signs of overexposure. The crew states that Assistant #2 was the only person who worked with the camera from the time the tube was damaged till the incident was discovered. Assistant #2 states he does not remember whether his badge was on his front pocket or back pocket. If it was worn on his front pocket, the dose reported for him is probably lower than his actual dose.

"A representative of the company is coming from Louisiana to Oklahoma to return Assistant #2 to Louisiana. Oklahoma will encourage the company to have him examined by a physician with a strong radiation background, seeking the advice of the state of Louisiana on a suitable physician.

"The above is a preliminary report based on telephonic communication with DEQ inspectors in the field, and is basically all that is known at this time. It has not been reviewed by the inspectors. DEQ will investigate, do enforcement, and keep NRC and Louisiana informed of the progress of our investigation."

The State noted that Nondestructive and Visual Inspection dba NVI has a Louisiana License (LA-5601 L01) out of Houma, Louisiana and had been operating in Oklahoma under reciprocity. The company home office has been heavily affected by Hurricane Gustav and company staff stated that they had just returned to their office for the first time on 9/5/08.

* * * UPDATE FROM LOUISIANA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (RICHARD PENROD) TO PETE SNYDER ON 9/8/08 AT 1050 EDT * * *

The State of Louisiana provided the following information via facsimile:

This event has been identified State of Louisiana Event Report ID No. LA0800018.

* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE BRODERICK TO PETE SNYDER ON 9/8/08 AT 1040 AND 1144 EDT * * *

The following is a summary of information provided by the State of Oklahoma via e-mail:

The source strength and isotope of the source referred to in the original report was 111 curies of Ir-192. The State of Louisiana requested blood work be done on the exposed individual. The company RSO had been unable to find a physician to do the work in Louisiana because of the recent tropical storm but did solicit help from REAC T/S where blood samples were sent for evaluation on 9/8/08.

Notified R4DO (Walker) and FSME (Flannery).

* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE BRODERICK TO PETE SNYDER ON 9/10/08 AT 1036 AND 1226 EDT * * *

"The last sentence of the [9/8/08 update] (about blood samples being sent to REACT/S on 9/8) is incorrect. No blood samples have been sent to REACT/S.

"There are actually two different sets of blood samples, one (several samples) to be processed locally, and one (a single sample) to be processed by REACT/S. REACT/S has sent the special container needed to the licensee in Louisiana, and the blood sample will be drawn on Monday and shipped overnight to Oak Ridge for processing."

"[On 9/9/08] the affected individual saw an occupational physician and the blood samples were drawn. The licensee [will] provide these results to DEQ and REACT/S as soon as they are available. The physician inspected the individual for signs of acute radiation exposure and found none.

"The licensee RSO reports that he spoke to the exposed individual by phone." The individual did not report any symptoms.

Notified R4DO (Walker) and FSME (Flannery).

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 44472
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: FUGRO CONSULTANTS INC.
Region: 4
City: WACO State: TX
County:
License #: L03875
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/08/2008
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2008
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
CYNTHIA FLANNERY (FSME)
ILTAB (E-MAIL) ()
MEXICO (FAX) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The licensee discovered that a Troxler moisture/density gauge was stolen sometime between 1600 CDT on 09/07/08 and 0730 CDT on 09/08/08. This was a Troxler Model 3430, S/N 29518 with two sources of 10mCi, Cs-137 and 40mCi, AmBe-241 stolen from a FUGRO consultants Inc. employee from a private residence in Waco, TX. This was reported to the Cities of Waco and Woodway Police Departments and filed under case # 08-21954 for the former.

Please refer to TX incident # I-8551.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 44480
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN BOWLES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/10/2008
Notification Time: 19:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2008
Event Time: 17:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 93 Power Operation 93 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER HVAC EMERGENCY BACKUP POWER SOURCE OUT OF SERVICE

"A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center has been lost due to the failure of the TSC HVAC emergency backup power source. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with a high priority.

"The NRC resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012