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Due to a lapse in appropriations, the NRC has ceased normal operations. However, excepted and exempted activities necessary to maintain critical health and safety functions—as well as essential progress on designated critical activities, including those specified in Executive Order 14300—will continue, consistent with the OMB-Approved NRC Lapse Plan.

Event Notification Report for May 28, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/27/2008 - 05/28/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44228 44233 44235

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 44228
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT LINDQUIST
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER 		Notification Date: 05/21/2008
Notification Time: 02:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2008
Event Time: 19:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
 Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

DECAY HEAT REMOVAL COOLING INTERUPTED DURING CORE RELOAD

"At 1956, during reactor core reload with a full refueling cavity, power was lost to the #2 non-vital instrument bus. This power loss resulted in closure of the shutdown cooling temperature control valve, HCV-341. The closure of HCV-341 interrupted the cooling capability of the in service shutdown cooling loop.

"While cycling a condenser motor operated valve a 480 volt ground occurred which resulted in tripping the feeder breaker to motor control center MCC-4B2. MCC-4B2 was supplying power to Instrument Bus 2 via the Inverter 2 test transformer. The test transformer was powering Instrument Bus 2 due to Inverter 2 replacement per plant modification. The loss of the #2 Instrument Bus resulted in HCV-341, the shutdown cooling heat exchangers temperature control valve, failing closed. HCV-341 was manually opened to restore cooling at 2019. At 2049 power was restored to Instrument Bus 2 and the shutdown cooling system was returned to automatic operation. Flow through the core was maintained throughout the event, as the shutdown cooling heat exchanger bypass valve responded by opening to maintain flow. At the time shutdown cooling was lost, 44 of 133 assemblies had been loaded into the vessel and shutdown cooling temperature was approximately 88 degrees F. Time to boil was conservatively calculated to be 22.5 hours per plant procedures which assume decay heat from all 133 assemblies. Shutdown cooling temperature rose approximately one degree during this event.

"Technical Specification 2.8.1(3)(1) was entered due to no Shutdown Cooling loop in Operation. No reactor coolant boron reductions were in progress. Irradiated fuel assembly loading into the reactor core was secured and actions to restore a Shutdown Cooling loop were being initiated. [Ft. Calhoun] entered] a 4 hour LCO to close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment to the outside atmosphere."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM ERICK MATZKE TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1416 EDT ON 05/27/08 * * *

"Following a detailed review of the event of May 20, 2008, Fort Calhoun station determined that the safety function of removing residual heat from the reactor coolant system was available throughout the entire event. The system is largely manual and the manual functions were not affected by the event. At the time of the loss of power the core was being reloaded. The heat load was very small and the temperature control valve (HCV-341) was closed to allow the system to increase in temperature. When control power to HCV-341 was lost the valve did not change position.

"Since the ability of the shutdown cooling system to remove residual heat was not impacted by the loss of power and plant procedures have provisions to control the system locally, the safety function of removing decay heat was not lost. Therefore this notification is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (William Jones)

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44233
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: UNIV MASS LOWELL
Region: 1
City: LOWELL State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0049
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE 		Notification Date: 05/22/2008
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
 Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1)
RON ZELAC (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING CHECK SOURCE

The State provided the following information via email:

"Licensee identified a leaking sealed radioactive source. Once identified, the source was taken out of service and placed in the licensee's waste stream and a contamination survey of the area was made. No measurable contamination was identified from this survey. Contamination wipes consisted of area wipes (filter paper) measured in a liquid scintillation counter.

"The Cs-137 source was used to test the response and functionality of hand-held radiation detectors. The leaking source, S/N 189-26-5, is a Cs-137 check source with an activity of 100 uCi on 3-1-87 and was manufactured by Isotope Products. The licensee stated the source may not meet the regulatory criteria for a sealed source since the front of the source is electroplated to allow for the detection of Cs-137 betas. As a precaution, the licensee reported it as a leaking source."

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 44235
Rep Org: DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Licensee: DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Region: 1
City: WARNER ROBINS State: GA
County:
License #: 37-30062-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID COLLINS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON 		Notification Date: 05/22/2008
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/11/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
 Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)
ILTAB (via email) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST LASER RECEIVER/TRANSMITTERS CONTAINING AM-241

"Two Laser receiver/transmitters were picked from stock for delivery to the Robins AFB Maintenance program. The two items were picked up from location and manifested for local delivery on 21 February 2008. The items were reported missing on customer complaint by the Avionics Repair shop on 11 March 2008. The item was originally marked as missing in the Automated Tracking System on 27 March 2008. Recent extensive searches have not discovered the missing items.

"Based on preliminary investigation, the items were manifested for delivery, but the local delivery truck did not show on the day it was ordered. The material remained in the Radioactive Material Shipping area for a couple of days. A hand-receipt transfer document was located but it did not have the driver's signature of receipt. Additionally, the transition of new personnel delayed the reporting of the loss to the DDC Radiation Safety Office.

"DDC Radiation Safety Office will work closely with the local Radiation Protection Officer to provide training to emphasis the requirements for timely reporting of incidents involving radioactive material."

INCIDENT NO: DDWG-2008-01

Item NSN: 1270-01-365-9471 containing two 8 microCuries Am-241 sources [16 microCuries total].

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY NRC R4 (BROWDER) TO J. KOZAL AT 1108 ON 5/27/08 * * *

Upon investigation of this event it was determined that the licensee is Defense Logistic Agency and not the US Air force. The header of the report has been changed accordingly.

Notified the R1DO (Rogge) and FSME EO (Bubar)



THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021